




UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN 
Department of Administration and Organization Theory 
 
AORG351 
Master’s Thesis in Public Administration 
 
SPRING 2019 
INSTITUTIONALISING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
REFORMS IN THE GHANAIAN PUBLIC SERVICE: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE VERSUS LEADERSHIP? 
 
BY 
Jac Hage Gyimah  
   THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION THEORY, UNIVERSITY OF 
BERGEN, NORWAY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 




The dispensation of the New Public Management (NPM) over the last two decades has 
provided a surest way of restructuring the administrative systems of Ghana’s Public 
Service through reforms. Ghana after adopting its maiden NPM reform in 1987, have 
remained focused on its bureaucratic reformative agenda. Since 1987, Ghana has 
witnessed several NPM reforms with some internationally adopted and others internally 
initiated. It is worth noting that, the NPM reform trajectories project performance 
management system and reform as an integral component of all these reform initiatives. 
The most recent Performance Management (PM) reform in the Ghanaian Public 
Service, is the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP). 
And in this connection, the study examines the whole operationalisation of PM reforms, 
specifically the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. In a narrow sense, it mainly 
explores and explains the impact and influence of leadership and administrative culture 
as contextual factors on the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in 
Ghana’s Public Service.  By using, the instrumental and institutional/cultural 
perspectives as well as the interplay of these perspectives (transformative approach), 
the study focuses on explaining failed and successful institutionalisation of the NPMP 
and ascertaining whether leadership, administrative culture or both matters in the 
institutionalisation process in the selected public organisations, that is the Office of the 
Head of Civil Service (OHCS), Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana (NMC), and 
the Youth Employment Agency (YEA). With regards to the research design and 
methodology, the study draws on qualitative data sourced from in-depth interviews (28 
informants), documentation reviews and observations. 
At the end of the study, the state of performance management was unravelled with 
NPMP identified as the current working PM reform in the public service. And OHCS 
and NMC were seen to have had quite a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP due to leadership efforts and cultural compatibility. 
The YEA on the other hand was seen to have had a false start to the implementation to 
the NPMP, and hence a policy deviation due to poor leadership style and commitment 
as well as cultural incompatibility. Also, the study concluded by arguing that both 
leadership and administrative culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP and 
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The capacity of the modern state is largely contingent on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of her bureaucracy. Most developing states especially in Africa are failing 
by sheer virtue of the fact that their public service as an essential state machinery is 
failing to perform up to acceptable standards. The public sector in Africa especially in 
Ghana “has historically performed poorly and is generally perceived as an obstacle to 
development” (Stein, 1994 as cited in Owusu, 2006:2).  
In this connection, performance management in the Ghana Public Service over the years 
has been one of the main concerns of the government of Ghana. Ghana in an attempt to 
revolutionise the public service to make it an efficient and effective instrument in 
carrying out its expected mandate since 1987 has introduced several NPM led 
performance reforms as an intervention mechanism to make the public service work. 
The Kufuor1 led administration in May, 2005 created a ministry (Ministry of Public 
Sector Reforms) which was charged with the responsibility of implementing public 
sector reforms in Ghana (Owusu, 2006). This alludes to the fact that there has been an 
unending surge in Ghana for ways of creating a robust and sustainable public-sector 
reform strategy (World Bank, 2005 as cited by Owusu, 2006). 
However, the outcomes and effects of these reforms have not been satisfactory vis-à-
vis their reform objectives. Since the introduction of these reforms, the public service 
has continually been marred with low level of productivity, poor performance 
management and hence, failed reforms. So, the questions that scholars and practitioners 
over the years have attempted to address are: i. why the public sector has failed to 
perform despite all these reforms? iii. Are these reforms too ambitious given the 
existing public service or whether reforms depend on the compatibility between reform 
objectives and the contextual environment?  
                                               
1 John Agyekum Kufuor is a Ghanaian politician who served as president of Ghana from 2001 to 2009. 
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
There is an increasing need for administrative re-engineering especially when 
administrative change is inadequate to keep an administrative system abreast of 
developments and in consequence, creating performance gaps, that is, when there is a 
significant disparity between what is being done and what ought to be done (Downs, 
1967: 191). Scholars like Caiden (1968) are of the view that, administrative reform is 
the most effective panacea to the malfunctioning of the natural processes of 
administrative change. This is because reform initiatives aim at removing obstacles to 
change, or of improving on the results of change (Adei & Boachie-Danquah, 2003: 7).  
There is an undeniable fact that, reforms in the Ghana Public Service have received a 
mixed record of successes and failures. One notable success of these reforms since its 
inception is the absolute downsizing of the entire public service. However, it is worth 
noting that most public service reforms have left a demoralised and unmotivated 
personnel largely incapable of performing basic functions (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002 
as cited by Owusu, 2006). Nana Kwasi Agyekum Dwamena, the head of the Ghana 
Civil Service emphasised in his presentation on “The Challenges and Opportunities of 
Civil Service Reform in Ghana” that, in spite of all reform initiatives in the service, the 
service is still beset with performance lapses and low morale among civil/public 
servants. He argued that, this ethos is partly as a result of the inability of reform 
initiatives to address system-wide problems in the civil service and the public service 
at large due to institutionalisation challenges such as contextual incompatibilities. 
The mixed record of reform efforts in Ghana and in Africa at large suggests that 
performance in public organisations is a difficult and a multi-faceted task and thus, must 
encompass a wide array of strategies to change the rules of the game fundamentally 
(Owusu, 2006). Long term, high level commitment and extensive support by public 
servants, national leaders and the international community must be the main 
preconditions for this change (Stevens and Teggemann, 2004 cited by Owusu, 2006).  
A number of studies have tried to offer explanations to the underlying causes of public 
sector reform failures and hence low productivity in Africa including Ghana. Several 
of these studies argue that most reforms are failing to enhance public servants’ 
performance because of the absolute marginalisation and neglect of organisational 
contextual variables like organisational leadership, cultural norms as well as 
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institutional and structural environments in the reform formulation and implementation 
process.  
1.2 Rationale of the Study 
Performance management and New Public Management (NPM) reforms have had an 
ever-increasing influence in contemporary public management especially during the 
age of performance in the 2000s and has become the centrepiece of most recent public-
sector reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). 
The main essence of performance management which constitute the key precept of 
NPM reforms is to reinforce accountability and enhance performance in the public 
services (Bouckaert and Peters 2002; Radnor and McGuire 2004; Ohemeng 2011; 
Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). However, Ghana over the years after the 
introduction of NPM inspired performance management reforms is still struggling to 
satisfy these basic objectives of performance management. The Ghanaian Public 
Service has witnessed several reforms since its inception in 1987 and the after-effects 
of these reforms have been unsatisfactory. Performance gaps still linger on the 
administrative contexts of the public service and thus sparking several debates among 
scholars on the essence and impact of NPM inspired reforms in Ghana. 
This in effect serves as the point of departure for the research study. The main rationale 
for the study is to contribute to the understanding of the interplay and impact of NPM 
inspired performance management reforms and contextual factors in the Ghana Public 
Service. In spite of all the studies and discussions on the relation between NPM reforms, 
performance management and context, György (2004) still describes the subject as “a 
largely unexplored field”. In this connection, it is of no doubt that the study contributes 
on the corpus of literatures on the subject as advised by King et al. (1994) on his 
discussion on the selection of a research topic. The study is of great theoretical 
relevance because it seeks to inquire and explain why there are performance gaps and 
hence, failed institutionalisation of NPM inspired performance management reforms. It 
explores the relationship between administrative reforms as a tool in the hands of 
government to bring changes in public service performance and administrative culture 
and leadership as contextual factors that harness the implementation and 
institutionalisation of these reforms. Most scholars like Ohemeng (2011) argue that the 
assimilation of reforms depend on context variables thus, reforms must be in direct 
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accord with context variables. The more the compatibility, the higher is the success 
rate. However, studies on the Ghana public sector reforms have been dominated by total 
focus on reforms and efficiency while institutional conditions and environment have 
received less attention, hence, marginalised. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The study seeks to offer explanations to the research problem by addressing the 
following questions: 
i.  What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana’s Public 
Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public 
institutions?  
ii. What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is 
it leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, 
leadership and culture? 
 
The first research question attempts to offer insights into the NPM inspired performance 
management reform initiatives in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy since the inception of 
NPM movement in 1987. It tries to explore the Ghanaian NPM inspired reform 
trajectory from its early dispensation to its present state. This unravels the instrumental 
nature of organisations with reforms as tools in the hands of government and leaders to 
bring changes in public servants’ performance. The second part of the research question 
then seeks to examine and explore how performance management systems and reforms 
have been institutionalised with respect to the most recent reform in Ghana’s Public 
Service. Here, institutionalisation is analysed by looking at how the PMS reform 
(NPMP) principles have been habituated by the various bureaucracies over time. 
The second research question also attempts to explore and examine the contextual 
features of the Ghanaian bureaucracy like administrative culture and leadership and 
furthermore, examine the compatibility and relationship between these contextual 
features and reforms. Performance Management Reforms are inspired by NPM and are 
based on neutral, fair, and performance-oriented evaluations.  To what extent have the 
reforms been contextualized in the Ghanaian context? It is assumed that the more the 
compatibility of the organisational context, the higher the success of reform initiatives.  
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1.4 Study Area 
The study focuses on Ghana’s bureaucracy, that is, the Public Services of Ghana. 
According to the Section 7 of the Public Service Commission Act: 1994, the Public 
Services of Ghana encompass all public services established by the Constitution and 
parliament as prescribed by law which include the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, 
the Audit Service etc. The Public Service Commission is in charge of the public service 
in Ghana and thus provides a supervisory oversight over all public service institutions. 
In light of this, the study focuses on three public institutions namely the Office of the 
Head of Civil Service, Youth Employment Agency and the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council of Ghana that operate under the supervision of the Public Service 
Commission.2 The rationale behind this choice is to examine the disparities of the 
nature and operationalisation of the performance management reform policy across 
these public organisations. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
It is the explicit goal of NPM inspired reforms to enhance productivity in public 
servants; however, there seems to be some contextual resistibility at the implementation 
level and hence, leading to failed reforms. These contextual factors that militate against 
administrative reforms cut across factors like regime type, leadership, ideology, 
administrative culture, record of economic development, resource availability, and 
independence of action (Ohemeng 2006). This study however narrows its scope to the 
impact and influence of leadership and administrative culture as contextual factors on 
the implementation and institutionalisation of performance management reform 
policies in Ghana’s Public Service. Reform institutionalisation analysis will also be 
narrowed down to the current PM reform in the Ghanaian Public Service. 
In terms of research participation, the Public Service Commission was the first point of 
contact for the study. The office provided several insights into the state of performance 
management reforms in the service. The study was then narrowed down to the street-
                                               
2 Further discussions on the selected cases and the reasons behind my choice will be provided in 
chapter three. 
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level bureaucracies to measure the extent to which performance management has been 
entrenched in Ghana’s Public Service.  
1.6 Background to Public Sector Reforms in Ghana 
Prior to the dispensation of public service administrative reforms in Ghana, the public 
service according to Nti (1978 as cited in Ayee, 2001: 2) was widely regarded as the 
“finest, most relevant and performance-oriented institution in Africa and also as “a 
moribund, paper pushing institution” across different periods. This assertion succinctly 
portrays the astounding and dire state of the public service during the pre-reforms era. 
The period of astounding performance and productivity where the public service of 
Ghana was widely regarded as the most constructive machinery of government spanned 
from the “period immediately before independence in 1957 to the mid-1970s” and was 
characterised by “well-trained” and competent civil servants who were satisfactorily 
“remunerated and resourced”, “manageable” service size, and upheld the golden 
principle of political neutrality and anonymity (Ibid:2).  
On the other hand, the period of administrative doom of the Ghanaian Public Service 
spanned from 1974 to early 1980s where Ghana was on an economic stagnation and 
decline (Ibid). The public/civil service during this period was largely characterised by 
several debilitating features like poor manpower planning, low staff morale with 
motivation-incentives problems, defective managerial competence, etc. which 
continually drag the service into its dire straits. (Ayee, 2001:4).  
 
These among other reasons led to the takeover of power by Rawlings’s PNDC3 through 
a coup d’état in December 1981. Ghana’s economical might and environment was not 
conducive enough to pursue the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP) and the Structural Adjustment Program that served as the only panaceas for our 
woes (Ibid). In conclusion, the Ghana Public Service after witnessing its maiden reform 
in 1987 has still remain on course with her public service restructuring exercise in order 
                                               
3 The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was the name of the Jerry Rawlings led 
Ghanaian government after he overthrown the People's National Party's elected government through a 
coup d’état on 31 December 1981 
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to make the service the main point of reference in Africa. The most notable ones 
include; 
i.  The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP); 
ii. Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP) 
iii. Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP); 
iv.Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS); 
v.Functional Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT)/District Development Facility; 
vi.Health Sector Reforms. 
Although most of the undertaken reform initiatives may differ in content and scope, 
their implementation challenges enfolded around the same corroborating factors.  
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is structurally organised into eight (8) chapters. The first and present 
chapter which happens to be the introduction offers introductory and background 
discussions of the study. It primarily discusses the research intent and theme of the 
study. It traces the socio-political phenomena (research problem) that might have 
influenced the intent of the research study as well as discussions on the main research 
questions, study area, scope and some public sector administrative reform background 
discussions. 
The second chapter offers the theoretical and conceptual approach of the study. It also 
offers how these theoretical and conceptual underpinnings have analytically been 
operationalised into variables; hence the research variables of the study. 
The third chapter discusses the research methodology and design of the study. It 
expounds on how the research was conducted and analysed.  
The next three chapters discuss the findings and analysis of the study. It discusses the 
operationalisation of performance management reforms, its institutionalisation as well 
as the contextual factors that explain and account for the successful and failed 
institutionalisation of performance management reforms in the Ghanaian bureaucracy. 
Some of the findings in these chapters especially the chapter four are very descriptive 
and it draws on data from both documentation review and interviews. 
The last chapter provides some theoretical and recap discussions, as well as concluding 
remarks. It also provides a summary of the research findings and the entire research. 
 - 8 - 
CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS: THE 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACH 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and discusses the theoretical concepts and perspectives 
underpinning the study, and also how they have been operationalised in the study. These 
theoretical precepts provide a broader premise for understanding how performance 
management reforms respond to organisational behaviour. On the basis of the 
theoretical discussions, a framework will be developed delineating both dependent and 
independent variables.  
The study primarily draws on two main perspectives, that is, the instrumental and 
institutional/Cultural perspectives advanced by Christensen et al. (2007) in explaining 
and understanding administrative reforms in the public service of Ghana. Discussions 
in this chapter are mainly extant literature reviews on the conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings and how they relate to the research study. 
2.1 The Concept of Administrative Reforms and NPM 
Administrative reform has been one of the managerial tools for reorganising the state 
and its public sector to realise its expectations of economy, efficiency, productivity, 
effectiveness and responsiveness. It is of no doubt that administrative reforms over the 
past decades have flourished in this regard ( Caiden G. E., 1988). However, the 
conceptual discourse of administrative reforms and New Public Management (NPM) 
has been unending. Debate over the nature of reforms and NPM is as intense today as 
it has been over the last decades (McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 7). 
The concept of administrative reform hinges on the basic reform idea that man should 
not wait for changes to occur naturally but should rather expedite the process by 
artificial means, improvements in the world order (Caiden, 1968). The term “New 
Public Management (NPM)” is a label for recent administrative reforms first used by 
Hood (1991) (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 18).  Christopher Hood’s 1991 article ‘A 
public management for all seasons?’ remains the most cited exposition of the concept 
of NPM (McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 38). New Public Management (NPM) 
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is a comprehensive neo-liberal ideology inspired global reform movement of which 
Hood (1991) describes as a doctrine, or at least a label for a set of administrative 
doctrines which he and others identified as ‘new’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; 
McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002: 38).  NPM “consists of deliberate changes to the 
structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting 
them (in some sense) to run better (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000: 8).   
The landscape of administrative reform is often complicated by discrepancies between 
the world of ideas and the world of practice, which may be loosely coupled (Brunsson 
1989 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012: 2). This draws attention to the fact that 
there exists some amount of inconsistencies between how reforms are conceived and 
developed, and how they are put into practice. Often it proves more difficult to change 
how people and organisations act than what they think and believe (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2012: 2). If one compares reform policy documents with reform decisions and 
with reform implementation and results, one tends to see different things (Pollitt 2001 
cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012: 2). In practice, sometimes there emerge 
somewhat disparities between reform objectives and the intended change.  
Performance Management System (PMS): An Essential Element of 
NPM Reform 
Performance management has had an ever-increasing influence in contemporary public 
management especially during the age of performance in the 2000s and has become the 
centrepiece most recent public-sector reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Ohemeng 
& McCall-Thomas, 2013). The surge of performance management can be traced from 
the emergence of NPM in the 1980s within the public sector of most countries (Carroll 
and Dewar, 2002). This was in response to the poor governance and moribund public 
sectors that had characterised most countries especially developing countries during 
that period. The main essence of performance management was to reinforce 
accountability and enhance performance in the public services (Bouckaert and Peters 
2002; Radnor and McGuire 2004; Ohemeng 2011; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 
2013). 
Performance management is still seen as an ambiguous concept despite the age of 
performance and its popularity in organisation and public management studies (Carrol, 
2000 & Otley, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). This is as a result of the fact that 
performance management is mostly confused with performance measurement and other 
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forms of performance assessments such as performance appraisal, performance 
monitoring, and performance reporting (Bruijn, 2007, Halachmi, 2005, McAdam et al., 
2005, Pollitt, 2006, Talbot, 2005 & Wholey, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). 
Mupazviriho (2003 cited by Ohemeng, 2009: 112) comments that “performance 
management extends beyond the concept of performance appraisal or performance-
related pay of the 1980s, which only tries to address how a person should be rewarded 
after the completion of tasks over a given period”.  
This confusion has partially accounted to what Ohemeng and Owusu (2011 cited by 
Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459) have discussed as “definitional quagmire”, 
that is, difficult to define. Most scholars tend to describe rather than define (Halachmi, 
2005, Heinrich, 2007, Radin, 2006, & Wholey, 1999 cited by Ohemeng, 2009). 
However, in the context of this study, Performance Management is defined as “the 
development and incorporation of performance measurement into an organisation’s 
management and policy systems, and the subsequent use of the information generated 
for decision making by managers and the politicians to whom they are accountable” 
(Van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2010; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459). 
Performance Management is composed of four main immanent elements which 
include: “i. deciding what is the desired level of performance; ii. measuring 
performance; iii. reporting or communicating performance information; and iv. using 
performance information to compare actual performance to the agreed performance 
level” (Carroll & Dewar, 2002: 413). In this regard, Performance Management is seen 
as a feedback cycle of intentional behaviour because organisational goals and program 
decisions are been shaped by performance information which are relevant to managers 
and subordinates , and thus, may allude to significant changes that will eventually 
require the setting and measurement of new performance targets; and in effect, starting 
the whole Performance Management sequence over again (Van Dooren, Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2010; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013: 459). 
The Three Main Objectives of Performance Management System 
Performance Management system is driven by three main objectives, that is, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability (Ohemeng F., 2011; Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 
2013). The efficiency of any performance management system is mostly concerned 
with “value-for-money” and how costs are compared to outputs guided by the principle 
of rationality (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 
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2013).  Effectiveness as an important objective of performance management system is 
also explained as the direct and indirect impacts and outcomes of public programs on 
the entire populace during and after implementation process (McDavid and Hawthorn, 
2006 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013). Finally, accountability also as an 
objective, is literally referred to as “the mechanism that obliges agents, entrusted with 
public resources, to answer for their actions and decisions regarding these same 
resources to those who assigned them the responsibility” (Romzek & Dubnick 1987, 
Pollitt 2011 cited by Ohemeng & McCall-Thomas, 2013:460). It is also worth noting 
that, efficiency and effectiveness collectively provides greater understanding into 
organisation’s service standards, successes, and failures, and hence, improved means 
of programmes and services delivery (Radnor & McGuire, 2004; Ohemeng & McCall-
Thomas, 2013). 
In conclusion, as already discussed, performance management is the most essential 
element of NPM that drives administrative reforms in most developed and developing 
countries. Australia and New Zealand, who have experienced NPM peaks, had 
performance management (an essential element of NPM) as an integral part of their 
public management during each phase of reforms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007).  
2.1.1 Why do Some Reforms Fail? 
The post implementation impact of administrative reforms has been mixed. Reform 
studies have shown mixed results for institutional reforms in development; many of 
these results are mixed (Andrews, 2013: 19). Reforms do not fail because, once 
implemented, they yield unsatisfactory outcomes; they fail because they never get past 
the implementation stage at all (Polidano, 2001: 346). They are blocked outright or put 
into effect only in tokenistic, half- hearted fashion (Ibid). In this section, I present 
reform arguments posited by scholars like Polidano C. (2001), Klitgaard (1997) and 
Karyeija (2010) on how some reforms fail and others do not. 
Explanatory Factors: Leadership of Change (Approach-Based Viewpoint) by 
Polidano (2001) 
Polidano (2001: 346) is of the notion that reform scholars tend to over emphasise on 
the content of reform (what sort of initiatives should be taken) at the expense of the 
reform approach (how to go about it) in their quest of explaining and suggesting ways 
to improve the prospects of reform. In light of this, Polidano advances an approach-
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based perspective in explaining reform processes. He focuses on the approach to reform 
and not the content. His perspective is rooted in the assumption that “what matters most 
in improving the record of implementation are the strategic and tactical decisions taken 
in the course of putting the reforms into effect” (Ibid). Polidano expands his perspective 
from three viewpoints: the scope of reform, the role of aid donors, and the leadership 
of change. However, due to the research intent of the study, discussions will be 
narrowed down to the leadership of change viewpoint as advanced by Polidano (2001). 
• The Leadership of Change 
This is the last crucial issue discussed by Polidano and it pertains to the leadership of 
the reform. He presents that in two parts. The first part concerns the establishment of 
central structures of direction for reform that involve and co-ordinate the efforts of 
different agencies and ensure that they make reform a priority (Polidano, 2001: 352). 
The second part on the other hand concerns the structuring of the entire reform initiative 
itself so that it is aimed at the activities of departmental staff rather than central agency 
bureaucrats (Ibid). 
With the establishment of an effective central coordination, scholars like Wilenski 
(1986) believe that reform will forever be kept on the back burner unless a dedicated 
unit is set up to drive it forward (Ibid). This implies that, “there must be a small core of 
people working full time on civil service reform. It needs no conspiracy theorist to see 
that reform may never get off the ground if it is added to the responsibilities of people 
who have many other things to do” (Ibid). With the second part of Polidano’s argument, 
he projects that after the vertical divides between the various central agencies have been 
successfully bridged, reformers must then turn their attention to the horizontal divide 
between the centre and the street-level offices where most government business is 
transacted, and where change must ultimately make itself felt if reform efforts are to 
succeed (Polidano, 2001: 354). 
Explanatory factors: Cultural Approach 
Polidano’s (2001) approach-based viewpoint especially with regards to the leadership 
of change discussion, mainly projects the structural rationalistic approach to reforms as 
the main explanatory factors for some failed reforms. Explanatory factors like culture 
are entirely overlooked by Polidano (2001). However, most reform scholars and studies 
like Klitgaard (1997) and Karyeija (2010) identify cultural variables as the most 
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convincing variables that account for some failed reform institutionalisation especially 
in developing countries. In the context of civil service in developing countries, reforms 
are mainly influenced by cultural variables such as power distance, ethnicity, political 
bias, affection, hierarchy, kinship, tribal networks, and the importance of leisure and 
celebration (Klitgaard 1997 cited by Karyeija 2010: 66). Karyeija (2010) argues that 
the failure of most public-sector reforms in developing countries is a result of the 
incompatibility between the reform and the host administrative culture. Reforms will 
not be accepted and eventually institutionalised as long as there is no cultural 
adjustment to enable them to take deep root (Ibid). Some of these cultural variables 
wrestle out and resist these reform goals and hence, failed reforms.  
These particular lines of explanation constitute the main tenets of the study, that 
is, the effect of culture (administrative) and leadership on reforms, specifically 
performance management reforms. 
2.2 The Theoretical Explanation to Administrative Reform and 
Culture 
The study adopts the instrumental and institutional/cultural perspectives as well as the 
interplay of these perspectives (transformative approach) in explaining administrative 
reforms in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. These new institutional theories provide a broad 
and yet relevant theoretical approach which explain the drivers of reform as a function 
of rationalistic human decisions in organisations as well as the factors that affect these 
decisions and reforms. The instrumental perspective presents a theoretical logic which 
underlies the concept of rational choice. Instrumentalists view reforms as 
administrative tools to expedite change in organisational through rational calculations 
(logic of consequentiality). Also, from a contextual point of view, instrumentalists also 
view culture as what has an organisation has. The institutional perspective on the other 
hand also provides a cultural contextual approach to the understanding of administrative 
reforms and how employees respond to reform policies. The institutionalists also 
believe organisational culture influences bureaucrats’ actions and inactions and thus, 
reform frameworks must always be in sync the host administrative culture.  
2.2.1 The Instrumental Perspective  
The instrumental perspective conceptualises public organisations as agents of national 
development and thus make decisions on behalf of the society. In this sense, it suggests 
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that public actors’ actions and inactions are guided by instrumental rationality in the 
achievement of organisational goals. Instrumental rationality entails members of an 
organisation assessing all available options or tools according to their consequences 
and in relation to the chosen goals making wilful choices between alternatives and 
achieving the effects desired through those choices (Christensen et al. 2007:20). The 
instrumental perspective hinges on the logic of consequence whose main point of 
departure begins with the ‘idea of organisations as instruments are concerned with 
clarifying goals and means -ends conceptions of organisations and their members’ 
(Ibid).  
The instrumentalists argue that organisations are made up of formal organisational 
structures and thus, fulfilling tasks and achieving desired results require the design of 
formal structures. Formal organisational structure basically refers to a ‘structure that 
consists of positions and rules for who shall or can do what and which defines how 
various tasks should be executed’ (Ibid:21). Formal hierarchy, division of labour and 
routine are essential elements for any bureaucratic organisational form with a formal 
organisational structure. Hierarchy simply refers to superior and subordinate relations 
in an organisation. Division of labour also means that organisational tasks are 
horizontally tied to different units and positions in an organisation (Christensen et al. 
2007). Routines also on the other hand refers to the ‘rules and procedures for who shall 
carry out tasks and how they should be accomplished’ (Ibid:24). In this sense, the 
standard organisational model is the departmental agency, embedded in a hierarchy of 
influence, responsibility, and control, and insulated from other influences (Olsen: 239). 
The concept of instrumental rationality underscores action based on means-end 
rationality where the end always justifies the means. Actors always choose between 
alternatives and they are much concerned with achieving predetermined goals.  
According to Christensen et al, (2007:22), implementation of rational actions consists 
of four elements; i. Goal or problem; ii. Alternatives; iii. Consequences; iv. Decision-
making rules. These elements are quite evident in bureaucrats’ behaviour especially 
when operating under reforms. They make wilful decisions based on the consequences 
of their choices (What will I gain?).  
In light of the discussions above, reforms and reorganisation efforts are based on 
explicit or implicit assumptions about formal organisations- how they are formed and 
changed, how decisions are made within and between them, and what effects they have 
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(Olsen, 1988). According to Christensen et al, (2007:130) performance management 
and administrative reforms conceived within the instrumental perspective are 
considered as structural-instrumental tools in the hands of political and administrative 
leaders. It is a control technique that:  a) operates on clear and coherent goals serving 
as basis for performance measurement; b) measures results on specified indicators that 
are reported to the senior organisational officials, and performance measurement 
systems allow this through testing outcomes; c) results have consequences in terms of 
rewards and punishment to the individual employees (Ibid). This particular perspective 
to reform is very managerial. Political leaders deliberately design the administrative 
apparatus to make it more effective and efficient through reforms (Olsen, 1988). In such 
political systems, reform decisions are voluntary and reflect the goals and expectations 
of rational actors involved (Ibid).  
Due to the rational choice logic underlying this particular perspective, Zey (1998 cited 
by Karyeija, 2010) outlines four main challenges that reformers (rational actors) face 
in the course of the implementation process. The first challenge is resource constraint 
(scarcity of resources). To Zey (1998 cited by Karyeija, 2010:56), the actor is 
constrained by the scarcity of resources; given that each actor possesses different 
resources and in different proportions, this constrains the actions taken. The second 
challenge is constraint of opportunity cost. Friedman and Hechter are of the notion that 
“these are costs associated with forgoing the most attractive course of action. An 
individual actor may choose the second most valuable end or goal in instances where 
resources are scarce” (Zey 1998 cited by Karyeija 2010:56; Karyeija 2010:56.” The 
third challenge is associated with institutional norms constraint. “These norms may be 
societal, organisational or family centred. The actor can be constrained by these norms 
when choosing the best course of action” (Ibid). The last challenge is tied to information 
constraint. The quality of information available is the major constraint, more so than 
the quantity: ‘the ability to control the source, amount, content, and accuracy of 
information has never been a stronger constraint on rational decision making’ (Zey 
1998: 3 cited by Karyeija: 56). 
2.2.2 The Institutional/Cultural Perspective 
The Institutional School of Thought contends that public organisations are marked by 
formal and informal norms which intend influence human action and dictates the ‘rules 
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of the game’ in organisations. By dint of this, Christensen et al. (2007) emphasise on 
why there is the need to draw a distinction between these two set of norms, formal and 
informal norms, due to their differing origins and modes of operation although they do 
influence each other. These set of norms form the building blocks of the organisational 
culture of the organisation. 
The view of the cultural perspective is in tandem with the logic of appropriateness 
which constitutes the fundamental logic of action of organisations. According to the 
Culturalists, human action is based on legitimacy, that is, to what extent is one’s action 
legitimate? Public servants’ actions are tied to the organisational norms (informal or 
formal) that specify which action is fair, reasonable, expected, and acceptable in the 
organisational environment. According to Christensen et al. (2007:40), this logic tied 
to organisational culture means that ‘when acting in public situations, one will not 
primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra 
arguments...but ‘instead, one will engage in matching, whereby rules for action are 
deployed in order to link situations and identities.  The logic of cultural appropriateness 
assumes that human behaviour and actions are influenced by these three fundamental 
questions: i. What type of situation is this? (recognition); ii. What is my identity? 
(identity); iii. What is the most appropriate action (for myself and my institution) for 
this situation (appropriate rules for action) (Christensen et al. 2007). 
They further argue that the organisation’s appropriate action is instigated by the 
‘normative and institutional foundation that may be highly divergent from that found 
in other organisations, depending on how an organisational culture has evolved and 
what its dominant informal norms and values are’ (Ibid). Here, cultural and informal 
norms hinges on experience, that is, learning by experience. This implies that in public 
organisations, the experienced public servants will have more advantage over the less 
experienced ones. Christensen et al (2007) argue that these experienced members of 
organisations possess the ‘institutional memory’ of the organisation and thus try to 
cascade these norms into the new members. 
The institutionalists in this sense view culture as an explanatory variable and thus 
possess some kind of explanatory power. They conceptualise culture as a prerequisite 
for the survival of organisations. This is done through ‘pattern maintenance’ to keep 
the organisation alive because according to them, organisations never or seldom die 
(Christensen et al. 2007).  One general argument of the culturalists is that, an 
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organisational culture aims at creating a collective feeling and identity by integrating 
public servants into the organisation with ‘integrative glue’. This presupposes that 
public organisations in their quest to realise collective goals must be devoid of ‘cultural 
heterogeneity and tensions’ (Ibid). Furthermore, culturalists conceive culture as a goal 
unto itself because organisational members’ orientation and socialisation take place 
through the internalisation of informal norms and collective values (Ibid). This in effect 
creates some kind of loyalty in the organisation whereby members work under less 
supervision and become more satisfied with their job. However, it is worth noting that, 
organisational culture breads goal complexity because of the proliferation and 
differences between official and real organisational goals. 
Change and stability are key elements in organisational settings (path dependency). 
Organisational norms and values are very difficult to alter once they are fully 
institutionalised. It is generally believed that ‘new ideas and new ways of doing things 
may threaten the stability of the system’ (Jamil, 2007:12). The course and outcome of 
processes of change is mostly influenced by the organisation’s established cultural 
features (Christensen et al, 2007: 124).  
Culture here is seen as a double-edged sword, such that, it helps create predictability 
and stability of actions on one hand, and also immunes organisations to change. Public 
servants may oppose reforms when they intend to change the stability of the host 
culture. This suggests that, reforms are likely to succeed and enhance performance 
when they are compatible with existing cultural norms. 
2.2.3 The Transformative Approach: The Dynamic Interplay of 
Instrumentalism and Culturalism 
Context is very crucial in understanding administrative reforms and decision making in 
many NPM countries. Thus, in order to better understand the role of context in reform 
and change, and reform and its effect in all situations, there is the need to examine both 
the instrumental and cultural approach in tandem in order to explain how their dynamic 
interplay accounts for the reform processes. Context literally refers to the 
circumstances, norms and values, environment, background or settings which affect, 
constrain, specify or clarify the meaning of an event (Christensen & Lægreid in Pollitt 
C., 2013:132). Contextual factors in administrative reforms represent the setting within 
which reforms are developed and implemented (Ibid).  
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Due to the contextual nature of administrative reform, there has been the growing need 
to blend different perspectives to understand the process of administrative reform across 
countries and policy areas and over time (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). By virtue of 
this, Christensen & Lægreid (2007:4) advance a broad transformative approach to 
public reforms which contend that “institutional dynamics of reforms can best be 
interpreted as a complex mixture of environmental pressure, polity features and 
historical institutional context”. They further argue that these factors in turn “define 
how much leeway political leaders have in making choices about reforms – that is, they 
both further and hinder reforms, resulting in complex patterns of influence, learning 
and effects” (Ibid).   
The first aspect of the transformative approach which is tied to the instrumental 
perspective emphasises that “different countries have different constitutional features 
and political-administrative structures and these factors go some way to explaining 
how they handle national problems and reform processes” (Weaver and Rockman 1993; 
Olsen and Peters 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2007:6). This even transcends 
to the organisational level whereby different organisations also have different structural 
and administrative features and thus, shape how they handle reform processes. 
The second aspect also tied to the cultural/institutional perspective emphasises that 
reforms are driven by national historical-institutional context. To Selznick, (1957 
cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012:8) cultural features of public organisations 
develop gradually in institutional processes, giving institutionalised organisations a 
distinct character or cultural soul.  
The last aspect conceptualises the implementation of administrative reforms primarily 
as a reaction to external pressure (environmental factors), be it either institutional or 
technical (Meyer and Rowan 1977 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). The 
institutional environment refers to the influence exerted by the prevailing, ideologically 
dominant doctrine diffused all over the world in the adoption of NPM reform 
(Czarniawska and Sevon 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). The technical 
environment on the other hand refers to the situation whereby reforms are seen as the 
optimal solution to widespread technical problems created by a lack of instrumental 
performance or by economic competition and market pressure (Self 2000 cited by 
Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). 
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A transformative perspective emerges when we combine the above discussed internal 
and environmental reform features to explain why NPM may have different content, 
effects and implications in different countries (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999a cited 
by Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 24). According to Christensen & Lægreid (2001: 24) 
external reform concepts and programmes are evidently filtered, interpreted and 
modified by a combination of the national political-administrative history, culture, 
traditions and style of governance which have developed in an evolutionary manner 
and the national polity features as seen in constitutional and structural factors. To them, 
these factors tend to constrain and create for purposeful choice, deliberate instrumental 
actions and intentional efforts undertaken by political and administrative leaders to 
launch NPM-reforms (Olsen, 1992; Olsen and Peters, 1996a cited by Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2001: 24).  
The transformative approach denies the absolute power and control of leaders over 
reform process. The approach however acknowledges that leaders are assured a degree 
of manoeuvrability but their influence is constrained by the environmental factors, 
polity features and historical-institutional context (Ibid). To Christensen & Lægreid 
(2001: 25), “at one extreme, international environmental pressure to adopt NPM 
reforms may have profound effects on national systems if they are simultaneously 
furthered by the political-administrative leadership and are compatible with historical-
cultural traditions” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25). At the other extreme, 
environmental pressure for reform may produce few changes and effects if political and 
administrative leaders consciously try to stop or avoid the reforms owing to their lack 
of compatibility between their values and norms and externally produced reforms 
(Røvik, 1996 cited by Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25).  According to Christensen & 
Lægreid, (2001: 25), in practice, political leaders can use certain elements of externally 
generated reforms or try to redefine ambiguous reform elements in a national context 
in order to match instrumental goals and national culture. Røvik (1998) and Sahlin-
Andersson (1996) cited by (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001: 25) also add that in yet 
another scenario, political leaders might accept the reforms, leaving their 
implementation to administrative leaders and thus, allowing for adjustment and editing 
to fit institutional-cultural features. 
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Summing up with theoretical approaches.... 
The foregoing discussions present a very broad theoretical framework in explaining the 
concept of administrative reform. The instrumental/Cultural debate advances 
institutional logics that underscore the very essence of reform and its relationship with 
contextual elements like culture and leadership. The instrumentalists believe leaders 
use reforms to instigate change and bring out the best out of public servants in an 
instrumentally rational way. The Culturalists on the hand argues that organisations 
reflect dominant cultural values in society which is generally seen as appropriate and 
cannot be changed readily. These perspectives serve as a point of departure for 
understanding the role of context in reform from a “transformative approach”. This 
approach contends that the dynamics of reform can be well understood by examining 
its contextual factors. As already outlined, the study focuses on the interplay of the 
leadership and cultural context in explaining the reform dynamics in the Ghanaian 
Bureaucracy. Any reform needs the appropriate soil to grow. The administrative context 
provides that soil to contextualise reforms and take deep root. If there is a mismatch 
between administrative context and reform objectives, then reforms may lack the 
necessary soil or foundation to institutionalise.  
2.3 Operationalisation of Variables: Towards an analytical framework 
framework 
By reflecting on the foregoing discussions of this chapter, the challenge is to 
operationalise the theoretical underpinnings of the study into clear cut variables, both 
dependent and independent for analysis.  
2.3.1 Dependent Variable: implementation and institutionalisation of 
PM Reforms 
The main dependent variable to be examined is the implementation and 
institutionalisation of Performance Management Reforms, specifically, the New 
Performance Management Policy (NPMP) developed and introduced by the Public 
Services Commission in the public service. This particular variable examines how well 
performance management system has been implemented and institutionalised in the 
public service. In effect, I pose the first research question as already mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. “What is the state of performance management reform in Ghana’s 
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Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised in the various public 
institutions?”  
The main rationale is to first investigate and explore the performance management 
reform trajectory as well as the current reform in the service; and the extent to which it 
has been habituated through institutionalisation. This particular aspect of the study 
hinges on the concept of institutionalisation advanced greatly in Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1967) work “The Social Construction of Reality”. Institutionalisation is 
identified as a process thorough which habits, norms and values are deeply rooted in 
organisations and become rules. People follow it and are afraid to break it, they feel 
comfortable with it and it gives them identity. Institutionalisation occurs whenever 
there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967: 70).  
Measuring the level of institutionalisation of the NPMP 
The NPMP provides a very comprehensive overview of how performance management 
should be operationalised in the public service. And by measuring the 
institutionalisation level of the reform, I have teased out four key constructs from the 
entire reform policy framework4 with bureaucrats’ perceptions. These constructs 
happen to be the main highlights and summary of the NPMP. Bureaucrats are being 
asked to offer their thoughts on the extent to which the constructs have been well 
entrenched in their respective bureaucracies. Thus, the study draws on the thoughts and 
outlook of bureaucrats on how well these constructs have been implemented and 
habituated over time in their respective organisations. Table 2.0 presents the four teased 
out NPMP constructs or objectives and some questions that seek to measure the level 
of institutionalisation. 
Table 2.0 The four teased out NPMP constructs and its measurement. 
                                               
4 These constructs are comprehensively discussed in chapter four and five. 
CONSTRUCT MEASURING THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALISATION 
• Construct A - 
Implementing Results-Oriented 
Management 
• The NPMP seeks to implement performance/results-
oriented management in meeting organizational goals. To what 
extent has this been institutionalised in the service? 
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2.3.2 Independent Variables: Administrative Culture Vs. Leadership 
The independent variable of the study happens to be the contextual factors that affect 
reforms stemming from the theoretical and conceptual perspectives which underscore 
the study. Thus, the independent variables of the study are administrative culture and 
leadership being adoptive or resistant to the reform process. By examining 
administrative culture and leadership as the independent variables of the study, again I 
pose the second research question as mentioned in the preceding chapter, that is: “What 
explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it leadership 
or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership 
and culture?”  
Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
Administrative culture as a critical element of organisational studies has been 
elaborated and discussed differently by different scholars, hence, there has not been any 
universally accepted definition. However, the working definition for this study is the 
“general characteristics of public officials, i.e., shared values, attitudes, and beliefs” 
(Henderson, 2005:41).  
 
 
• Construct B - 
Introduction of Robust 
Performance Appraisal System 
• The NPMP seeks to introduce a more robust of 
Performance Appraisal System (PAS). How effective is the 
appraisal system in this institution? Has it influenced the 
performance of public servants? 
• Construct C - 
Transparency of performance 
targets 
• The NPMP also seeks to enhance transparency of 
performance targets – In a consultative manner between assessees 
and assessors. To what extent has this been institutionalised? Are 
you satisfied with the level of transparency?  
• Construct D – 
Ensuring an effective Reward and 
Sanction System. 
• One key objective of the NPMP is to ensure an effective 
Recognition, Incentive, reward, and sanction system linked to 
performance. To what extent has this been institutionalised? How 
often do bureaucrats get rewarded or sanctioned after an appraisal 
year? 
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Measuring Administrative Culture  
The concept of administrative culture is measured and analysed within the purview of 
the following cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
political neutrality. These dimensions are drawn from a commingle of ideas of 
Hofstedes’ (2010) and other culture scholars like Jamil (2002) and Karyeija (2010). 
According to Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, (2010:31), dimensions of culture are the 
aspects of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures. Hofstede et al. (2013) 
advance four cultural dimensions: power distance, collectivism versus individualism, 
femininity versus masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. However, the study adopts 
only two out of the four cultural dimensions. The main reason behind this choice is to 
really focus on the structural institutional make-up as well as its impact on 
administrative systems of the Ghanaian bureaucracy which cuts across issues like 
hierarchism and power, and the Public Service as a formal institution; hence power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance are deemed appropriate in that regard. Collectivism 
versus individualism, and femininity versus masculinity dimensions were not 
considered since they are more focused on relationship and gender than structural 
features. My third cultural dimension which happens to be political neutrality 
dimension can be traced from cultural studies by Jamil (2002) and Karyeija (2010). 
Karyeija in his study examines how political neutrality affects performance 
management in the Ugandan bureaucracy. In a nut shell, these three cultural dimensions 
were considered because they have indeed dominated most national level and/or cross-
national studies across the globe.  
The cultural dimensions and their indicators 
Power Distance  
Power distance is one of the main dimensions of national cultures. This dimension is 
based on Hofstede’s ideas on power and authority relationships in organisations. 
Hofstede defines power distance as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010:61). There are two main 
forms of power distance in organisations; large power distance and small power 
distance. Large power distance is mainly hierarchic in nature where actions and 
inactions of subordinates are influenced by top-down superior commands in hierarchic 
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organisations (Jamil, 2002). Small power distance on the contrary is more egalitarian 
in nature and really characterised by total interdependence between boss and 
subordinates in a collegial atmosphere (Tayeb, 1988 as cited by Jamil, 2002).  
Ghana as a West African country is seen to have a high or large power distance society 
according to Hofstede et al’s (2010) Survey on 76 countries and regions. West African 
countries of which Ghana is part, scores 77 on the power distance index ranking 17-18 
out of 76 based on IBM database plus extensions.  In instances where a society has 
large power distance, then it follows that organisations may as well be considered to 
have large power distance tendencies (Karyeija K. G., 2010 : 70). Thus, by inference, 
it can be said that, there is a higher inclination of having a large power distance 
bureaucracy in Ghana. In analysing power distance in the Ghanaian Public Service, 
three main concepts of power distance have been identified to serve as the indicators 
for analysing power distance. They are: Hierarchism and Boss-Subordinate 
Relationship. 
• Hierarchism 
One of the main indicators of power distance is hierarchism. Large power distance 
organisations are mostly characterised by tall hierarchies. In the large power distance 
organisations, superiors and subordinates consider each other as existentially unequal 
and mirrored in hierarchies (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). In such cases, 
power is highly centralised and wielded by a selected few (Ibid). Due to the highly 
centralised nature of power in large power distance organisations, subordinates 
constantly feed on the directives and instructions of their superiors in order to be able 
to work. Subordinates expect to be told what to do and they do, and they dare not 
question authority but to take orders (Munene et al 2000; Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010: 73). In such organisations, hierarchism is an essential component for 
their survival. In implication, the moment the existing hierarchies break down, it is most 
likely to result into organisational failure. This is because the entire organisational setup 
is undergirded by hierarchism. There are always a large number of supervisory 
personnel, structured into tall hierarchies of people reporting to each other (Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 73). This aspect of power distance even transcends to the 
salary system of the organisation. There is a wide gap between the salary earnings of 
superiors and subordinates in large power distance organisations (Ibid).  
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Hierarchism has been an essential part of the PMS especially in high power distance 
countries like Ghana and has constantly hindered the maximum impact and 
effectiveness of PMS in these countries. The PMS trends in Ghana have sought to 
accord so much power to superiors and thereby making subordinates more vulnerable. 
By dint of this, the Ghanaian bureaucracy has struggled with the issue of subjectivity 
which has constantly crippled the PMS process and its effect in the Ghanaian 
bureaucracy over the years. Until the introduction of NPMP in 2014, most junior 
bureaucrats regarded performance appraisal as an exploitation tool in the hands of 
leaders. 
This particular situation is accentuated in Karyeija’s (2010: 70) question that, 
“performance appraisal works on the premise that the rater and ratee can engage each 
other in conversation without fear, as peers, but how can this be achieved in a large 
power distance culture where both parties expect that only the superior gives 
instructions and commands?”. He further posits that “in large power distance cultures, 
those in lower ranks are not expected to participate in the performance appraisal 
(Kirkbride and Westwood 1993) and thus the performance appraisal system does not 
fit with the culture because the subordinate may find it difficult to meet the rater and 
set his or her own goals in cooperation with the rater” (Ibid: 71).  
• Boss-Subordinate Relationship: Formalism vs. Informality 
Relationships between subordinates and superiors in a large power distance 
organisation is frequently loaded with emotions (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010: 
73). The ideal boss in the subordinates’ eyes, the one they feel most comfortable with 
and whom they respect most, is a benevolent autocrat or “good father” (Ibid). This 
alludes to the fact that personal relations mostly matter and thereby making formal rules 
and procedures redundant in large power distance organisations. In large power 
distance cultures when hierarchy is combined with informal relations, boss-subordinate 
interface is mostly tensed and unhealthy unlike in small power distance cultures. This 
has been because of the existentially unequal nature of large power distance 
organisations. Tensed large power distance cultures have never been compatible with 
PMS reforms. In relation to this, Mendonca and Kanungo (1994 cited by Karyeija, 
2012: 71), puts forward that all critical activities in performance appraisal require the 
manager to function as a coach and mentor to his subordinates, but high-power distance 
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is ‘certainly not compatible with this nature of a manager-subordinate relationship’. 
The only way the negative boss-subordinate relationship in large power distance 
organisations is managed is through sycophancy to smoothen the relationship (Karyeija 
2012). Karyeija (2012: 71) posits that sycophancy is manifested in many ways such as 
flattery and by imitating the boss. Thus, it is intended to create an impression of a servile 
person and to win favour from the boss, and also thriving to impress the boss by 
diligently carrying out tasks meted out by the boss especially in the context of the 
performance appraisal (Ibid). Sycophancy in a nutshell, tends to foster personal 
relationship between bosses and subordinates in large power distance organisations and 
bosses in most organisations tend to utilise that to neutralise the negative implication 
of large power distance culture. 
Hypothesis 1: The existence of a large power distance culture and informal relations in the 
Ghanaian Bureaucracy may threaten proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the 
Ghanaian Public Service. 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance denotes ways of handling uncertainty, which are part of and 
parcel of any human institution in any country (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2010:191). The concept of uncertainty avoidance hinges on the assumption that the 
future is always uncertain, but we have to live with it (Ibid). In this sense, uncertainty 
avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
ambiguous or unknown situations (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010:191). To 
Hofstede et al. (2010: 191), this feeling is, among other manifestations, expressed 
through nervous stress and in a need for predictability: a need for written rules. From 
an organisational perspective, uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree to which people 
are likely to prefer structured or unstructured organisational situations (Islam, 
2004:323). It also reflects the propensity to take risks and the attitude towards change 
and innovation (Ibid). Organisations can have either strong or weak uncertainty 
avoidance depending on the society in question (Jamil, 2002; Hoftstede et al, 2010). 
Organisations with strong uncertainty avoidance or low tolerance for ambiguity tend to 
have more formalised and centralised rules and regulations system with employees 
taking less risk by breaking rule and regulations (Jamil, 2002). In strong uncertainty 
avoidance cultures, leaders are continually engaged in rules, regulations and laws 
formulation in order to reduce stress and anxiety that come with uncertainty situations. 
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Here, they are very committed to avoiding unclear situations and hence creating an 
anxiety-free environment. In such situations, the future is always anticipated because 
of the existence of known standards that guide human actions and organisational 
processes.  
The situation is different in weak uncertainty or high tolerance for ambiguity 
organisations. Here, organisations are characterised by low degree of formalisation and 
job definitions (Jamil, 2007: 89). For the purpose of measuring and analysing 
uncertainty avoidance in the Ghanaian Public Service, these concepts have been 
identified as the basis for analysis: Rule Orientation and Innovation. 
• Rule Orientation 
Uncertainty Avoiding Organisations tend to reduce organisational anxiety caused by 
ambiguous or unclear situations through “rule orientation” – application of both written 
and unwritten rules (Hofstede et al. 2010). Hofstede et al. stresses that the need for rules 
in strong uncertainty avoidance cultures is very emotional (Ibid). People in such 
cultures have been programmed since early childhood to feel comfortable in structured 
environments (Ibid). In implication, administrative systems in uncertainty avoiding 
organisations are very rigid and room for manoeuvring is limited, and employees feel 
comfortable with that. Space makes them uncertain. In addition to this, Hofstede et al. 
(2010) furthermore add that the concept of rule orientation and uncertainty avoidance 
is closely tied to Power Distance. This is in the sense that, in high power distance 
organisations, the exercise of discretionary power by superiors replaces to some extent 
the need for internal rules (Ibid: 209). In situations, where the future is known due to 
the unavailability of explicit rules and regulations, superiors tend to dictate the “rules 
of the game”. 
However, critics from weak uncertainty avoidance organisations oppose vehemently to 
concept of rule following, that is, the emotional need for rules. They argue that the 
emotional need for laws and regulations in a strong uncertainty avoidance society can 
lead to rules or rule oriented behaviours that are purely ritual, inconsistent, or even 
dysfunctional (Ibid). In view of this, countries from weak uncertainty avoidance 
cultures rather exhibit an emotional horror of formal rules (Ibid: 210). People in such 
cultures believe the society or organisation can survive without the existence of formal 
rules. Thus, the application of rules must only be in case absolute necessity (Hofstede 
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et al. 2010: 209). They believe many problems can be solved without formal rules 
(Ibid).  
According to Hofstede et al. (2010: 213), formal rules are very essential for 
implementation processes. They argue that “implementation of new processes demands 
a considerable sense of detail and punctuality” and this is made possible in high 
uncertainty avoiding cultures. In implication, the existence of formal rules especially in 
uncertainty avoiding organisations are very crucial for the survival of a reform or any 
policy. These rule culture backing the reform provides support for a successful 
implementation and institutionalisation. The rules stipulate what ought to be done at 
any given time and when well enforced, may lead to the desired change intended by the 
reform.  
• Innovation 
Innovation means new ways doing things and not appreciated highly in organisations 
characterised by strong uncertainty avoidance. Weak uncertainty avoidance 
organisations are mostly focused on ways to challenge the status quo through creativity 
and innovation unlike strong uncertainty avoidance organisations who are always 
showing a “need for precision and formalisation” (Hofstede et al. 2010). According to 
Hofstede et al., (2010: 211) ambiguity and chaos are sometimes praised as conditions 
for creativity. They believe in the application of one’s expertise when faced with 
ambiguities on the floor of work (Ibid). In this regard, top managers are always in 
constant search of strategies to address organisational phenomena, and thus, it tends to 
challenge and stimulate the innovation and creativity prowess in them. 
Again, in relation to appraisal reforms, high uncertainty avoidance bureaucracies may 
be characterised by bureaucrats unwillingness to accept organisational change 
(Mendonca and Kanungo, 1999 cited by Karyeija, 2012). Any reform that is bound to 
bring change to the organisational PMS in such cultures is seen as a threat because 
bureaucrats are not ready to relinquish their old way of handling their appraisal systems. 
So, whenever there is newly introduced reform, they become more anxious and become 
stressed about the future and mostly immune to change and hence creating appraisal 
reform deadlocks. In this regard, Karyeija (2012: 75) further elaborates “in cultures 
with strong uncertainty avoidance norms, emotions are displayed in the way that 
everything different is dangerous. People resist changes and worry about the future”. 
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de Jager (2001) accentuates this change phenomenon in his argument that ‘Most people 
are reluctant to leave the familiar terrain behind. We are all suspicious about the 
unfamiliar; we are naturally concerned about how we will get from the old to the new, 
especially if it involves learning something new and risking failure’ (de Jager 2001:24). 
However, with regards to implementation processes, Hofstede et al (2010) contend that 
innovation has more than one face. To them, it may be true weak uncertainty avoidance 
cultures are better at basic innovations but may be seen to be at disadvantaged in 
implementation, that is, developing these innovations into new products or services 
(Ibid: 213). Owing to this, it presupposes that strong uncertainty avoiding organisations 
have a greater tendency of having better implementations due to the availability of 
details and rules guiding the entire implementation process with weak uncertainty 
avoiding organisation having implementation challenges.  
In connection to this mixed effect of uncertainty avoidance on the implementation of 
reforms, I present two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less innovation, 
more resistance to change. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may impede successful 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. 
Hypothesis 3: More rule following may institute positive attitude to rule setting and its 
enforcement.  Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful implementation 
and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. 
Political Neutrality 
Over the years, the role of politics has been marginalised in contemporary study of 
organisational culture where too much emphasis has solely been placed on 
organisations’ internal context such as employee’s work-related attitudes, organisation 
structure and management systems (Jamil, 2002). According to Jamil (2002), such an 
approach to the study of organisational culture may not offer greater insights into public 
organisational behaviour where politics is a critical element in shaping public 
administration and its relations to society. He argues that the fundamental 
characteristics of public administration is its relationship to politics and its position in 
a wider political system (Jamil, 2007:69). This dimension of culture specifically 
highlights on the incorporation of theories of politics into the study of organisational 
culture. This dimension seeks to look at the extent to which bureaucrats are politically 
 - 30 - 
neutral or biased. According to Jamil (2002), relationship and attitudes of bureaucracies 
to politics are not the same and are determined by the context or society involved. 
Political neutrality refers to civil servants performing their jobs professionally and 
without biases towards politicians (Karyeija, 2010:78). Jamil (2007: 70) posits that the 
administration of public organisations is a neutral instrument which is concerned with 
translating into practice political decisions which are derived from other sources 
(Barker, 1966; Self, 1972 cited by Jamil, 2007: 70). The electoral system may bring in 
new political leaders but administrators remain unchanged through the system of career 
which is connected to the impersonal character of bureaucracy (Jamil, 2007: 70). 
The study adopts Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy to serve as a 
benchmark for analysis with respect to political neutrality. 
• Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy 
 Robert Putnam (1975 as cited Jamil, 2002:94) in his analysis of bureaucratic 
responsiveness in Britain, Germany and Italy identifies two forms of bureaucratic 
attitudes, that is, classical bureaucracy which is more procedure or rule oriented and 
political bureaucracy which is also more problem or programme oriented. The Classical 
bureaucracy is the kind which is more committed to upholding the principle of political 
neutrality in its administrative system. Classical bureaucracies are always neutral and 
loyal to all governments and regimes that come to power (Jamil, 2007).  This situation 
is made possible through the system of Weberian bureaucracy (especially in the case of 
Europe) where administrators are arranged according to a hierarchy with vertical 
authority system, lifelong career, impersonality, and promotion on the basis of merit 
(Ibid: 70). Classical bureaucracies are always able to withstand any political upheaval 
which does not alter and destabilise the institutional structure and function of the entire 
bureaucracy. Jamil (2007: 71) stresses that classical bureaucracies believe in the 
assumption that “issues should be resolved through adhering to some objective and 
standard criteria of legality and technical practicality”. Such bureaucracies believe in 
the universal application of rules devoid of any form of political considerations leading 
to favouritism. They see themselves as one people and the bureaucracy is not 
fragmented along political lines. 
The political bureaucracy depicts the “opposite syndrome” (Ibid). The political 
bureaucracies consider the influence of partisan politics on policy as very legitimate 
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and thus, their everyday lives are characterised by bargaining and compromises rather 
than following rules and routines (Ibid). They see political influence as a part of their 
administrative systems. In this vein, bureaucrats’ actions, especially those who got 
recruited by the help of an affiliated political party, must be in sync of with the values 
and dispositions of the affiliated political party. Such bureaucracies really run a highly 
politicised administrative system.  
In relation to PM reforms, one key implication of this bureaucratic attitude along 
classical and political dimensions is the threat to objectivity and equity in the PMS 
process due to the inherent political fragmentation especially in political bureaucracies. 
The appraisal process of most PMS must always kick away subjectivity. Bureaucrats 
must always be objectively appraised based on the performance and accomplishment 
of their performance targets. Due to principle of equity and the universal application of 
rules that underpin classical bureaucracies, this aspect of appraisal is always upheld 
unlike political bureaucracies. The political bureaucracy is highly fragmented along 
political lines, and thus, threatens the issue of objectivity in the appraisal process. There 
are higher tendencies of favouring bureaucrats who belong to the appraiser’s factional 
group and vice versa when the appraisee and the appraiser are not connected politically.  
Hypothesis 4: “the higher the degree of political neutrality in the Ghanaian Public Service, 
the less the bureaucracy becomes fragmented along political lines. Such a situation 
facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and hence, a better 
NPMP implementation and institutionalisation in the Ghanaian Public Service.”. 
Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
Leadership has largely been seen and assessed as a significant predictor of 
organisational success through strategy formulation (Acheampong, Odoom, & 
Tweneboah-Koduah, 1997: 338). This insinuates that organisational performance is 
shaped by the rational calculations of organisational leaders. Leaders in the upper 
echelons of an organisation influence organisational performance directly through their 
characteristics and behaviours and indirectly through the strategic choices they make 
(Ibid). 
Leadership as a contextual variable of administrative reform is often seen as 
situationally contingent and thus, different situations demand different types or styles 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 113). According to Christensen et al. (2007), this particular 
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assertion has received several differing interpretations from different schools of 
thought. However, the most suitable interpretation for this study is that leadership is 
exercised in different contexts, and thus will vary in thinking and behaviour (Ibid: 114). 
In the implementation of reforms, conditions for leaders’ actions vary due to the 
structural and cultural constraints (Ibid). leadership types and styles are mostly shaped 
by the structural and cultural features of the organisation. To Christensen et al. (2007: 
114), some leaders will have a tighter framework of clear goals, organisational 
structures and position-instructions or leader contracts, but be given few cultural 
guidelines. Some leaders on the other hand will act according to historical traditions 
and norms, with few formal directives for their behaviour (Ibid). 
Reform implementation such as the PM reform is heavily contingent on response of 
leaders towards the reform and as such, leaders respond differently towards reforms. 
Since leaders are often seen as rational actors, they mostly create a friendly atmosphere 
when they are faced with environmental incompatibilities. They try to make the 
environment conducive for a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the 
reform policy. Most of these externally or internationally adopted reforms are faced 
with some environmental especially cultural resistance, hence, most committed 
organisational leaders tend to manage the situation by adopting certain implementation 
techniques by way of establishing a friendly environmental receptiveness for the reform 
policy. Such implementation strategies include policy training, friendly negotiations, 
establishment of cordial relationships between key actors (superiors and subordinates), 
etc. 
In contrast, highly institutionalised organisations with strong cultures, have higher 
tendencies of resisting reforms and change especially when reforms conflict with the 
existing cultures. Leaders in such organisations always feel reluctant to comply with 
reforms which tend to bring some cultural change. They either resist these reforms or 
manipulate the reforms to suit the existing cultures. Such organisations believe in 
incremental change which happens over time rather than radical change. 
Hypothesis 5: The right leadership strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to 
manage cultural incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.   
In summary, Figure 2.0 presents a broad overview of the analytical framework of the 
study. 













Figure 2.0 Analytical framework 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
It is generally hypothesised that the success or failure of administrative reforms is 
contingent on the degree of its compatibility with contextual factors like organisational 
culture. This chapter has sought to discuss all the relevant theories in relation to the 
subject matter of the study and how they would be operationalised throughout the study.  
Instrumentalism emphasises, the logic of consequences (Instrumental rationality) 
whereas the culturalism is tied to the logic of appropriateness. The chapter concluded 
with discussions on some literature review on the concept of administrative reform and 
culture, and some major studies similar to my study. The next chapter will primarily 
discuss the research design and methodology of the study. It is purely a qualitative 
study. 
Independent Variables 
1. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE AS 
THE LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS 
Cultural Dimensions as Benchmark for 
Analysis 
• Power Distance 
• Uncertainty Avoidance 












NPMP Constructs as Benchmark for Analysis 
• Implementing Results-Oriented Management 
• Robust Performance Appraisal System 
• Transparency of Performance Targets.        





Transformative Approach  
• Cultural Perspective 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter offers a detailed account of the research design and methodology of the 
study. A qualitative research design was used to explore and explain the extent to which 
organisational culture and leadership affects performance management administrative 
reforms in the Ghanaian public service. 
3.1 Research Strategy 
As already mentioned, the study employs a qualitative approach. It adopts a multiple 
case study research strategy (comparative) to investigate the research phenomenon. 
Why Qualitative Research Design? 
The underlying intent of the research study is to study the research phenomenon through 
the eyes of the people studied in their natural setting, and hence, a qualitative research 
design  (Bryman, 2012). Performance management system as a social behaviour is very 
contextual and thus, it is best understood when organisational actors are engaged in 
face-to-face interaction to acquire up close information as well as observing them 
behave and function in their natural context. This means that we cannot understand the 
behaviour of members of a social group other than in terms of the specific environment 
in which they operate (Bryman, 2012: 401).  By dint of that, the study employs a 
qualitative approach in order to explore and understand the meaning the respondents 
ascribe to the research phenomenon in their natural setting by engaging them to share 
their views and experiences and also observing them behave and function in their 
natural context. Moreover, data credibility is more enhanced when respondents are 
allowed to share their views, personal stories and experiences on the research 
phenomenon and thereby giving greater insights into the complex processes of the 
influence of context on performance management reforms in the public service.  
Furthermore, the employment of case study research strategy grants me the leeway to 
retain the meaningful characteristics (Yin, 2003) of bureaucrats in the Ghanaian 
bureaucracy as compared to other qualitative research strategies such as grounded 
theory, narrative research, archival analysis etc. And also, by establishing a holistic 
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picture of the study, the qualitative case study grants me room to draw on a plethora of 
data from multiple sources. 
Last but not least, considering the limited number of cases, participants, and variables 
of the study, qualitative design is seen as the most ideal method of inquiry to carry out 
the research the research study. Jamil et al. (2013: 907) stresses this in their argument 
that “if the research design includes few cases and few variables, researchers are more 
likely to adopt a qualitative method. This is more common in ethnographic or case 
studies adopted to understand administrative culture”. 
3.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis of a case study is “related to the fundamental problem of defining 
what the problem is” (Yin, 2003: 13). In other words, it refers to the case(s) of the study. 
A case can be a social system, a person, an event, and/or a process (Ibid). The unit of 
analysis (cases) for the study is the public service of Ghana focussing specifically on 
the Office of the Head of Civil Service, Nursing & Midwifery Council, and the Youth 
Employment Agency. 
Brief Profile of the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS)5 
The OHCS is the HR regulatory body of the Civil Service of Ghana. It also serves as 
the seat of the head of Civil Service. The current Head of the Civil Service is Nana 
Kwesi Agyekum Dwamena and was appointed on the 1st of January, 2014. In general, 
the mission of the Civil Service, as stated in the Civil Service Law, 1993 PNDCL 327, 
“is to assist the Government in the formulation and implementation of government 
policies for the development of the country.” The OHCS is tasked to “promote and 
ensure continuous renewal and professional development of the Human Resource of 
the Civil Service by ensuring that the MDAs are optimally structured, adequately 
staffed with the right skills mix to provide policy advice to Ghana’s political leadership 
to facilitate good governance and accelerate national development.”  
 
                                               
5 Information Source: www.ohcs.gov.gh 
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Brief Profile of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC)l6 
The NMC is a statutory body and has its mandate rooted in the part III of the Health 
Professions Regulatory Bodies Act 2013 (Act 857). The Council had its name changed 
from Nurses and Midwives Council of Ghana as provided for in the NRCD 117 of 1972 
and LI 683 of 1971 during the year 2013 to Nursing and Midwifery Council following 
the enactment of the Health Professions Regulatory Bodies Act, 2013 (Act 857). The 
Current Registrar of the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana is Mr. Felix Nyante 
and was appointed to the position of Registrar in August, 2014. The mission of the 
N&MC is to “secure in the public interest the highest standard of training and practice 
of Nursing and Midwifery”.  
Brief profile of the Youth Employment Agency (YEA)7 
The YEAwas established under the Youth Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) to empower 
young people to contribute meaningfully to the socio-economic and sustainable 
development of the nation. Its objective is to support the youth between the ages of 15 
to 35 years through skills training and internship modules to transit from a situation of 
unemployment to that of employment. According the Youth Employment Act, 2015, 
the head of the YEA who happens to be the Chief Executive Officer, shall be appointed 
by the President of Ghana. The Current Chief Executive Officer of the YEA is Mr. 
Justin Kodua Frimpong. The mandate of the YEA as established under the Youth 
Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) is to “oversee the development, coordination, 
supervision and facilitation of employment for the youth and related matters in Ghana.” 
With regards to the funding of the agency, the sources of funds for the agency as 
stipulated in section 23 of ACT 887 include: 
• 80% of the communication Service Tax (CST); 
• 10% of District Assembly Common Fund subject to a formula approved by 
parliament; 
• 5% of the Ghana Education Trust Fund subject to formula approved by 
parliament and; 
• Donations, gifts and grants. 
                                               
6 Information Source: www.nmcgh.org 
7 Information Source: www.yea.gov.gh 
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3.2.1 Why these Cases? 
Purposive Sampling strategy was adopted in selecting the cases for my study. This is a 
non-probability form of sampling which aims at sampling cases and participants in a 
strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being 
posed (Bryman, 2012: 418). First and foremost, the main reason for the selection of 
these three different institutions was to access a wide set of participants across public 
institutions that are relatively different in terms of function and personnel. The idea was 
to procure a diversity of participants across different public institutions in terms of 
function and personnel by drawing some respondents from the Health Service (Nursing 
and Midwifery Council), the Civil Service (Office of the Head of Civil Service) and an 
agency tasked with specific grassroots responsibilities (Youth Employment Agency). 
At the end of the study, a wide set of data from these disparate institutions provided 
several insights into the reasons why some institutions respond differently to a “one 
size fits all” policy like the New Performance Management Policy. These three 
institutions operate under the supervision of the Public Service Commission. This 
implies that they all operate within the same performance management framework 
introduced by the commission and will thus also enhance better comparative analysis 
among these institutions. 
Another goal of this study was to have a blend of respondents from both perceived good 
and poor performing institutions both in relation to the implementation of the PMS 
reforms and productivity. The selected organisations offer a blend of both perceived 
efficient and poor performing organisation. With my interaction with the Public 
Services Commission of Ghana (PSC), organisations such as the Office of the Head of 
Civil Service and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana were identified as some 
of the good performing organisations in terms of the operationalisation and 
institutionalisation of the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP). The Youth 
Employment Agency on the other hand was considered for my study after a short pilot 
study I conducted to identify some perceived underperforming organisations in the eyes 
of the public. After the pilot study, the YEA was identified as one of the most perceived 
ineffective agencies in Ghana. The agency is tasked with the responsibility of 
employing both skilled and unskilled young men and women into the various public 
sectors in Ghana. As a result, a chunk of state monies is pumped into the agency for 
their activities each year, on the contrary, the aftermath effect of these efforts has been 
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disappointing thereby making the agency ineffective. Political factors continually, since 
its creation, hamper its activities and the entire functionality of the agency. Thus, out 
of curiosity, I found it interesting to include the YEA in my study to substantiate this 
finding by examining the PMS of the YEA and their response to the NPMP. The PSC 
moreover did identify them as one of the slow starters in the performance management 
policy implementation process.  
Last but not least, convenience was also a factor in the selection of the cases of the 
study. It was quite easier to assess organisations like the N&MC, OHCS and the YEA 
as compared to the public service organisations. Due to the time constraint, I had to rely 
on some public servants for accessibility to their organisations. It was quite easier to do 
so with the N&MC, OHCS and the YEA.   
3.3 Research Population, Participants & Selection Techniques 
The study focused on the meaning participants ascribe to the research subject. It relied 
on their views and thoughts on the whole performance management system of the 
public service and the extent to which it has been entrenched in their organisations. Due 
to the partly exploratory intent of the study, it was quite imperative to seek the voice of 
the participants by sharing their views, personal stories and experiences. The target 
population comprised of all well-informed stakeholders in the various organisations 
whose views and experiences were deemed crucial for the study. Thus, study population 
focused on both principal officers and junior officers.  The study saw to it that all levels 
of staff across all targeted organisations were substantially represented. 
With regards to the selection of participants, I employed both purposive sampling 
(opportunistic sampling) and snowball sampling approach. With the snowball 
sampling, participants were able to propose other participants who have had the 
experience relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012: 424). The idea was to gather a wide 
array of rich information of greater significance to the purpose of the research, (Layder, 
1998) from information-rich informants to enhance the validity of the study. In light of 
this, officers with specific information and experience about performance management 
were targeted and possibly sought further potential respondent referrals. The study in 
total had twenty-eight (28) respondents who were interviewed. Table 3.0 offers a 
distribution of the bureaucrats who participated in the study 
 
 - 39 - 
Table 3.0. Participants Distribution 
 
3.4 Method of Data Collection 
3.4.1 Qualitative Interview 
Interview is one of the most important case study data collection tools (Yin, 2003). 
According to Yin (2003) case study interviews are seen to be guided conversations. 
With interviews, it is imperative for researchers to follow a personal line of enquiry as 
reflected by the case study protocol and also ask actual questions in an unbiased manner 
that satisfies the needs of the line of enquiry (Ibid:90).  
The study adopted in-depth interviews as its main data collection tool. It drew on both 
open-ended and semi-structured face to face interview with guiding pre-set questions 
as an interview guide. This prevented me from drifting away from the line of enquiry. 
The open-ended nature of the interview allowed the respondents to propose insights 
PUBLIC ORGANISATION NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 
Office of the Head of Civil Service Principal Director 1 
Senior Administrative Officer 3 
Junior Administrative Officer 5 
TOTAL 9 
Nursing & Midwifery Council Principal Director 1 
Senior Administrative Officer 3 
Junior Administrative Officer 6 
TOTAL 10 
Youth Employment Agency Principal Director 1 
Senior Administrative Officer 2 
Junior Administrative Officer 6 
TOTAL 9 
Public Services Commission of Ghana Chief Director 1 
Total Number of Participants 28 
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into certain questions which may serve as a basis for further insights through follow-up 
questions (Ibid). All the research interviews were conducted at the various premises of 
the various organisations (mostly participants’ offices). The average span of the 
interviews for the low information-rich informants was approximately forty-five (45) 
and approximately One (1) hour for the high information-rich informants. Below are 
some of the questions asked as well as informants’ responses during the interview 
engagements: 
• Interviewer... How do you see hierarchism and power distance in this 
organisation? 
Respondent... Every institution has hierarchies of which you have to respect. This 
office has a top down approach system of governance here. But management also 
accommodates the bottom up approach through which those at bottom can make 
contributions. I will not say there is quite a big distance with regards to power. So, 
management of power is at the doorstep of every officer. At any given time, we are 
always welcome as long as we channel our issues through the appropriate process. I 
am an administrative officer and I have a deputy.  
• Interviewer... How is the boss – subordinate relationship like? 
Respondent... The boss – subordinate relationship is very cordial and we walk to them 
at any time. 
It is worth noting that the interview method of data collection came with its own 
challenges. One key challenge was that most of the interview sessions got interrupted 
by office personnel and visitors which made it difficult to for the interviewees to 
constantly maintain their concentration throughout the session. Nonetheless, I tried my 
best to constantly refresh their memories on the discussions whenever they seemed lost.  
In addition, although the study is qualitative (Case Study) in nature, I had to employ a 
rating instrument as a field tactic to help validate and measure the extent to which some 
elements of the NPMP have been institutionalised8. The rating instrument had a 
measuring scale of 0 to 10, which in sum accumulated to a general score of 80.  Scores 
                                               
8 As part of the variations within Case Studies, case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative 
and qualitative evidence (Yin, 2003:15) 
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from 50 and above indicated a high level of institutionalisation whereas scores from 30 
and below indicated a low level of institutionalisation with a score of 40 indicating an 
average level of institutionalisation. 
3.4.2 Secondary Data 
Yin (2003) really highlights on the essence of the use of secondary data in case studies, 
in that, it enhances the quality of the study by means of data triangulation. In addition 
to the usage of interviews as the main primary data source, the study also gathered data 
from other secondary sources inclusive of documents, and direct observation. Table 3.1 
offers a general overview and summary of the tools of data collection employed for the 
study. 
Table 3.1 Tools of data collection employed for data collection 
Tools of data 
collection 




perceptions of the 
various variables of 
the study. 
- Principal Directors 
- Senior Officers 
- Junior Officers 
Public Service 
Rating Instrument - Bureaucrats’ 




- Principal Directors 
- Senior Officers 
- Junior Officers 
Public Service 
Observation - Bureaucrats’ 
behaviour; how they 
work and behave in 
relation to the 
variables of the study. 
- Direct observation of 
bureaucrats 
Public Service 
Documentation  - Documents about the 
previous PMS and the 
NPMP. 
- Public Service 
Commission  
-  Selected Cases 
Public Service 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Condensed Content Analysis was adopted for my data analysis to guard against being 
captivated by the richness of the data collected and thus preventing what Lofland 
describes as analytic interruptus (Bryman, 2012: 565). Content analysis provides a 
rigorous structure for analysing data by providing tighter definitions of the data coding 
process to distil the categories into themes (Kairuz, Crump & O’Brien, 2007: 372).  
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The study employed a four-step content analysis. The first step was the immersion of 
data. First and foremost, the qualitative data collected from interviews and other sources 
were transcribed into texts and furthermore organised into strands of data or meaning 
units. After the immersion of data, the next step was the reduction of the meaning units 
into simple words that is condensed meaning units. The condensed data were further 
abstracted into subthemes and higher logical levels that is themes. Finally, these 
subthemes and themes were analysed together to examine the thread of meanings that 
run through the entire data. Some of these content analyses are provided throughout the 
thesis for meaningful analytical discussions. An example of the condensed content 
analysis used for the study is provided below in table 3.2. 
3.2 Condensed content analysis used for the study’s data analysis 
3.6 Quality of Research 
Several scholars like, Yin (2003), Bryman (2012) and Creswell (2013) have expressed 
several criteria for judging the quality of any research design. However, the study 
adopts Validity, Reliability, and Generalisation as some criteria for assessing the 
checking the accuracy and credibility of my findings as posited by Creswell (2013) 
although they do overlap with Yin’s (2003) validity tests.  
3.6.1 Validity 
Qualitative validity refers to the techniques and strategies the research employs in 
checking the accuracy of the findings (Creswell, 2013). In other words, it means 
Meaning Unit Code/Condensed Meaning Unit Sub-theme Theme 
“This tool guides officers and 
I think that is a reflection of 
the objective you made 
mention of.” 
The effectiveness of the tool 






The institutionalisation of 
Construct A - Implementing 
performance/results-oriented 
management in meeting 
organisational goals. 
“In this office, I will say yes, 
it has significantly been 
institutionalised but, in the 
Civil service at large, No.” 
Significantly institutionalised in 
the OHCS 
“Yeah, I think that aspect is 
entrenched in a way. I can see 
the traits in the management 
style.” 
Traits quite evident in the 
management style of leaders 
“I think we are not there yet. 
And there is more room for 
improvement in that aspect.” 
More room for improvement. Not fully 
institutionalised 
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enhancing the integrity of the conclusions of a research study (Bryman, 2012). Validity 
is very much related to what Yin (2003) discusses as construct validity. In implication 
the validity of the research evaluates the degree to which the research phenomenon was 
rightfully addressed (Kirk and Miller, 1986). It seeks to establish the extent to which 
the study objectively achieves its research objectives. In relation to my study, this 
particular validity was established at the data collection phase of the study. To achieve 
this validity of the study, first and foremost, I saw to it that specific dimensions of 
organisational culture, leadership and administrative reform policies were clearly 
outlined and operationalised based on well researched concepts and were in sync with 
the main objectives of the study. 
Furthermore, throughout the data collection phase, I again made sure that the selected 
measures in investigating the contextual effect and the institutionalisation of 
performance management systems reflected the actual study variables. In effect, all 
concepts and questions were clearly and succinctly explained to respondents to prevent 
any form of ambiguity. Respondents were engaged in a clear language of instruction 
(preferably English Language) for easy and smooth communication. 
One of the main tactics that I employed to increase the construct validity of the study 
the use of multiple sources of evidence in a corroborative fashion. The main rationale 
behind this, was to establish converging lines of inquiry that is the process of 
triangulation. According to Yin (2003: 98) findings or conclusions of studies 
(especially case studies) are most likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based 
on several different sources of information. With converging lines of inquiry and data 
triangulation, potential problems of construct validity are addressed (Ibid). 
Additionally, the study employed the member checking (Creswell, 2013) technique, 
also known as informant feedback or respondent validation, to achieve the validity of 
the study. In view of that, I presented back the draft case study report to the key 
informants for review and data validation. 
3.6.2 Reliability 
The reliability of a study is about demonstrating the replicability of results of the study 
using the same research methodology (Yin, 2003). One of the main aims of this study 
is to build a premise for replicability. In other words, the study puts in place and develop 
correct measurements, instruments and procedures which will enable later investigators 
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to reproduce the same results or findings of the study by observing the study’s laid 
down measures and procedures. According to Yin (2003:38), one prerequisite for 
achieving this validity is to document all procedures followed throughout the study. In 
view of this, an interview guide, and case study database (notes and documents) were 
developed in my quest to enrich the reliability of my study.9 And this was observed at 
the data collection phase of the research. 
Another strategy that was employed to achieve this validity is to maintain a chain of 
evidence. This also increases the reliability of the study. The maintenance of a chain of 
evidence refers to principle whereby external observers are able to follow the derivation 
of any evidence by tracing the steps in either direction (from conclusions back to 
research questions or vice versa) (Ibid:105). In view of this, all relevant documents and 
literature sources are well cited to help readers trace the authenticity of information and 
how they led to the research findings.  
3.6.3 Generalisation (External Validity) 
Generalisation basically refers to what Yin (2003) describes as the external validity. It 
is mostly about building a premise for generalisation (Yin, 2003). One of the main 
problems associated with case studies is the inability to make scientific generalisations 
beyond cases to wider populations (Ibid). Qualitative generalisation is mostly used in a 
limited way in qualitative research since the intent is not to generalise findings to 
individuals, sites, or places outside of those under study (Creswell, 2013: 192). This 
study seeks to resolve this problem by doing an analytical generalisation that is, 
generalising from empirical observations to theory rather than the population (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008:1468). The concern is to validate theories and to what extent 
theories were relevant to this study. In this connection, theories concerning 
administrative culture and leadership, and its influence on performance management 
systems will be generalised through analytical generalisation. This will be achieved by 
using multiple case study design and replication logic. This means, responses from the 
respondents from the selected organisations will be generalised to the theories 
underpinning the study and also may have some implications for other African 
                                               
9 Interview guide and other documents provided in the appendices 
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countries. For example, the variables employed in this study can also be used by others 
to analyse the same problem issue. 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Adhering to strict ethical rubrics in research helps in trust development and enhances 
participants’ cooperation. Ethical issues in research throw lots of challenges to most 
researchers especially when respondents feel their protection is not guaranteed. The 
study saw to it that ethical principles which include; avoidance of harm to participants, 
seeking informed consent, confidentiality, and personal integrity were strictly upheld 
in my study.  
3.8 Chapter Summary 
In an attempt to offer some ‘ex-post’ insight into the reason behind failed performance 
management reforms and low productivity in Ghana’s Public Service, this chapter 
provides a detailed account of the research design and methodology of the study. The 
study employed a qualitative method of enquiry with a multiple case study as the main 
research strategy. With the Public Service as the Study’s Unit of Analysis, the study 
drew several participants from the Office of the Head of Civil Service, Youth 
Employment Agency, and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana who operate 
under the auspices of the Public Services Commission. Furthermore, multiple source of 
data collection was employed to enhance the validity of the study. The chapter also 
offered an in-depth account of the validity of the study as well the ethical principles 
upheld by the researcher. 
The next chapter opens discussions on the findings of the study as I present findings on 
the state of performance management reform in Ghana’s Public Service. (Part A of the 
first research question). It will be very descriptive as it presents the current performance 
management reform in the Ghanaian Public Service. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN THE 
GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY. 
 4.0 Introduction 
This chapter opens discussions on the findings of this study. It begins discussions on 
the very nature and state of Performance Management Systems in the Ghanaian 
Bureaucracy, which in turn answers the first part of the first research question of the 
study; what is the state of performance management reform in Ghana’s Public 
Service?  The chapter provides a trajectory of results-oriented performance 
management reform attempts in Ghana’s Public Service and also draw to the limelight 
the most recent performance management reform policy, that is New Performance 
Management Policy (NPMP) framework, rolled out in the Public Service by the Public 
Services Commission (PSC) in 2014. This chapter offers descriptive yet comprehensive 
discussions on the reform trajectories as well as broad overview, implementation and 
governance structure or framework of the policy. Who are the key actors involved? 
What are the roles of these actors? The chapter then wraps up with my critical 
reflections on the NPMP policy. Findings presented in this chapter are mainly sourced 
from interviews and some document reviews. 
4.1 Trajectory of Results-Oriented Performance Management in 
Ghana’s Public Service 
Institutionalising a performance driven culture into Ghana’s Public Service has since 
proven to be a difficult task despite several efforts through results-oriented reform 
initiatives. One of the attempts by reformers over the years has been the paradigm shift 
from a traditional performance management culture to a more rationalistic (results-
oriented) way of performance management in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy.   
Before the Public Service of Ghana first witnessed its maiden NPM – inspired 
administrative reform, that is, the CSRP, the service had its own performance 
management instrument, that is, the Annual Confidential Reporting System (ACRS) 
which was later reviewed in 1974. The main objective of this performance management 
instrument was to allow assessees the right to read and comment on their performance 
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appraisal reports (Ibid). This instrument was reviewed and improved under the CSRP 
in 1992 which led to the introduction of the Performance Evaluation System (PES). 
This system was primarily an interactive process between managers and members of 
staff. The main focus was on the category of Deputy Directors and equivalent grades 
and below (Ibid).  
In spite of all these performance systems, the service was still beset with its moribund 
state giving rise to a radical paradigm shift from a traditional bureaucratic system to a 
more result-oriented management culture. Paradigm shift in this context is conceived 
as a transformative change from one way of thinking to another (Karjeija, 2010: 109). 
The first attempt in this regard was the introduction of the Performance Agreement 
System (PAS) in 1997. The system ran from1997 to 2008. The PAS which in some 
instances will be described as the old performance management system was quite ad-
hoc in its implementation and had its own challenges. The system as a whole lacked a 
clear feedback system. This implies, this system was just only concerned with the rule 
driven bureaucratic way of doing things without paying attention to the 
individual/organisational output based on set targets either at the organisational or 
individual level. This system was very prescriptive in nature and it had a highly top 
down approach.  
4.1.1. Challenges of the Old Performance Agreement System (PAS) 
The old performance management system was plagued with several implementation 
challenges. First and foremost, the system lacked a clear defined, articulate and 
enforceable implementation framework (PSC, 2015). This particular challenge has 
been the main threat to the Ghanaian NPM movement. Most of these reforms or systems 
are normally presented without appropriate enforceable implementation framework. 
Policies with clear cut enforceable implementation framework creates what Berger and 
Luckmann (1967:51) describes as “reciprocal typification of habitual actions” where 
newly introduced policies become routine and persistent. In a broader spectrum, it 
creates the platform for a smooth implementation and institutionalisation process.  
Another implementation challenge of the old performance management system was the 
low Executive commitment/involvement and support for the PMS in contrast to what 
pertains in other developed/developing countries (PSC, 2015). The executive support 
can be in a form of making all requisite resources be it, human, financial, or material 
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resources readily available for a successful implementation. By dint of this, it is quite 
easy to put in place proper monitoring measures for a successful policy implementation. 
The negative attitude of the executive in a way then trickles down and shape the attitude 
of bureaucrats especially the leadership of the bureaucracy.   
Again, the non-linkage of the process to an enforceable Reward and Sanctions 
Mechanism partly accounted to the downfall of the old PMS system (Ibid). Performance 
management instruments with proper reward and sanctions mechanisms creates some 
sort of extrinsic motivation which tends to drive bureaucrats’ attitude towards the 
instrument and the policy as a whole.	 
The entire policy framework became a failure because all these foregoing challenges 
among others daunted the very objective of the policy, that is the provision of an 
objective means of assessing performance in the public service. The adverse effects of 
these challenges on the performance management culture of public servants were very 
overwhelming and quite destructive. Firstly, according to the Public Service 
Commission of Ghana, these challenges created a non-responsive culture (PSC, 2015). 
There was absolute non-responsiveness or adherence to Staff Performance Appraisal 
System or Performance Agreement. This boils down to the weak implementation 
framework by the implementation body. Secondly, due to the implementation 
challenges, the old PMS system was beset with poor performance reporting system and 
non-compliance to timeliness/deadlines. This was as a result of lack of proper training 
and monitoring mechanisms. As already mentioned, the public servants in the first place 
did not understand the whole PMS policy. And again, it boils down to lack of proper 
training and hence creating this lacklustre attitude.    
In response to these challenges and effects, the Public Services Commission saw it 
prudent to develop a new PMS policy framework (New Performance Management 
Policy) to realign the vision of creating a more effective and efficient public service. 
This new policy framework is what this study seeks to analyse and explore its 
operationalisation. 
4.2 The New Performance Management Policy Framework (NPMP) 
The New Performance Management Policy Framework, which was first piloted in 
2011, was developed and introduced in 2014 by the Public Services Commission in 
collaboration with the Office of the Head of the Civil Service, the Australian Public 
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Commission and other key stakeholders to help institutionalise apt performance 
management culture in the public service. The Australian Public Service was very 
instrumental in the development of the policy. However, the engaged director at the 
PSC did emphasise that, their support was mainly in the form of the design of the tool, 
training and workshops.  
The Policy is apparently still at the training phase of the implementation process with 
the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) spearheading the training at the 
Ministerial and Departmental level. Although there is no concrete statistics on the 
number of public service organisations using the policy, an engaged director at the 
OHCS did hint in one of my interviews that of about 243 public service organisations, 
only 85 have implemented it at their respective organisations.  
4.2.1 Reasons for the Introduction of the NPMP 
Firstly, the New Performance Management Policy Framework was mainly introduced 
as part of the government’s quest to revamp the Public Service through NPM-inspired 
administrative reforms. The main rationale behind its introduction was to fill in the 
administrative gaps which came with the old performance management system and to 
introduce a “one-for-all” policy framework for the entire public service. The PSC 
director noted in our engagements that: 
“...there were different ones, first of all, measuring different things but we 
wanted at least all public service organisations to use one for all. The public 
service commission as part of the public service reform, deemed it important 
to introduce a good performance management system in order to improve 
service delivery” (Chief Director, PSC). 
So, contrary to the old system, this policy seeks to institute quite a robust and a 
comprehensive performance management system from a holistic perspective. The 
NPMP hinges on the underlying assumption that, performance is an on-going process 
that takes place from the time an employee joins the organisation until they leave and 
should be used in time to support and develop people through their employment with 
the organisation (PSC, 2015: 7). 
Secondly, this system was introduced to provide a comprehensive Performance 
Appraisal System (PAS) and methods on how individual and institutional performance 
should be measured. This system presents quite a different assessment approach where 
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performance is assessed both at the individual and institutional level unlike the old PMS 
system. The engaged director at the PSC in her explanations did underscore that the 
NPMP provides a more systematic, phasic way of measuring performance in the Public 
Service both at the individual and organisational level.  
By correcting the implementation defects and deficits which characterised the old 
system, the NPMP aims at institutionalising better reward and sanction systems linked 
to performance as well as training and career development for the individual. This was 
really identified as one major kink of the old PMS which needed to be ironed out.  
Also, most importantly, the NPMP was introduced to reduce subjectivity, which 
characterised the old system, to its minimum degree.   
With a paradigm shift to a performance driven management, the new system 
emphasises on continuous feedback and employee development.  
4.2.2 The Implementation Framework of the NPMP. 
How does a policy get operationalised at the organisational level to achieve intended 
policy results? Who are the key bureaucratic actors and stakeholders involved in the 
implementation process? What are the roles of these actors as far as the implementation 
of the policy is concerned? This section primarily discusses the governance structure 
and the implementation framework of the NPMP. Here, I will try to discuss what Knill 
and Tosun (2012:148) describe as the “post-decisional politics” of the NPMP. The 
ultimate outcome of any policy can fall short of its’ intended results or outcomes if the 
policy is insufficiently implemented (Ibid). The governance structure or 
implementation structure of the NPMP is very top-down in nature. This means that, it 
is the primary goal of the policy makers to implement the policy goals of the NPMP 
from the top bureaucratic divisions down to the street-level bureaucracies with little or 
no lower level bureaucrats’ participation in decision making relative to the entire 
implementation of the policy. The main discussions of this section will focus on the 
roles of the various bureaucratic actors in the NPMP implementation chain. The study 
did identify a four-level implementation chain of the NPMP. The key bureaucratic 
actors making up this four-level implementation chain include: the main autonomous 
agencies, that is the Public Services Commission (PSC), the National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission (FWSC); 
 - 51 - 
the Governing Councils and Boards; the Heads of the Public Services, Chief 
Executives, and Chief Directors (Management); and the Street-level Bureaucrats. 
The Role of Autonomous Agencies 
The key autonomous bodies or agencies in charge of the overall design and 
implementation of the NPMP are the Public Service Commission (main policy 
designers and implementers), the National Development Planning Commission, and the 
Fair Wages and Salaries Commission. 
The Public Services Commission 
The PSC, per its Act is to promote a high level of integrity, accountability and 
competence in public service organisations in Ghana. And as already discussed in 
Chapter Five, the NPMP was developed by the PSC against the backdrop of this 
mandate through institutional administrative reforms. In this connection, it has this 
implicit implementation responsibility of developing guidelines, standards, regulations 
and procedures which provides an institutionalisation framework for the NPMP in the 
various public services (PSC, 2015).  
Secondly, the PSC, as part of its regulatory duties, requires each public service 
organisation to provide annual performance report on all aspects of its Human Resource 
Management activities (Ibid). The essence of this is to create a post implementation 
feedback mechanism to help ascertain the state of organisational performance in the 
various public organisations. 
The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Fair Wages and 
Salaries Commission (FWSC) 
Although instrumental in the overall implementation of the policy, these two 
organisations are more in charge of peripheral implementation roles as compared to the 
PSC. The core mandate of the NDPC is to “advise the President on development 
planning policy and strategy” per Article 82 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The 
FWSC, on the other hand, per its mission statement is to ensure that best practices in 
job grading, evaluation, performance management and research are employed in pay 
administration to ensure that pay in the Public services is linked to productivity and that 
high-calibre employees are attracted to and retained within the public service.  
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With regards to the implementation of the NPMP, the primary role of the NDPC and 
the FWSC is to provide indices or measures for incentives, rewards, increments, 
sanctions and productivity as the NPMP seeks to institute a more robust 
recognition/reward/sanction system in the Public Services of Ghana (PSC, 2015). The 
engaged director at the PSC noted that the FWSC is apparently working on the salary 
reward scheme of the NPMP and it has already been agreed in principle.  
4.2.2.2 The Role of the Governing Councils and Boards 
The Governing Councils and Boards are seen as one of the key implementers of this 
policy. As a major stakeholder in the implementation chain of the NPMP, the governing 
boards have the role of overseeing the general administration and evaluation of 
Performance Agreements signed with their CEOs (PSC, 2015). The various governing 
councils and boards as part of their core mandates serve as the primary performance 
evaluative agents of the organisation with the CEOs and perhaps, some top officials as 
their main subjects.  
4.2.2.3 The Role of Management 
Management in this context refers to the administrative leadership of the various public 
organisations. The leadership comprises of the Heads of the Public Services, Chief 
Executives and their Deputies, and Chief Directors and their Deputies. These 
bureaucratic actors are seen as one of the key implementation agents crucial for a 
successful implementation. The NPMP has management as one of its central actors at 
the organisational level. In view of that, management is responsible for the general 
administration and enforcement of the Performance Management System in their 
respective organisations (PSC, 2015). Management is in charge of the day to day 
administration of the organisation, thus, anything that feeds into the organisational 
output is an upshot of a nested sequence of leadership decisions and that is the theory 
behind the role of management. 
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4.2.2.4 The Role of “Street-level Bureaucrats” 
Several scholars like Keiser and Soss (1998), and Langbien, (2000) have offered several 
developments on the concept of street-level bureaucracy10. Street-level bureaucrats in 
this context, unlike the traditional Lipskyan definition, refers to those practicing and 
typically, anonymous public servants at the very end of the public policy chain (Sevä 
& Jagers, 2013 :1060). In its simplest form, they are seen as the lower bureaucrats 
steering affairs at the lower units of the organisation.  
As I have already mentioned, the implementation of the NPMP is presented in a top-
down fashion where street-level bureaucrats are positioned at the very tail end of the 
implementation chain. These group of bureaucrats did not influence the design of the 
policy in any way, however, they are only regarded as mere implementation instruments 
to achieve the NPMP goals. The finding of the study indicates that some of these 
bureaucrats are not even aware of the existence of the NPMP (about 40%). All that they 
know of, is just the performance appraisal aspect of the policy as a general 
administrative practice implemented from the top management. For example, three out 
of the nine interviewees from the Office of the Head of Civil Service were just oblivious 
of the NPMP. One of these four bureaucrats opined when asked about the NPMP that: 
“I	don’t	really	know	about	that	policy	so	I	cannot	say	anything	about	it”. 
This reflects in the fact that, street-level bureaucrats were just marginalised right from 
the design of the policy to its implementation. They had and still have no or little role 
to play in respect of decisions concerning the implementation of the NPMP.  
4.2.3 The Key Features of the NPMP 
Principles and Policy Statements/Guidelines 
The New Performance Management Policy is theoretically conceptualised on four key 
principles, that is Accountability, Transparency, Equity and Ownership. These building 
constructs tends to guide the operationalisation of the whole performance management 
                                               
10 The term and logic of “Street-level bureaucrats or bureaucracy” was first used by Michael Lipsky in 
describing public servants in “schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services 
offices, and other agencies whose workers interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation 
of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions (Lipsky, 1980: xi). 
 - 54 - 
system. The Public Services Commission is very much determined to build up a more 
performance driven culture on these four principles. Box 4.0 offers a brief summary of 
the four key principles of the policy.  
Box 4.0 The New Performance Management Policy Principles  
Policy Principles 
Accountability: The principle of Accountability hinges on the basic premise that every individual, unit, 
department/ division must be accountable on a continuous basis to his/her superior, the public for their 
actions and inactions.  
Transparency: By making the system very transparent, the new system generally agrees that, firstly, the 
setting and outcome of performance targets at both the individual and institutional level must be done and 
discussed in a very consultative manner between assessors and assesses.  
Equity: Equity in this new system implies that the system should be devoid of any form of discrimination 
with respect to gender, ethnicity, geographical location, physical infirmity etc. Also, the principle of 
equity in the context of this policy seeks to establish a system where the frequency and use of assessment 
outcomes are the same for every individual or public service institution. 
Ownership: The basic assumption of this principle is that the whole process and outcome of the 
assessment mechanism must be owned by all stakeholders as well as the assessors and assessees both at 
the individual and organisational level.  
 
Based on the foregoing principles, the policy is being operationalised and driven by 
eleven (11) explicit context-specific policy statements or guidelines. These statements 
provide some clear policy-specific objectives in the purview of what ought and needs 
to be done in the attainment of the ultimate policy goals. Box 4.1 succinctly presents 
the eleven undergirding NPMP’s policy statements. 
Box 4.0 The New Performance Management Policy Statements/Guidelines  
Policy Statements 
Policy Statement 1: Performance Management shall be a management tool for meeting organisational 
goals. 
Policy Statement 2: Performance Management shall be used to create a shared understanding of what is 
to be achieved and how it is achieved. 
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Policy Statement 3: Performance Management shall be viewed both as an approach and a system for 
managing people and other organisational resources. 
Policy Statement 4: Performance Management shall be used to promote the health and long-term growth 
of the institution. 
Policy Statement 5: Competencies and measurement standards shall drive the performance management 
process to achieving desired results. 
Policy Statement 6: Performance Management shall drive the process through clear, consistent, visible 
and active involvement of the governing bodies, senior executives and managers. 
Policy Statement 7: Management and staff shall adopt effective and open communication systems at all 
levels for the successful promotion of the performance management process. 
Policy Statement 8: Performance Measurements shall be linked to performance planning and assessment. 
Policy Statement 9: Incentives, rewards, recognition and sanctions shall be linked to performance. 
Policy Statement 10: Performance results and progress shall be openly shared and communicated with 
employees, customers, and stakeholders. 
Policy Statement 11: Performance measurement results shall be used to effect continuous change and 
improvement. 
The New Performance Management System of NPMP 
Based on the underpinning policy principles of the NPMP, the performance 
management system depicts a six-stage cyclical process. The system is developed in a 
way that all phases of the performance process are directly interlinked creating a 
rational network mechanism for monitoring and assessing staff performance. These 
stages include: Performance Planning: Development of performance plans and 
targets, identification of key metrics and their associated timelines, the mode of 
operation and attainment of these metrics; Performance Measurement: Setting 
agreed-upon performance goals, allocating and prioritising resources, informing 
managers to either confirm or change current policy or programme directions to meet 
the set goals, and report on the success in meeting those goals (PSC, 2015:10);  
Performance Monitoring: Development of proper monitoring mechanisms to help 
identify performance issues and take correct measures in dealing with those issues; 
Performance Evaluation: Undertaking a bi-annual level assessment both at the 
individual and organisational level; Annual Performance Reporting: Generating 
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performance reports through a proper appraisal mechanism. This takes place at the 
institutional level; and Performance Improvement Plans: Putting in place training 
systems and proper reward and sanction systems linked to performance.  
The system is developed in a way that all phases of the performance process are directly 
interlinked creating a rational network mechanism for monitoring and assessing staff 
performance. Figure 4.1 presents a visual summary of the performance management 











Figure 4.1 The 6 phase Performance Management System Cycle of NPMP  
(Source: PSC, 2015 NPMP Policy Document) 
4.3 Critical Reflections 
The NPMP with its results-oriented intent looks very comprehensive and promising. 
The policy formulators and implementers are very much optimistic with the post 
implementation effect of the policy on the performance of public servants. However, in 
spite of its robustness and optimism, I strongly opine that the policy has its own defects 
in content and in scope. The most interesting concern about the policy worth pointing 
out is the outlined policy statements. First, looking at these statements, they are just too 
many and hence some repetitions. For example, I think the policy statement 7 and 10 
among others do overlap and a case of repetition. They both seem to underline the 
intention of enhancing communication among employees for an effective performance 
appraisal process. 
Second, some of the statements and their explanations look very vague. They are not 
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statements are supposed to drive the overall objective of the NPMP. Thus, I was 
expecting an in-depth operationalisation of these statements with their various 
implementation approach in order to prevent any form of misinterpretations at the 
organisational level.  
That notwithstanding, for the purpose of a more constructive and critical analysis of the 
policy, four key constructs have been teased out from the policy statements and the 
entire NPMP as mentioned in chapter two. These four key constructs will serve as the 
key policy constructs or objectives and a framework within which the entire policy 
(NPMP) will be analysed vis a vis the bureaucrats’ perception. These constructs have 
been outlined as follows; 
• Construct/Objective A - Implementing Results-Oriented Management; 
• Construct/Objective B - Introduction of Robust Performance Appraisal System 
• Construct/Objective C - Transparency of performance targets; 
• Construct/Objective D – Ensuring an effective Reward and Sanction System. 
There will be further elaborations on the policy constructs in the next chapter. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed the first research question with discussions on the state and 
nature of performance management of the Ghanaian bureaucracy as well as its 
administrative restructuring in the age of NPM in Ghana. With a better outlook 
especially with PM reforms, the introduction and implementation of the NPMP seeks 
to provide a platform for a rational and scientific assessment of performance of public 
service employees which was very subjective, arbitrarily managed and sometimes 
flavoured with favouritism under the old PM system. It seeks to nullify the already 
existing supposition of performance management in the Ghana Public Service that 
“performance management is a one-time ad hoc mechanism”. On the contrary, this 
policy seeks to advance a more rationalistic/mechanistic approach to performance 
management.  
The next chapter will offer further insights into the state of performance management 
reforms in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. It will present findings on the extent to which 
the NPMP has been institutionalised at the various bureaucracies. Discussions will be 
mainly about bureaucrats’ perception on how the NPMP is fairing and the extent to 
which it has been institutionalised.  
 - 58 - 
CHAPTER FIVE 
INSTITUTIONALISING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
REFORMS: THE NEW PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
POLICY(NPMP) IN PRACTICE 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter is a build-up on the preceding chapter as it surges deeper into the 
operationalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. It seeks to also address 
the second part of the research question; To what extent has this (PM Reforms and the 
NPMP) been institutionalised in the various public institutions? As part of 
discussions, I will look at some implementation anomalies that characterised the old 
PMS and yet deferred to the current PMS dispensation creating an implementation and 
institutionalisation deadlock.  
5.1 Institutionalising the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service 
This chapter looks into the New Performance Management Policy (NPMP) from an 
institutionalisation view point with respect to the selected cases of the study. This 
pertains to the issue of “habitualisation” (habitual actions).  
The study found some organisations who are really making some substantial headway 
with the policy as far as institutionalisation is concerned. However, there were still 
some traits of implementation lapses identified by the study. The state of the NPMP at 
the OHCS and the NMC was encouraging despite some few implementation lapses 
identified in the whole performance management system. The situation at the YEA was 
unsatisfactory especially with their response towards the new PMS and even PM as a 
whole. The subsequent sections will discretely discuss in detail the extent to which the 
NPMP has been institutionalised in the above-mentioned cases with particular reference 
to the key constructs of the NPMP outlined in the preceding chapter as the benchmark 
for analysis.  
5.2 The Good Performers: The Case of the OHCS and the NMC 
Performance Management System has been a great fool-proof administrative formula 
for instigating high level of result-oriented behavioural culture among employees at the 
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OHCS and the NMC of Ghana. The managements of the OHCS and the NMC are really 
striving to get PMS and the NPMP fully institutionalised since its adoption in 2014. 
Although there exist some contextual constraints, the entire managements of both 
organisations have tried to control the phenomenon and enhanced some degree of 
compatibility11. 
The OHCS 
The Office of the Head of Civil Service was hit by a radical PMS alteration led by a 
revolutionary leader, the Head of the Civil Service, in 2014. According to engaged 
bureaucrats at the OHCS, this was the turning point of their PM fortunes and even up 
to date, the OHCS is projected as a key spearhead of the NPMP. The only engaged 
director the OHCS described this movement as below: 
“In the Ghana civil service, it took the Head of Civil Service to say that ‘we 
have ended it. This is where I want us to go’. I wouldn’t say our performance 
management system was in a mess but it wasn’t far from that either. Out of 
dissatisfaction, the current Head of Service had to embark on what I will say, 
a performance management revolution and hence the adoption of this new 
policy from PSC.” (Principal Director, OHCS). 
From the findings of the study, the NPMP seems to take greater root in the 
administrative systems of the OHCS. Performance management or appraisal is not 
merely seen as administrative convention in the OHCS but as a key administrative 
component which drives organisational productivity. Having said that, the performance 
management “game” has not been all rosy in the OHSC. As a human organisation with 
a Ghanaian cultural setting, the NPMP has been beset with some implementation 
defects creating as a stalemate vis à vis the policy goals of the NPMP. 
The NMC 
Just like the case of the OHCS, it also took a revolutionary leader, that is the HR 
director, to revamp certain administrative systems especially with performance 
management at the NMC upon his appointment as the HR director. The NMC was 
marred with several administrative deficiencies with respect to performance 
management. The HR director noted this in my interaction with him: 
                                               
11 Compatibility issues will be comprehensively discussed in the next chapter. 
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 “Until my appointment as the HR director for the NMC, the NMC had 
several lapses in its administrative systems. One typical example is that, the 
organisational even had no basis for promotion of its employees which was 
just unacceptable” (Principal Director, NMC). 
So, against this backdrop, the NMC invited the PSC after it had formally launched the 
NPMP for some enlightenment on the policy. The NPMP was then formally rolled out 
at the NMC in 2014 and ever since, the NMC has stayed committed to the policy. The 
NMC was faced with several initial implementation challenges as typical of any “one 
size fits all” externally adopted policy which needs some sort of assimilation with the 
existing host culture of the organisation. The main initial challenge faced by the NMC 
was that, the employees (mostly nurses) found it very difficult to comprehend the whole 
PAS aspect of the policy.  
In order to ascertain the extent to which the NPMP has gained roots at the OHCS and 
the NMC, the teased-out four policy constructs/objectives outlined in the preceding 
chapter will serve as the analytical paradigm for institutionalisation discussions in the 
next sub sections. And, they will be discretely discussed in tandem with the bureaucrats’ 
perceptions and at the same time as the main unit of measurement of the extent of the 
institutionalisation of the NPMP.  
5.2.1 Construct A- Implementing results-oriented management 
The first construct is rooted and underpinned by the first four policy statements of the 
NPMP (outlined in chapter four). Looking at the four policy statements of the NPMP 
and hence this construct, it presupposes that, the NPMP is meant to address all the 
managerial anomalies that characterised the old PMS system. This particular construct 
is highly managerial, and it hinges on the assumption that, organisational productivity 
reflects rational calculations through “hard-core” management practices. So, most 
importantly, the NPMP must be seen as one of the core management tools in driving 
the core mandate of the organisation, which will consequently promote the health and 
long-term growth of the public organisation. So, at the end of the day, the NPMP is 
expected to promote the professionalisation of the HR Management in the entire Public 
Service for improved management of staff (PSC, 2015: 18)  
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The OHCS 
With regards to bureaucrats’ opinions in respect to the degree of the institutionalisation 
success of this particular construct, although there were varying opinions, majority of 
the interviewees agreed to a substantial degree of the institutionalisation success of the 
construct A. Six out of eight respondents interviewed on the subject admitted that there 
is a great deal of institutionalisation. Bureaucrats agreed that, despite all the challenges 
that the organisation is facing with the implementation of the NPMP, they feel the 
leadership of the OHCS is really doing something right with their managerial approach 
in the organisation. One of the bureaucrats had this to say when asked on the subject of 
institutionalisation of construct A:  
 “Yeah, I think that aspect is entrenched in a way. I can see the traits in the 
management style. But I think they do have other management styles. It is not 
fixed. We kind of use the conceptual system, where we apply a particular line 
of management as and when it happens.” (Junior Administrative Officer, 
OHCS). 
This particular respondent was full of praise for the entire management of the OHCS. 
The respondent was just impressed with the level of the management at OHCS and was 
quick to liken the performance of the entire management to what is happening in the 
private corporate world.  
Despite the fact that most of the bureaucrats reacted positively to the extent of the 
institutionalisation of construct A, two of the respondents were adamant on the fact that, 
there is still more room for improvement in the OHCS and the whole public service at 
large. These persons felt that, although management is trying, they cannot match the 
competence of the elite Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers in the 
business corporate world. One of them opined that: 
“I think we are not there yet. And there is more room for improvement in that 
aspect. You know something, the civil service will always remain the civil 
service. What is happening in the private sector is totally different here. Like I 
said, management needs to step up their game a bit.” (Junior Administrative 
Officer, OHCS). 
In conclusion, I will emphasise that, considering the opinions and perceptions of the 
engaged bureaucrats (study respondents), there has been a significant degree of the 
institutionalisation of a result-oriented management at the OHCS and the future looks 
all bright as far as this construct is concerned and the NPMP as a whole.  
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The NMC 
Since 2014 after the NMC first had its taste of the NPMP, there has been a massive turn 
around in the general response of bureaucrats to performance management systems in 
the Council. And I believe it is by virtue of the fact that the entire leadership has 
remained commitment to the laid down PM trajectory and considerations which 
triggered the adoption and implementation of the policy at the NMC. As already 
discussed in the preceding sections, one of the key policy goals mirrored in this 
construct is to sensitise the leadership or management of the various public 
organisations to organisational demands by implementing results-oriented management 
principles in meeting organisational goals. Nine bureaucrats were engaged in an in-
depth interview on this particular subject with seven bureaucrats constituting a 
majority, admitting to a great deal of institutionalisation at the NMC. Most of the 
bureaucrats did acknowledge that, the entire leadership of the NMC is really one of a 
kind in the public service. Despite the negative public perceptions about public service 
organisations, the NMC of Ghana still has its integrity intact. I observed a very great 
working atmosphere and culture as well as the administrative structures at the NMC. 
So, even before my research engagements, I developed a preconceived thought that, the 
management of this particular organisation is really doing a great job per the public-
sector standard in Ghana. My preconceived thought was later substantiated by the 
responses of my research participants as the research unfolded. With respect to the 
institutionalisation of this particular construct, the views of the majority are summed 
up in this admission by one of the bureaucrats: 
“I have been here for four years and the management here have really made 
me appreciate them a lot. Their structures are really credible and it is not 
surprising that the council is really doing so well. We have our integrity intact 
and we are going by what is expected of us by the PSC. So, our ability to 
achieve our organisational goals is as a result of the commitment and efforts 
of management.” (Senior Administrative Officer). 
These admissions lay clear credence to the fact that, the attempt by management to 
inculcate hard core management principles in their quest to professionalise HR 
management at NMC has duly been appreciated by its staff. Notwithstanding the above 
discussed consensus, two of the engaged bureaucrats were quite disappointed and 
pessimistic with the performance of management and the level of institutionalisation of 
this particular construct. I had one interesting revelation from one of the bureaucrats 
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who is an administrative staff at the HR unit which really caught me thinking 
throughout my research stint at the NMC. The bureaucrat hinted that, from where she 
is positioned unless something drastic is done, she sees the NMC very far from reaching 
the desired outcome of this particular provision of the policy. Although, it never 
corroborated with the views of the whopping majority, I still found her assertions very 
interesting. This is what she said: 
“I don’t think it has been institutionalised, maybe they are doing well with 
other administrative systems but with performance management, I think we 
have a long way to go. Sometimes, it is like they don’t care especially with 
regards to appraisal. Maybe management don’t know what is going on at the 
unit level. I think there is low commitment of management to administrative 
systems. I know of people who come to work and just sit on the internet all 
day. So, you see?” (Junior Administrative Officer, NMC). 
Thus, this presupposes that, irrespective of the rosy and optimistic picture painted by 
most of the bureaucrats, there somewhat exists some administrative deficiencies 
crippling productivity of which management may be oblivious of. However, the 
question is, to what extent can this assertion be validated? What may have influenced 
her claims? And even if her claims are true, what then might have caused the general 
positive response to the above discussed subject? 
5.2.2 Construct B – Robust Performance Appraisal System (PAS) 
This policy construct or objective happens to be one of the key reasons behind the 
development of the NPMP. Looking at the paradigm shift from the traditional old way 
of appraising bureaucrats’ performance to the NPMP, the NPMP is to “ensure an 
objective and transparent scheme of assessment of performance” (PSC,2015: 2); and 
for this reason, the rationale for this particular construct. In implication, it is the 
objective of the NPMP to establish quite a robust performance appraisal system 
compared to the old PAS that had crippled productivity in the Public Service over the 
years. So, this PAS that comes with the NPMP is to create a clear direction for 
employees by ensuring that work is aligned with the strategic effort and direction for 
the Public Services (Ibid). 
The OHCS 
Based on the findings of the study, I can explicitly state that, the institutionalisation of 
a more robust PAS at the OHCS has been encouraging as a degree of success has been 
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chalked up by the office or the organisation. However, the institutionalisation progress 
of some elements of the PAS like post-appraisal actions (rewards & sanctions) still lags 
behind. Again, eight bureaucrats at the OHCS were engaged to find out the extent to 
which performance appraisal system has been institutionalised in the organisation. 
They all did admit that, PAS is one of such administrative systems that is least 
compromised in the organisation. And with my short research stint at the OHSC, I 
realised and observed that every official was thriving to work in order to achieve his or 
her work target(s) for the day. At times, I had to even forfeit some interview 
appointments due to the unavailability of officials as a result of bureaucrats trying to 
achieve their targets for the day and thus, making them busy for any engagement. So, 
this particular observation corroborated with what I gathered from my interviews that 
PAS is such an uncompromised administrative system in the OHCS. One of the 
engaged bureaucrats had this interesting claim to make on the degree of the 
institutionalisation of PAS at the OHCS: 
“It has been very effective. It has informed us of our training needs and where 
to improve. That’s something that the appraisal system has really worked on. 
After the assessments and your shortfalls are identified, you are given training 
to improve and that is one thing I like about the policy. When it comes to 
appraisals, there are no compromises. We go through all the appraisal stages 
and it has really influenced performance if not hundred percent, I will say 
about 80%.” (Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS). 
A rating instrument was employed as a field tactic to help validate the positive reaction 
of my interviewees to the degree of institutionalisation. The rating instrument had a 
measuring scale of 0 to 10, which in sum accumulated to a general score of 80. I had a 
mean score of 58.7 out of 80 with the least recorded theoretical score being 40 out of 
80 and the highest recorded theoretical score being 70 out of 80. Table 5.0 provide a 
distribution of the overall score as rated by the bureaucrats on the institutionalisation of 
the PAS whereas Table 5.1 provides a description of the rating instrument and how 
bureaucrats responded to it (mean rating). 
Table 5.0 Distribution of the overall score as rated by the bureaucrats on Construct B 
Rater  The Overall Score on the Degree of the institutionalisation of 
Construct B 
OHCS NMC 
Bureaucrat 1 50 out of 80 21 out of 80 
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Bureaucrat 2 65 out of 80 66 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 3 60 out of 80 47 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 4 40 out of 80 56 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 5 70 out of 80 61 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 6 60 out of 80 57 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 7 55 out of 80 57 out of 80 
Bureaucrat 8 70 out of 80 46 out of 80 
Source: Field notes  
 
Table 5.1 vivid description of the rating instrument and how bureaucrats responded to 
it (average rating). 
Phase of the 
PA Cycle 












Define roles and 
responsibilities 
8.1 6.8 High Degree 
Communicate 
corporate vision 
and strategic plan 
7.6 7.1 High Degree 
Set functional and 
individual 
objectives aligned 
to the vision 




6.0 6.4 High Degree 
Prepare personal 
work plan 
7.2 7.0 High Degree 
Progress 
Reviews 





7.5 6.9 High Degree 









9.2 7.0 High Degree 







Agree on sanctions 
where necessary 
4.6 3.1 Low Degree 
Total – 58.7 Total – 51.3 
Source: Field notes 
The NMC 
Performance Appraisal Systems at the Nursing and Midwifery Council of Ghana has 
been as practicable as possible. I must say that, there has been a great deal of 
institutionalisation of a more robust PAS in the NMC as well as its effectiveness. I only 
had one bureaucrat vehemently opposing to this claim which indicates that the degree 
of its effectiveness has been overwhelming. I had seven of the engaged bureaucrats 
expressing their extreme excitement towards how the PAS has taken roots at NMC and 
how it is moving the organisation forward. The post implementation era of the NPMP 
at the NMC has seen the organisation attaining certain organisational feats which have 
projected the NMC as one of the most effective and efficient public organisations in 
Ghana. One of the bureaucrats had this to say on the effectiveness of the PAS and its 
transformational power on bureaucrats’ as well as organisational performance: 
“As I mentioned, our performance collectively adds up to the entire 
organisational goal. We go through appraisal both at the institutional level 
and at the individual level. At the beginning of the year, we set out targets, 
peg it very high and we work towards it. We modify it during mid-year 
reviews. Stories from our organisational assessors indicate that we are one 
of the best institutions in Ghana of which some institutions have been 
recommended to take on our steps.” (Senior Administrative Officer, 
NMC). 
According to the bureaucrats, performance appraisal at the NMC has been modelled on 
the systematic phasic approach to performance assessment that comes with the NPMP. 
All the seven bureaucrats agreed in principle that, the appraisal year opens with 
performance planning whereby all members of staff are required to set performance 
targets on either individual basis or unit basis. And these targets must be in sync with 
the overall organisational goal(s) for the year. There is a general mid-year programme, 
mostly in June, where these set targets are modified and reviewed. The bureaucrats 
 - 67 - 
really emphasised progress review programs as one of the key tenets of the appraisal 
system. This is mirrored in a bureaucrat’s assertion in the following: 
“We go through the appraisal process every year. It is very effective. We 
always set targets for the whole year and perhaps review them during mid-
year reviews. Progress review is one thing we don’t joke with. It really 
informs us on the progress we are making in the attainment of our set targets. 
It has become part of our administrative systems” (Junior Administrative 
Officer, NMC). 
Annual appraisals, which follow the progress review phase, provide an evidence-based 
feedback to the organisation in relation to the set targets by its members. And again, 
the bureaucrats agreed to a very large extent to the degree of its effectiveness. They all 
did admit that, performance assessment at the end of the year since the implementation 
of the NPMP has become an inevitable administrative component that no one could 
ever think of avoiding.  
However, the issue of aftermath decision after performance appraisal again popped up 
as the main missing component of the PAS. All but one of the seven bureaucrats who 
spoke well about the entire PAS expressed their disappointment with the aftermath 
decisions after performance appraisal. And, this is in relation to rewards and sanctions 
as a consequence for good and poor performance. These bureaucrats believe that, hard 
work must always be paid off by some form of recognition and vice versa. This 
recognition or sanction in turn serves as a motivational point of reference that drives 
employees’ output which then feeds into the overall organisational output as advanced 
by Ryan & Deci (2000).  
On the contrary, one official completely dismissed the whole positive impression 
created by her colleagues about the PAS system and the entire implementation of the 
NPMP at NMC. She really painted a very negative picture about performance appraisal 
at NMC and this is what said: 
“Like I said, even though the policy has been implemented, but its 
effectiveness has been the problem. I must tell you that, we even hardly fill 
the appraisal forms. It is only when we are due for promotions. You see, it is 
different in the private sector. I don’t even remember the last time I got 
appraised. The whole of last year, we didn’t fill the appraisal form. I was 
even just asking my colleague that, we really have to fill the form.” (Junior 
Administrative Officer, NMC). 
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Not that withstanding, there was a general positive reaction to the degree of the 
institutionalisation and effectiveness of the PAS at NMC. And, my rating instrument 
again employed to validate the claims of the engaged bureaucrats. I had an average 
score of 51.3 out of 80 with the least recorded score being 21 out of 80 and the highest 
recorded score being 66 out of 80. The table 5.1 and 5.2 presented earlier provides more 
information in this regard. 
5.2.3 Construct C- Transparency of performance targets  
The next construct for analysis, that is Construct C, mirrors the second principle of the 
NPMP, transparency and to some extent the seventh policy statement as already 
discussed in the preceding section. The NPMP was introduced to kick away subjectivity 
that had crippled the performance appraisal in the public service. As a matter of fact, 
the only way PSC could do to reduce this canker to its minimal degree was to introduce 
some accountability checks in the whole PAS by insisting on a fluid communication 
flow and thus, making the entire PA process transparent right from the setting of targets 
at both the individual and institutional level to the discussion of assessment outcomes 
between assessors and assessees. So, this particular objective seeks to project the 
transparency and to some extent, accountability intent of the NPMP which starts right 
from the setting of performance targets. By virtue of that, all forms and formats for the 
assessment process should be easily available to all, clear and precise in terms of what 
has to be done (PSC 2015: 4). 
The OHCS 
With the degree of the institutionalisation of this particular construct, although it was a 
fairly mixed reaction, majority of the bureaucrats admitted to a great deal of 
institutionalisation. In terms of clarity and transparency of performance targets, five of 
the engaged bureaucrats expressed their satisfaction to the degree of its 
institutionalisation. They were content with how transparent the whole PAS has become 
as compared to the old PAS. Bureaucrats now feel that organisational performance, 
appraisal and productivity are shared responsibilities and thus, their role in setting and 
achieving organisational goals cannot be overlooked. The general transparency 
situation at the OHCS is summed up in this bureaucrat’s assertion:  
“Basically, at the end of the year, everybody has his or her job schedule and 
out of that, your targets are teased out. So, technically, that alone is kind of 
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transparent because all schedules are prescribed by the organisational 
manual which the institution has and it let it suit the current situation within 
which an officer finds him or herself and based on that the assessor develops 
targets.” (Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS). 
On the other hand, I had bureaucrats referring to lack of transparency of performance 
targets as one of the key factors stymieing the progress of the policy. Although 
constituting a minority, three of the bureaucrats lamented on the less consultative nature 
of performance target setting in their units. And they feel that it is so wrong especially 
considering what the NPMP seeks to achieve in relation to transparency and 
accountability. One of such persons lamented in the following: 
 “With that aspect, I think there is a challenge because we are not able to go 
through everything with the appraisees and the appraisers. Most of the 
targets are brought to us and that is so wrong. I believe that, with the new 
system, everything regarding performance measurement and appraisal must 
be as transparent as possible. So why this?” (Junior Administrative 
Officer, OHCS). 
Having put that across and considering the foregoing findings on the subject, it is of no 
doubt that, irrespective of the existing defects as raised by the three bureaucrats, the 
OHCS is still on course with the level of the institutionalisation of the Construct C and 
at least, there has been a significant degree of institutionalisation. However, let me add 
that, it does not look all that rosy for this particular construct. The OHCS need to pay 
attention to the issue of lack of transparency of performance targets as raised by the 
three bureaucrats. They need to identify and curb such cases if they are to carry the 
whole implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP to a successful end. 
The NMC 
Transparency of performance targets has not been a big issue at the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council of Ghana under the dispensation of the NPMP. Performance 
Appraisal System like I did indicate in the preceding section has taken so much root at 
the NMC and members of the organisations now believe that, the ability of the 
organisation to realise its objective(s) of the year is hugely contingent on their collective 
involvement in the overall planning of performance targets especially at the lower level 
which then feeds into the overall objective(s) of the organisation. And, it all points to 
the transparency element or principle of the NPMP which gives employees the 
opportunity to see and analyse the entire appraisal process from an objective viewpoint 
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rather than mere subjective speculations. Over the years especially under the old PMS, 
the issue of transparency of PAS in the public service of which the NMC is of no 
exception became a huge topic of discussion when most of the bureaucrats complained 
on the way and manner in which their performance was measured and assessed.  
Bureaucrats at the NMC now agree to a large extent that, the level of transparency of 
the PAS especially with regards to how their targets are teased out and appraised has 
been impressive. Most of the bureaucrats agreed to the fact that, performance targets 
and assessment outcomes have been as transparent as possible and discussions in that 
regard are always done in a consultative manner between subordinates (assessees) and 
bosses (assessors). In addition, communication flow has been so great and thereby 
fostering a very congenial environment for the realisation of their set targets as all 
information and logistics are made easily available to them. This is what one of the 
bureaucrats opined in our discussions on the transparency of performance targets: 
“There is a great deal of transparency here. When we resume from new year, 
we meet and table out a communication plan which discusses about what we 
are going to do for the year, and what our focus is. Each and every time, the 
strategy becomes different. So, we come out with an objective of the year then 
we break them down to specifics. So, we sit down and dialogue out the overall 
objective and agree on the various individual targets in a general unit 
meeting. So, you see how open and transparent the exercise is?” (Senior 
Administrative Officer, NMC). 
This particular positive reaction to the transparency of performance targets as well as 
the entire PAS process was mirrored in the responses of all except one of the engaged 
bureaucrats. It is the very same bureaucrat who has been so critical of the whole 
operationalisation of the NPMP at the NMC. On this particular construct, this is how 
she sarcastically put her comments across: 
“We hardly fill the performance appraisal form and let alone setting 
performance targets. Don’t worry yourself my brother, it doesn’t happen at 
all. We only fill out our forms when it is time for promotion. With that, we are 
always in a hurry to do that.” (Junior Administrative Officer, NMC). 
5.2.4 Construct D - Reward, and sanction system  
The Objective D constitutes what the policy defines as “Decision Making”. One of main 
reasons for the introduction of the NPMP was to incorporate some rewards/incentives, 
sanction systems linked to performance. In this regard, the Policy Statement 9 of the 
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NPMP states that incentives, rewards, recognition and sanctions shall be linked to 
performance. Over the years, the PMS of the public service had no proper linkage of 
the PMS to any enforceable reward and sanction mechanisms as a form of extrinsic 
motivation to boost performance in the service. In response to this defect, the NPMP 
was introduced to help correct and provide a mechanism for rewarding high 
performance and managing unsatisfactory performance. 
The OHCS & NMC 
The institutionalisation of this particular provision of the policy has been very 
disappointing. Looking at the rating instrument described in table 5.2, it is very clear 
the OHCS & NMC are really struggling with the institutionalisation of reward and 
sanction systems. The issue of motivation is a major element of organisational theory. 
Human efforts are influenced by either intrinsic or extrinsic factors. So, with this as a 
backdrop, there was the need for extrinsic motivational systems in the NPMP to drive 
bureaucrats’ performance.  
The engaged bureaucrats at the OHCS expressed their utmost disappointment at the 
post-appraisal actions taken by management after every appraisal year. In fact, I had 
only one out of the eight engaged bureaucrats at the OHCS admitting to a great deal of 
institutionalisation of this particular construct. This is what the officer opined in our 
discussion on the subject: 
“I would say to some extent. The current project that I was co-opted unto is 
to find ways and means to streamline performance linking it to rewards and 
that is what we are going to focus on. But in our small way, we have ways 
and means to recognise staff. 2016, I received a citation from the chief 
director in front of everyone for outstanding performance. And that is a way 
of motivation. And this year, there will be something like that so everyone is 
really working hard to sweep it up. Also, if there should be some form of 
foreign workshops, good performers are always rewarded with that. So, there 
is always that drive to perform well.” (Senior Administrative Officer, 
OHCS). 
Looking at the above quoted assertion, it is quite easy to deduce that, the officer is a 
direct beneficiary of an award scheme that was instituted in 2016 and also part of the 
team that was sent to South Korea for training in 2018. The officer felt those acts of 
appreciation were motivating enough for him and to keep him going. But I think that is 
not what the NPMP seeks to achieve in respect to this particular objective. As already 
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discussed, one of the key principles of the NPMP is equity and thus, all good performers 
must be rewarded in the same measure and not a selected few. Actions for good 
performance and poor performance must be applicable to all manner of officials. In this 
regard, most of the engaged bureaucrats felt there is no need for performance appraisal 
if there are no immediate post appraisal consequences such as recognitions and 
sanctions.  
Just like the OHCS, the employees at the NMC also believe that, the NPMP has been 
implemented just to make them work harder without any form of reward or recognition. 
In fact, I also had only one of my interviewees fairly agreeing on some amount of 
recognition linked to performance at the NMC. To this bureaucrat, he felt the fact that, 
the whole PAS is linked to promotion should be a reward in itself. As a unit head, he 
noted that, notes on good and bad performance are recorded on the appraisal form to 
inform the HR about how well members of staff are performing at the unit level. This 
in effect serves as a point of reference for promotional opportunities and also to inform 
the HR of the training needs of the employees’ vis à vis their performance.  
In spite of the positive picture painted by the aforementioned bureaucrats from the 
OHCS and NMC, the rest of the bureaucrats from these bureaucracies were just 
expressing their disappointments to the motivational schemes instituted at their 
respective organisations. On the issue of promotions and training linked to performance 
as a way of reward, they contended that, training and promotions are just part of their 
condition of service and thus, their bureaucracies do not treat them as a reward or 
sanction scheme to motivate them. The negative picture of reward and sanction system 
at the OHCS and NMC is summed up in this bureaucrat’s assertion:  
 “I have not heard anybody being sanctioned for poor performance or 
rewarded for good performance. I don’t think something is done after 
appraisal aside it being a requirement for promotion. Also, I don’t think 
training here is even linked to our performance. It is just part of the 
organisation because at the beginning of every year, HR requests for our 
training needs “(Junior Administrative Officer, NMC). 
One interesting observation I had with respect to this issue was an instance where an 
organisational driver had to express his aversion to the extent to which he is used in 
running several errands without any form of recognition or reward. I remember him 
passing a comment in his groans that: 
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“You guys just use me for unnecessary errands but you don’t even appreciate 
my efforts” 
However, looking at the level of productivity and the average ratings in table 5.1 with 
regards to this rewards and sanctions, it indicates that, bureaucrats at the OHCS and 
NMC are not motivated extrinsically in order to perform. It is quite surprising to see 
such a remarkable success of these bureaucracies in relation to productivity especially 
when the organisation lacks any form of reward or sanction system linked to 
performance to motivate employees. However, I can hypothetically attribute the reason 
for high performance without any proper form of extrinsic motivation to their general 
assumption that, “poor performance may jeopardise their promotional prospects”. 
5.2.5 Final Reflections 
Considering the foregoing discussions on the degree of institutionalisation of the NPMP 
at the OHCS and the NMC, it is very obvious that performance management under the 
NPMP dispensation has been very promising and really seen as a thing of the future. 
The introduction of the NPMP has undoubtedly fine-tuned the perceptions of 
bureaucrats on performance management and the role they play in the overall 
attainment of the core mandate and mission of their respective organisations. 
Bureaucrats have now come to appreciate that, PMS as though behaviourally inclined, 
is also more of a mechanistic system to instigate high level of performance both at the 
institutional and individual level. In spite of the great success of the institutionalisation 
of the NPMP at both the OHCS and the NMC, there are two key highlights worth 
reflecting upon.  
First and foremost, the above discussed findings suggest a very dire state of reward and 
sanction systems linked to performance in these organisations. I believe this is a key 
principle of the NPMP that the OHCS and the NMC should under no circumstance 
compromise on. Extrinsically motivated persons may produce desired outcomes either 
because of the reward at stake or the threat of punishment. With this kind of motivation, 
the individual’s desire towards a particular action or work is driven by separable 
outcomes and not self-interests. Against this underlying logic behind the inculcation of 
construct D in the NPMP, bureaucrats in these bureaucracies will be more than willing 
to embark on any organisational related task with little or no interest in the assigned 
task and thus, enhancing productivity.  
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Secondly, the study found one bureaucrat out of the nine engaged bureaucrats at the 
NMC who really painted a very negative picture about the entire PMS and NPMP at 
the organisation. Her discussed revelations create a very negative impression about the 
organisation’s attitude towards performance appraisal at the NMC. Although, she may 
be the only interviewee to have criticised the whole system, can it possibly be that she 
may represent just a section of the bureaucrats who are not just satisfied with the general 
state of performance management at the NMC or her reaction was more of a personal 
attack on her superiors or even the NMC as a whole. Having that said, I think the general 
impression created by the engaged bureaucrats reveals a great deal of 
institutionalisation of the NPMP at the NMC in spite of their own implementation 
challenges. Figure 5.0 provides a broad network analysis and summary of how the 
institutionalisation of the NPMP is coming along at the OHCS and the NMC with 
respect to the policy constructs. 
 
A great deal of institutionalisation 







Not fully institutionalised                                                 A great deal of institutionalisation              
  
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                A great deal of institutionalisation 
 
Figure 5.0 Network analysis of the degree of the institutionalisation of NPMP at the OHCS 
and NMC 
5.3 A Bad Performer?  The Case of the Youth and Employment 
Agency (YEA) 
Performance management at the YEA has been quite unsatisfactory as revealed by this 
study. In spite of the unsatisfactory state of performance management, the leadership 
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of the YEA is striving very hard to revamp its PMS leading to the creation of a unit at 
the HR department in charge of performance management and career development in 
2018. This unit according to the unit leader, shall oversee the entire PMS in the office 
and ensure its operations is able to instil a routine performance monitoring and 
assessment culture necessary for one’s career development at the YEA.YEA is 
perceived to be one of the highly politicised agencies in the public sector of Ghana. In 
this light, the political nature of the organisation has crippled several administrative 
systems including performance management and thereby, stagnating the functions and 
effectiveness of the organisation as well as its bureaucrats. As of October 2018, the 
agency could not lay claim to any performance report of the YEA in the past three years. 
And this is as a result of an inconsistent nature of performance assessment and 
management at the YEA as revealed by the Unit Head.  
Unlike the case of the OHCS and the NMC of Ghana, the NPMP was just rolled out at 
the YEA in 2017, three years after its official launch by the PSC. According to the 
officer in charge of the PM, this late response of the YEA to the NPMP is as a result of 
their unawareness of the policy until late 2017. She added that, the agency was invited 
for their maiden training in May 2018 and was still managing the old appraisal 
instrument although not very effective. However, in spite of the deplorable state of 
performance appraisal and management at the YEA, the HR director did admit the 
essence of an effective performance appraisal system at the YEA, and thus, the agency 
was looking forward to an end of year performance appraisal of bureaucrats under this 
dispensation of the NPMP. He asserted that: 
“The Head of Finance and Administration and myself at the beginning of this 
year agreed that, this year there will be an appraisal section for employees 
because as an employee you need to be appraised” (Principal Director, 
YEA). 
Despite this promising step by management, I found that little or no effort was done to 
push this decision to a complete realisation. After several engagements with the 
bureaucrats, I realised most of the bureaucrats were oblivious of this decision by 
management and no form of performance target has been agreed upon by these 
bureaucrats and their bosses. The question then is if there has not been any set 
performance target, how are bureaucrats going to be assessed? The performance 
appraisal cycle stipulates that, the appraisal process opens with a planning phase where 
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targets are set, however, the situation at the YEA looks quite different. So, can this be 
a false start to the NPMP? And can this false start also be as a result of lack of 
understanding of the NPMP and an incompatibility of the NPMP with the 
organisational culture, and thus creating a deviation?  
5.3.1 False Start by the YEA: A Case of Policy Deviation? 
The attempt of YEA to implement the NPMP resembles a false start and thus, a clear 
case of policy deviation. Policy deviation is a dimension of policy adaptation (Bakshi , 
Talaei-Khoei , Ray, & Solvoll , 2017). Policy deviation according to (Lewis 2010 cited 
by Bakshi, Talaei-Khoei, Ray, & Solvoll, 2017: 3) is an adaptation by relaxation which 
means monitoring consequences of non-conformance behaviour against the desired 
behaviour proposed by the policy to minimum incompliancy. Policies from a legal 
theory perspective are seen as a sense of duty because of the authority issuing the policy 
and it is not subject to any form of modification (Ibid). In this connection, any form of 
policy modification resulting to some level of incompliancy is a clear case of policy 
deviation. 
In the case of YEA, the organisation attempts the whole policy implementation process 
by modifying and reducing the entire appraisal instrument to a two-page document. 
This is where the deviation starts from. The appraisal instrument that comes with the 
NPMP is quite comprehensive (a eleven-page document) with several additional notes 
to help guide the employee in the assessment exercise. In my engagement with the HR 
director, he did note that he is trying to reduce the content of the document since to him, 
it is very bulky and user unfriendly. He explained that in the following: 
“One big challenge about this whole instrument is that, this is a very bulky 
document and we are trying to reduce it to something small which can easily 
be filled. Depending on your organisation and structures, you need to do it 
to favour what you do. So, we are trying to further reduce it to a maximum of 
two pages and then make sure that it is effective.” (Principal Director, 
YEA). 
The decision to reduce the contents of the document is a deviation and a “false start” 
especially looking at what the PSC seeks to achieve with the instrument. From my 
viewpoint, the issue of bulkiness is not a good justification for reducing the document. 
Looking at the document itself and its content, its bulkiness is worthwhile. The 
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instrument is designed in such a way that, any lame person should be able to read and 
fill out the document without or with little difficulty.                                                                              
Second, as I did indicate in the preceding section, the HR director informed me of their 
intention of having an end of year appraisal with the NPMP. However, after checking, 
it was revealed that the bureaucrats do not even have performance targets which will 
serve as a benchmark for their assessments. This also to me is a “false start”. As already 
discussed, the PAS of the NPMP is a cycle which starts with a planning phase and ends 
with a decision-making phase. In implication, before any employee will be appraised, 
he or she must have gone through a planning stage where performance targets would 
be agreed on in a consultative manner and later reviewed at the progress review stage. 
So, this is a clear case of deviation from the provisions of the NPMP.   
The main possible reason for this false start is perhaps the inability of leaders to manage 
the incompatibility of certain aspects of the NPMP and the host organisational culture. 
This is partly as a result of poor leadership styles and commitment towards a successful 
implementation. Mostly when reform implementers and leaders are faced with a case 
of cultural incompatibility, they tend to alter certain aspects of the policy at the 
organisational level and at the long run, distorts the overall objectives and intentions of 
the policy or reform. These anomalies do happen when policy implementers tend to 
take decisions based on convenience rather than adhering strictly to the demands of the 
policy. From my viewpoint, the entire policy right from the onset has been 
compromised and it presupposes that the leadership and officials in charge of the PMS 
although well abreast with the NPMP in theory, are trying to modify the policy due to 
some cultural and attitudinal incompatibilities. The performance management unit head 
did indicate that, the general attitude of the bureaucrats towards PMS has not been the 
best. According to her, bureaucrats think performance appraisal is just a waste of time. 
She furthermore adds that, there is the general mind-set that performance appraisal has 
always been flavoured with favouritism and subjectivity and thus, bureaucrats do not 
feel motivated to go through appraisal processes. With this perception in addition to 
some other attitudinal cultural norms, the implementers find it imperative to alter some 
content and structure to suit this organisational syndrome and thereby making it user 
friendly.  
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 In this connection, as part of discussions in the next chapter, I will try to examine the 
extent to which the leadership and cultural characteristics of the YEA account and 
explain the false start and deviation. 
5.3.2 Final Reflections 
In spite of the far-reaching effort of the YEA to revamp its PMS, the implementation 
and institutionalisation attempt of the NPMP look very cosmetic and unpromising. 
Until the implementers accept the policy as it is and seek a better understanding of the 
policy, I do not see any possible radical positive change and impact on the entire 
bureaucracy since the policy itself has been compromised at the top level with some 
traits of incompliancy (policy deviation). 
Having said that, it is worth noting that policy implementers at the YEA are highly 
optimistic of the success of the NPMP in enhancing productivity in the organisation. 
To them, the content of the NPMP is not entirely new to the organisation since it 
captures certain features of the old PMS. By dint of this, the assimilation of the policy 
into its existing administrative systems will be less challenging as compared to an 
entirely different policy. The PM Unit Leader (a key implementer) stressed on the fact 
that the NPMP is just an ad-on and an updated version of the old PMS. She further 
noted that the old PMS had some sort of appraisal but the NPMP has come to sanitise 
the entire the appraisal system and make it more transparent. She adds: 
“The NPMP would not be entirely new to the already existing system here at 
the YEA. It will be just an ad-on to make things much easier. And it will help 
know the potential of every employee. Because, the employee now sets targets 
for him/herself and they are held responsible at the end of the day.” (Senior 
Administrative Officer, Unit Head, YEA). 
This assertion also substantiates the claim that implementers are well abreast with the 
policy but makes a false start by attempting to appraise employees without transparently 
setting performance targets with employees. 
5.4 Challenges with the Implementation/Institutionalisation of the 
NPMP 
Against the backdrop of the foregoing discussions on the implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP at the organisational level, it lays credence to the fact 
that, the implementation and institutionalisation process has not been so smooth. The 
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whole process has been beset with several challenges and they are very evident in the 
findings of the study. 
First and foremost, one main challenge crippling the whole implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP is the issue of bulkiness of the PA instrument. As 
hinted in the preceding discussions, most of the organisational leaders are not so 
comfortable with the nature of the policy especially with regards to the appraisal 
instrument. Bureaucrats did acknowledge in principle that the instrument is very bulky. 
In consequence, the leadership of most of these public organisations are expressing 
some degree of reluctance in the adoption of the policy at the organisational level. These 
complaints of bulkiness of the appraisal instrument are not something the key policy 
formulators and implementers, that is the PSC, are oblivious of. My engagement with 
the director at the PSC revealed that, the PSC are very much aware of the bulkiness 
complaints, however, they do insist that the bulkiness of the document is on purpose 
and not to complicate the whole performance assessment process. She noted that in the 
following: 
 “The main challenge as I have mentioned is that some people think the policy 
and tool is bulky but we have explained to them that it is not bulky. What they 
see in there are just instructions. They are just unwilling to take out the 
instructions and put them as attachments. (Chief Director, PSC). 
Another key challenge stymieing the progress of implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP at the various public organisations is ineffective policy 
monitoring by the Public Service Commission. As already mentioned, it is only 85 out 
of 243 public organisations (constituting just 34.5%) that is said to have rolled out the 
policy at their respective organisations. This policy setback emanates from the fact that 
the policy lacks any form of command-and -control regulation by the PSC. According 
to Knill & Tosun (2012:23), authority-based policies like the NPMP must be guided by 
policy instruments whereby government hierarchically prescribes requirements that 
must be fulfilled by the regulatees, with failures to comply usually involving penalties. 
It is one of the missing elements of policy implementation that has got the NPMP stuck 
at the training phase after its introduction four years ago and thus a deadlock situation 
in the assimilation of the NPMP into the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. Although, the policy 
has been launched and rolled out by the PSC, it is poorly monitored by the PSC. The 
engaged director at the OHCS lamented bitterly on this particular subject as follows: 
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“I think somebody is not doing his or her work and I put the blame squarely 
at the doorstep of the Public Services Commission. Because, you issue 
something and they don’t even monitor. They have 243 institutions and in 
fact, it is only 85 institutions that are implementing it. So, what happens to 
the rest? Every public service organisation is supposed to use it and the 
public service commission is supposed to also monitor.” (Principal 
Director, OHCS). 
Another key challenge worth pointing out is the failure of policy implementers to 
institute a more robust reward and sanction systems tied up with employees’ 
performance, which seeks to be one of the key constructs of the policy. This is one of 
the key revelations of the study as almost all the engaged bureaucrats were quite 
disappointed with the situation at their respective organisations. Also, poor attitude 
towards PMS and the NPMP due to cultural incongruence were identified as the 
challenges crippling the full institutionalisation of the NPMP. 
Looking at the outlined challenges in tandem with the previous challenges of the old 
PMS, it is worth concluding that, the implementation/institutionalisation of the NPMP 
has witnessed just an absolute deferment of the old PMS anomalies (as discussed in 
chapter four). For an effective comparative analysis of the anomalies of the two PMS 
systems, table 5.2 provides a comparative representation of the implementation 
challenges of the two systems. 
Table 5.2 Comparative analysis of the implementation challenges of the Old PMS and 
the NPMP. 
Old PMS NPMP 
• Lack of a clear enforceable 
implementation framework 
• Lack of any form of command-and -
control regulation by the PSC. 
• Negative attitude towards PMS 
due to subjectivity  
• Aversion towards PMS due to 
subjectivity history 
• low Executive/Leadership 
commitment 
• Poor leadership commitment at the 
institutional level 
• Non-linkage of the process to an 
enforceable Reward and Sanctions 
Mechanism 
• Lack of reward and sanction systems 
tied up with employees’ performance 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter offered a comprehensive analysis of the operationalisation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP at the street level bureaucracies. From the findings of 
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study, the OHCS and NMC are seen as organisations having a great deal of 
institutionalisation with the NPMP. However, the findings do suggest that it is not all 
rosy with the implementation and institutionalisation of the policy at these 
organisations. Both organisations despite their successes are still struggling with the 
construct D of the policy. The YEA on the hand is seen as “new babies” in terms of the 
implementation of the policy. The organisation in its quest to revamp its PMS decides 
to roll the NPMP out, however, its attempt to get the NPMP implemented is seen as a 
false start and thus, clear case of policy deviation. The chapter concludes with 
discussions on the implementation anomalies unearthed by the study. These anomalies 
are seen as a deferment of the old PMS anomalies.  
The next chapter explains contextual effect of leadership and culture on the 
institutionalisation of PM reforms (NPMP) as it addresses the second research question: 
What explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it 
leadership or contextual factors such as administrative culture that matters? Or a 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT REFORMS: ADMINISTRATIVE 
CULTURE VS. LEADERSHIP 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter primarily addresses the second research question (What explains the 
institutionalisation of performance management reform?) as already mentioned in the 
preceding page. It attempts to explain the institutionalisation of the NPMP in the 
various organisations (selected cases of the study) in the Ghanaian Public Service. Here, 
I mainly discuss the contextual factors that account for the successful and failed 
implementation of the NPMP at the OHSC, NMC and YEA. The findings of the study 
show two things, that is, NPMP is institutionalised in OHCS and NMC but not in YEA. 
Why is it institutionalised in these two but not in the third one? It seems that, leadership 
is an important factor for the institutionalisation of NPMP in OHCS and NMC. Thus, 
NPMP is and as instrument depends on leadership for institutionalisation. But why has 
leadership not been able to instil NPMP in YEA? Is cultural incompatibility as well as 
leadership inability to manage the incompatibility the factors impeding 
institutionalisation?  
The chapter presents two main arguments, that is, Administrative Culture as a 
Contextual-Explanatory Variable and Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory 
Variable. These two variables constitute the internal context of the bureaucracies. The 
first part of the chapter will discuss Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory 
Variable. As part of discussions, I will first map out the Ghanaian Bureaucratic Culture 
with Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Political Neutrality as the main 
cultural dimensions and, then further analyse the effect of all the three cultural 
dimensions on institutionalisation of the NPMP. The second part will wind up 
discussions by looking at leadership as a contextual variable explaining why some 
organisations have performed better with the NPMP institutionalisation than others. 
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6.1 Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
6.1.1 Mapping the Ghanaian Bureaucratic Culture and its Contextual 
effect 
This section and some subsequent sections discuss the general characteristics of the 
administrative culture of the Ghanaian Public Service and its contextual effect on the 
institutionalisation of the NPMP. It is one of the key objectives of the study to identify 
and examine the administrative culture of Ghana’s Public Service and to draw the 
relationship between these cultural tendencies as a context to the NPMP. In order to be 
able to analyse the compatibility of the host culture and the PM reform, it will be 
prudent to first identify the features of the culture, and consequently becomes easier to 
analyse how they affect the institutionalisation of PM reforms. A total of twenty-five 
(25) bureaucrats from the selected cases of the study were interviewed on the issue of 
inherent administrative culture in the bureaucracy along the three cultural dimensions 
of the study.  
6.2 Power Distance 
In this section, I present findings from the study. In quest of examining the power 
distance as cultural dimension in the public service, the 25 study participants across the 
selected cases were quizzed on issue of power distance. The power distance interview 
questions enfolded around two main concepts of power distance and which happens to 
be the main indicators of analysis of the study with respect to power distance. These 
concepts include; Hierarchism and Boss-Subordinate Relationship. The study did 
reveal a very large power distance public service. All engaged bureaucrats admitted and 
accepted to some extent that, power is distributed unequally in their respective 
organisations.  Thus, the subordinates see their organisational leadership as “colonial 
chiefs”12 and their existence as only complementary to the work of their leaders.  
 
 
                                               
12 A term borrowed from Gerald Karyeija (2010) in his doctoral dissertation “Performance appraisal in 
Uganda’s civil service: Does administrative culture matter? 
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• Hierarchism 
All the engaged bureaucrats admitted to a very hierarchical bureaucracy. And this 
presupposes that, superiors and subordinates consider each other as existentially 
unequal in terms of function and power. The study reveals a bureaucracy whereby 
power is highly reserved in the hands of a selected few (superiors). The bureaucrats 
believe that, power cannot be equally shared and thus, leaders must always feed 
subordinates with directives in order to function in their various work domains. 
Findings of the study suggest a very long chain of command in the various 
bureaucracies where personnel report to their immediate superiors in a very tall 
hierarchical system. However, the bureaucrats do have some sort of acceptance and 
respect for the established hierarchies and thus, they believe that hierarchism should be 
the best way of dividing up work in any formal organisation. The system is such that, 
you dare not resist authority and this aspect of culture traces its roots from the Ghanaian 
societal culture where the leader is always right. This is what one of the bureaucrats 
from the OHCS asserted with regards to hierarchism in the bureaucracy, specifically, 
OHCS and it projects the general hierarchical culture across all the three organisations:  
“Every institution has hierarchies of which you have to respect. This office 
has a top down approach system of governance here.	 We have a very 
organised hierarchical structure here. Work always comes from the top and 
disseminates down to the subordinates.	One of the key features of the public 
service is hierarchism.” (Junior Administrative Officer, OHCS). 
• Boss-Subordinate Relationship 
The bureaucrats responded and reacted differently to the issue of boss-subordinate 
relationship and thereby creating some sort of both intra and inter-organisational 
variations in bureaucrats’ perceptions. First and foremost, the boss-subordinate 
relationship at the YEA totally differs from the situation at the OHCS and the NMC. 
Findings from both the OHCS and the NMC shows a very positive relationship between 
superiors and subordinates. Despite the fact that, these two organisations are 
horizontally hierarchic, this element of hierarchism is not so much reflected in the way 
they work and interact with each other. Bureaucrats in these organisations see 
themselves as one people irrespective of one’s administrative status. I personally met 
the Head of Civil Service constantly engaging bureaucrats unofficially both on the 
corridors and in their various offices on work related issues and even other OHCS social 
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issues. Also, I remember suspending one of my interviews at the OHCS when my 
interviewee had to ready herself to join the team visiting a bereaved colleague, as way 
of OHCS sympathising with the bereaved colleague. All these observations corroborate 
with the fact that, the aforementioned organisations in spite of their large power 
distance have very great staff working relationships. Bureaucrats from these two 
organisations really paints a very rosy picture about how they relate with both their 
superiors and subordinates through sycophancy. To them, the doors of their superiors 
are always open and thus, there is never a tensed moment at the various offices. And, I 
did not observe otherwise either. I observed a very great working atmosphere. This 
cultural situation at the OHCS and NMC is reflected in the quote by a bureaucrat at the 
NMC below: 
“Though we have a very respected hierarchical system, we have a very 
friendly working relationship here. I can easily walk to the registrar and talk 
to him on any work-related issue. And he can equally call me to work for him 
and communicate that to my immediate boss. This does not happen just here 
in my department and it is a general thing here.” (Senior Administrative 
Officer, NMC). 
Findings from the YEA on the hand, shows a very typical large power distance 
organisation with quite a tensed or negative working relationship between superiors and 
subordinates. Although bureaucrats’ responses were mixed, majority of the bureaucrats 
had a pessimistic outlook on the boss-subordinate relationship at the YEA. Only two 
out of the eight engaged bureaucrats agreed to a fairly positive working boss-
subordinate relationship. Most of the bureaucrats on the other hand feel that the boss-
subordinate relationship at the YEA is dependent on one’s personal relationship 
(sycophancy) with the boss or the subordinate. Due to the hierarchical nature of the 
YEA, this very nature of the organisation transcends across every aspect of the 
organisation. Some bosses feel bossy and perhaps treat theirs subjects as mere 
subordinates. To these bureaucrats, accessibility of bosses is quite difficult and it 
requires some degree of personal relationship with a boss or a secretariat before one 
will be able to see a boss.  
Figure 6.0 provides a network summary and analysis the power distance situation in the 
selected cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy.  
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OHCS, NMC & YEA  
Very hierarchical large power distance Organisations 
YEA                                                                                                         
 Tensed boss – subordinate relationship      
                                               
                                    
                                                                                                  
 
 
OHCS & NMC                                                               
     Positive boss – subordinate relationship                  
Figure 6.0 Network analysis and summary of power distance in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy 
6.2.1 Power Distance and Performance Management 
Performance management just like any other organisational subsystem in a bureaucracy 
is centrally controlled and regulated by the top leadership especially in high power 
distance organisations. Due to the disparate nature of power relations among the public-
sector organisations in Ghana, the NPMP was developed to promote a very healthy 
human relation among workers and thereby making the entire PMS very transparent as 
mirrored in the third NPMP construct. As already discussed, transparency is one of the 
key principles of the NPMP to help avoid the abuse of power in performance 
management. But I ask, “To what extent has this been achieved?” Has power distance 
become a hindrance to this?  In this section, I will explicate the extent to which the 
power distance culture affects performance management and ascertain whether it has 
spawned some level of resistance or receptivity to the NPMP leading to failed or 
successful institutionalisation respectively.  
• Hierarchism and the NPMP 
The NPMP really thrives on how hierarchies are structured in the bureaucracy. The 
study reveals long hierarchies in all the three cases of the study. All the bureaucrats 
believe that hierarchies are very essential for the survival and growth of their 
bureaucracies. In high power distance organisations, hierarchies help bring orderliness 
and help streamline the organisational chain of command. In such bureaucracies, 
subordinates draw on the expertise and experience of bosses in order to thrive in their 
various work domains. The NPMP is designed in such a way that, it relies on the internal 
POWER DISTANCE IN THE 
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hierarchies in order to monitor and measure bureaucrats’ performance as well as 
organisational productivity. The policy itself is designed to promote hierarchism. First 
and foremost, the NPMP is seen is a management tool for the organisational leadership 
as stated in the first policy statement. 13 It is a tool to help managers and superiors to 
effectively manage people (human resources) and other organisational resources. 
Secondly, the appraisal system sees to it that there is always an appraiser and an 
appraisee which is interpreted as a superior and a subordinate. In implication, it 
presupposes that without a hierarchical structure, individual performance cannot be 
measured and evaluated. Last but not least, it is one of the key objectives of the NPMP 
to involve the governing bodies, senior executives, and managers in the entire appraisal 
system to help monitor performance appraisal and prevent any form of subjectivity 
which may permeate through the appraisal process. The engaged director at the PSC 
explains: 
“Like I told you, the PSC realised that the old PMS was not able to establish 
any link between the key stakeholders of the various organisations. So how 
then do we get the various boards and the top executives to monitor 
performance? This new performance policy aims to sensitise these top 
executives to performance management in the public service and we have 
tasked them to ensure the effectiveness of this policy and performance 
management in their organisations. They really have a very huge 
responsibility under their belts” (Chief Director, PSC). 
All the foregoing discussions alludes to the fact that, without a properly delineated 
organisational hierarchy and chain of command, the policy goals of the NPMP can be 
threatened. In this sense, the findings of the study reveal a very conducive and a 
compatible hierarchical environment necessary for the NPMP to thrive. All the three 
cases of the study, that is, the OHCS, NMC and YEA are well organised with very 
clear-cut hierarchies. The OHCS and the NMC are really thriving as far as the 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP is concern and it worth noting 
that, the hierarchical structure has to some extent accounted for that. The YEA on the 
other hand may have its own implementation challenges, but with respective to the 
prospects that comes with hierarchism, the future looks bright. The bureaucrats believe 
and respect their hierarchical structures which is an inherent requirement for a 
                                               
13 Refer to Box 4.1 The New Performance Management Policy Statements/Guidelines 
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successful implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. This indicates that 
bureaucrats will not find it difficult showing deep loyalty towards the performance 
management and the NPMP once it is properly implemented.  
• Does Boss-Subordinate Relationship Matter? 
A healthy human working relation in an organisation is really essential for an enhanced 
organisational productivity and that is what the NPMP brings to the table. It is one of 
the main policy statements of the NPMP to promote the health and long-term growth 
of the institution. This statement enjoins managers and subordinates to work together 
to meet the vision and goals of the organisation through consistent capacity building of 
the employees to ensure the sustainability and longevity of the institution (PSC, 2015: 
5). In consequence, it is the primary objective of the NPMP to bring superiors and 
subordinates together to collectively realise the mission and vision of the organisation. 
Hence, with respect to this policy statement of the NPMP, it can be said that boss-
subordinate relationship really matters and is an essential prerequisite in order for the 
policy to thrive.  
Another aspect of the NPMP which draws on the boss-subordinate working relationship 
has to do with the performance appraisal itself. As already discussed, the NPMP 
presents a very phasic appraisal process just to kick away subjectivity. At the planning 
stage, superiors are supposed to be set performance targets with their subordinates in a 
very consultative manner in order to enhance transparency. In this connection, it is of 
vital importance to have such a congenial working relationship among employees to 
make this policy provision happen. 
As already discussed in the preceding chapter, the OHCS and the NMC are seen as 
high-power distance organisations with an inherent positive boss-subordinate working 
relationship. These two organisations again are projected as good performing 
organisations with respect to the operationalisation of the NPMP. Bureaucrats from 
these organisations believe the performance appraisal process has been very transparent 
devoid of any form of subjective manipulation and interpretation. To them, they now 
get the opportunity to sit down with their bosses to set performance targets for 
themselves without any imposition of targets from above. Thus, they believe this feat 
is as a result of the very positive relationship that exits between their superiors and 
them. One of the bureaucrats explains: 
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“My boss is a very open person and I really like how he handles work in this 
office. When it comes to appraisal, he makes sure you are okay with your 
targets. We all organise our targets together. At times, he disagrees with 
some of my targets claiming they are over ambitious. It is one thing that has 
really kept us going. I do not know what happens at the other departments 
but I believe the situation cuts across. We enjoy what we do here because we 
are one family and this has really enhanced a very objective performance 
appraisal.” (Junior Administrative Officer, NMC) 
Against the backdrop of this, it is very evident that there is a substantial degree of 
compatibility between this particular cultural tendency and the NPMP and thus, it is not 
so surprising seeing the level of institutionalisation of the NPMP at the OHCS and the 
NMC. On the other hand, the findings of the study suggest that superiors and 
subordinates have quite a tensed working relationship. One’s relationship is dependent 
on his or her personal relations with the boss and it is mostly professional. This is one 
cultural feature which serves as a big threat to performance management and the 
NPMP. How can one go through an objective performance appraisal process with an 
unhealthy working relationship with a boss? Despite the objectivity intent of the NPMP, 
most of the bureaucrats at the YEA do not see that coming. One of them explains this 
in the following: 
“I do not see myself sitting down with my boss to set targets. In the first place, 
it is not even easy to see and talk to my boss. She is always busy. So, I believe 
it will be very difficult sitting down with my boss to set performance targets. 
Maybe she will know how to go about it.” (Junior Administrative Officer, 
YEA). 
Does this account for the reason why the YEA was not able to set targets with their 
employees in spite of their annual performance appraisal intent? In organisations with 
tensed large power distance cultures, it will be quite difficult to realise a very objective 
performance appraisal process because the bosses feel juniors must always succumb to 
their personal preferences. Failure to succumb is liable to low appraisal score and hence, 
an underperformance. From the findings of the study, it can be deduced that the bosses 
feel threatened with how the NPMP seeks to bridge the power gap between bosses and 
subordinate which may even give rise to subordinates questioning their authority and 
decisions as far as performance appraisal is concern. 
 
 
 - 90 - 
Summing up... 
The findings from the YEA confirm the hypothesis that “the existence of a large power 
distance culture and informal relations in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy may threaten 
proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service”. This is as a 
result of the tensed informal working relations between bosses and subordinates at the 
YEA and thereby, impeding a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the 
NPMP (Policy deviation). In contrast, the findings from the OHCS and NMC refutes 
this hypothesis. The findings suggest a very positive effect of large power distance on 
the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. These organisations although 
very hierarchical (large power distance culture) have very healthy boss-subordinate 
informal relations through sycophantic approach. And in effect, their power distance 
culture has accounted for a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the 
NPMP.  
6.3 Uncertainty Avoidance 
By examining the uncertainty avoidance in the public service, again all the 25 study 
participants were engaged in an interview on issues relating to uncertainty avoidance. 
The interview questions mainly had issues pertaining to Rule Orientation and 
Innovation (Concepts of Uncertainty Avoidance) which happens to be the main 
indicators of uncertainty avoidance analysis of the study. Generally, the findings of the 
study suggest a very strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy with just some few 
variations among the selected organisations. 
• Rule Orientation 
Generally, all bureaucrats admitted to the fact that per the Ghanaian societal cultural 
orientation, no organisation will be able to survive without formal and informal rules 
and regulations even if they do not work. However, the YEA has quite an interesting 
rule orientation. Although the findings suggest a strong uncertainty avoiding 
organisation, the public servants feel that the organisation have not put in enough effort 
to get the organisational rules enforced. This in effect put them at risk in their everyday 
work life since the future is always uncertain just in weak uncertainty avoiding 
organisations. Some of the bureaucrats even admitted to a very low level of awareness 
of the organisation’s code of ethics. However, while most of them showed some level 
of discontent with the general attitude towards rules at the YEA, others were quite 
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satisfied with the situation. The later feels that, inasmuch as the existence of rules is 
crucial for organisational survival, the rules must be more relaxed. A senior bureaucrat 
opined in the following: 
“The general attitude towards rules here is not so encouraging. The rules are 
there but it is about the enforcement. The rules here have just been relaxed. I 
remember we are not supposed to be access YouTube and other social media 
websites with the office computers and internet but that has not been 
enforced. People still do it.” 
The NMC and the OHCS shares some similarities with respect to rule orientation. 
Bureaucrats from both organisations admitted to a very strong emotional need for rules 
in their respective organisations. They believe rules, laws and regulations are very 
essential for their existence and thus, the absence of rules will be detrimental to their 
work. To them, their organisational rules are very strict and that may probably be the 
reason behind their organisational success especially with regards to policy 
implementation like the NPMP. To these bureaucrats, this emotional need for rules 
increases their urge to work hard as well as keeping them busy at all times.  
• Innovation 
 As already discussed, the findings of the study suggest a very a strong rule orientation 
bureaucracy and hence strong uncertainty avoidance. Thus, as part of the uncertainty 
avoidance analysis, I seek to examine the extent to which creativity and innovation 
survives in such a strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy. Findings from the OHCS 
and NMC suggest that innovation to some extent is very much appreciated in their 
organisations especially with NMC which has innovation as one of its core values. Most 
of the interviewees from these organisations (5 out of 8 from the OHCS and 6 out of 9 
from the NMC) admitted that despite the plethora of inherent strict rules, their 
management is also committed to giving them room to be innovative. However, the fact 
that these organisations allow for some innovation does not allow for absolute 
innovation. All forms of innovation must be in sync with the overall core values and 
mission of the organisation. Innovation and rule following are not seen as two mutually 
exclusive variables in these organisations. These bureaucracies believe that 
implementation of innovative ideas involve some level of detail and punctuality as 
typical of strong uncertainty avoiding organisations (Hofstede et al. 2010). A bureaucrat 
from the NMC describes this in a quote below:  
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“One of the values of our organisation is innovation as a way to motivate and 
encourage staff. Previously, people were not used to social media 
interactions. We were used to the traditional form of public relations like the 
newspapers and radio. Right now, public education in video is taking over. 
People want to see to remember. And now we put most of our public education 
activities in very short 2-3 minutes video form and circulate them on the 
social media forms. So, I can say we are always moving from one level to the 
other. And these developments are people innovative ideas of which the NMC 
duly recognise and appreciate. However, all innovations must be in line with 
the organisation’s mission statement” (Senior Administrative Officer, 
OHCS). 
In strong uncertainty avoiding organisations like the NMC and the OHCS, one’s 
innovation is shaped by the inherent rules, ethics and hierarchical power. Also, 
innovation in high power distance organisations is mostly subject to superiors’ 
approvals.  
The YEA on the other hand depicts a very strong uncertainty avoiding culture with little 
tolerance for innovation. Most of the bureaucrats (6 out of 8) believe that innovation is 
not so much appreciated in the organisation. At the YEA, it is quite difficult to 
experiment new ideas since everything directly comes from the top. Job description is 
strictly top down and some feel that is the reason behind the failing Ghanaian 
bureaucracy as they believe it is an inherent canker in the Public Service of Ghana.  
In a nut shell, although there were some variations in the indicators of uncertainty 
avoidance among the selected organisations, the entire findings as already mentioned 
suggest a very strong uncertainty avoiding bureaucracy. All these three organisations 
believe in the fact that, employees cannot thrive in an anxiety-ridden organisation where 
the future is always unknown. Hence, there must be rules to bring orderliness. Figure 
6.2 provides a thematic summary and analysis of uncertainty avoidance in the selected 
cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy. 
6.3.1 Uncertainty Avoidance and Performance Management 
The study presents a mixed implication of uncertainty avoidance on performance 
management and the NPMP as mirrored in the two uncertainty avoidance hypotheses:  
 “Uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less innovation, more 
resistance to change. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may impede successful 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.”;  
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YEA                                                                                                   NMC & OHCS 
 Strong need for rules / Poor enforcement                                               Innovation appreciated 





OHCS & NMC                                                                                  YEA 
Strong need for rules / Strict enforcement                                  Less room for innovation 
Figure 6.1 thematic analysis and summary of uncertainty avoidance in the Ghanaian 
Bureaucracy 
 
and “More rule following may institute positive attitude to rule setting and its 
enforcement. Thus, higher uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.” 
As already discussed in chapter two, the first hypothesis suggests a negative (resistance 
to change by the PMS and the NPMP) implication of uncertainty avoidance on PMS 
and the NPMP. The second hypothesis whereas suggests a positive (availability of well 
enforced rules guiding implementation) implication of uncertainty avoidance and 
NPMP.  
In this section and its subsequent subsections, I will discuss and analyse how the 
interplay of the NPMP and the uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies of the 
organisations accounts for the state of the NPMP in the selected bureaucracies. As part 
of the discussions, I will as well focus on the compatibility issues pertaining to this 
interplay. 
• Rule Following, Uncertainty and the NPMP 
The comprehensive outlook of the NPMP helps reduce any form of uncertainty which 
may characterise performance management in the Public Service. Strong uncertainty 
avoiding organisations rely on details and precise instructions on how to carry out work 
in the organisation. With the comprehensive nature of the NPMP, anything pertaining 
to performance management and appraisal is clearly defined. This in itself is supposed 
to make performance measurement and assessment easier and to control any form of 
anxiety which may emerge out of appraisal ambiguities. All the NPMP policy 
guidelines and statements are very instructive and enjoins managers and subordinates 
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE IN THE 
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to take up responsibilities in meeting organisational goals. Furthermore, these 
instructive guidelines are supposed to instigate the desired policy outcomes when the 
implementation framework which comes with the NPMP is duly enforced. The 
implementation structure of the NPMP is very top-down and it requires greater 
commitment from the key stakeholders at the upper echelons of the organisation to 
ensure an effective implementation and institutionalisation process.  
Hypothetically, the strong rule orientation tendency of the Ghanaian bureaucracy 
should be very receptive to the NPMP and its specifications. As the study reveals, 
bureaucrats from the OHCS and the NMC believe the existence of a rule following 
culture has accounted for the success with the NPMP. Inasmuch as the policy comes 
with its guidelines and implementation framework, these organisations do have their 
own implementation policies and statutes (both written and unwritten) that also guide 
the implementation and institutionalisation process at the organisational level. A 
director at NMC remarks: 
“One key thing that is very essential for a successful implementation is that, 
there must be policies to guide the implementation. If you do not have the 
policies, it will be difficult to achieve the desired success. And that is one 
secret to our success here. We have implementation policies on almost every 
system and policy here. It is not only for performance appraisal.” (Principal 
Director, NMC) 
Due to the strong need for rules for organisational compliance, the bureaucrats do have 
much respect for these statutes and become more inclined to comply with the 
performance appraisal procedures. A bureaucrat from the OHCS explains this in the 
following quote: 
“We have rules that guide this performance appraisal. The current 
administration is very passionate about performance and performance 
appraisal. I can tell you that, you do not have any reason not to comply with 
these rules when it comes to appraisal. This is one of the main reasons why 
the policy is working”. (Senior Administrative Officer, OHCS) 
In sum, it is very evident that in these two organisations, their strong uncertainty 
avoidance and rule enforcement cultural tendencies have provided an enabling 
environment for strict enforcement of the policy guidelines, the various implementation 
frameworks and policies and hence an effective policy implementation and 
institutionalisation.  
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Looking at the rule orientation situation at the YEA, although there is a strong 
emotional need for rules, the existing rules are hardly enforced. Employees tend to do 
whatever they feel appropriate with little or no consideration for aftermath 
consequences. This cultural phenomenon may have partly accounted for the policy 
deviation and false start to the NPMP. The policy itself has been compromised at the 
top level by the policy implementers at the YEA due to the fear of non-compliance. In 
this connection, the implementers find it prudent to compromise and relax the 
provisions of the NPMP to attract some level of compliance (compliance by 
convenience). A clear example of such situation can be traced to the intention of the 
HR department to give out appraisal forms to employees to fill and return them once 
they are done because they feel it will be difficult to sit an employee for about 20 
minutes to discuss and appraise their performance. This in effect creates the impression 
that the organisation is not ready for the policy in the first place. 
The foregoing discussion alludes to the fact that the rule following cultural environment 
does not look so conducive for the enforcement and institutionalisation of the NPMP at 
the YEA. Until there is an attempt to institute a strict rule enforcement culture, the 
effectiveness and development of the NPMP still continue to be under threat. However, 
such an attempt may not prove to be an elusive task due to the employee’s strong desire 
for rules as well as an enforcement culture.  
• Innovation and Strategic Thinking 
One key management value that the NPMP upholds is innovation as a condition for 
organisational change in the Public Service. Hence, it is the ardent desire of the policy 
implementers to see public servants show a great level of innovation and strategic 
thinking in their line of work. By dint of this, the NPMP has innovation and strategic 
thinking as a competence14 indicator to measure how employees achieve organisational 
results. The innovation and strategic thinking competence enjoin bureaucrats, in their 
quest to achieve their performance targets, to provide support for organisational change, 
                                               
14 The appraisal instrument has a section described as competencies (core and non-core competencies). 
These competencies are supposed to serve as performance measurement standards to enhance 
performance and a learning climate conducive to continuous development. Check appendix for a full 
copy of the appraisal instrument. 
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to think broadly and demonstrate creativity as well as originality in thinking. One of 
the key NPMP implementers at the PSC explains: 
“And we say the competencies are how you achieve results and these are 
general management signs that tells you that, when you do these things you 
should achieve results or it should help you achieve your targets... In relation 
to the core competencies, we always tell them to be innovative. For example, 
at times when you want to go somewhere and other officers also want to use 
the same vehicle for errands, you just have to put your schedules together and 
put yourself in one vehicle and see how you can achieve that task together.”. 
(Chief Director, PSC) 
The findings of the study reveal that innovation is very much appreciated at the OHCS 
and the NMC despite some level of restrictions posed by organisational rules and 
regulations. Innovation and change are two mutually inclusive organisational elements. 
This implies that, innovation is an important prerequisite for change. An organisation 
which allows a substantial degree of innovation, sees change as its optimum goal. Thus, 
considering the implication of the innovation tendencies of the OHCS and NMC, first, 
the decision to reorganise their PMS with the introduction of the NPMP could be linked 
to their disposition to embrace change. It took forward minded and strategic thinkers at 
the OHCS and the NMC to embark on a performance management revolution at the 
OHCS and the NMC. Second, the NPMP then gained roots after its introduction due to 
the fairly receptiveness of the inherent innovation culture. Although the NPMP enjoins 
bureaucrats to exhibit some level innovation in their line of work, the policy itself and 
its content is tied to strategic thinking and innovation.  
In spite of the degree of tolerance for innovation in these strong uncertainty - avoiding 
organisations, innovation and creativity are to some extent curtailed. This is because 
employees do not have that unlimited capacity to make judgements and to take 
decisions for themselves as they continually feed on the superiors’ preferences and 
expertise. The ability to think broadly and demonstrate creativity requires a great deal 
of subordinate independence where one will be able to make independent rational 
calculations in carrying out organisational tasks. The bureaucrats from the OHCS and 
the NMC feel their level of innovation do not allow such a freedom and furthermore, 
all innovation attempts must be in sync with their organisational manual of work. 
Nonetheless, this missing element do not prove so worrisome for the organisations 
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because the bureaucrats are so much used to the strict rule following culture and hence 
has little impact on their performance and appraisal scores. 
The YEA on the other hand do not have room for innovation at all as revealed by the 
study. In light of this, it presupposes that there is a lower tendency of bureaucrats to 
think broadly and get creative since the cultural environment do not encourage that. 
Bureaucrats at the YEA are solely dependent on their superiors for their organisational 
tasks and as well as suggestions on ways to carry out those tasks. In this regard, any 
attempt to bring the innovation tendencies out from these bureaucrats will prove to be 
a daunting one due to the incompatible innovation culture. This cultural phenomenon 
has moreover created an “it will not work” syndrome. This is because, any decision or 
policy which seeks to challenge and change the existing status quo is mostly met with 
some initial resistance. Most of the bureaucrats at the YEA feel change has gradually 
become a nearly unachievable element in the organisation. This particular phenomenon 
tames the innovation prospects that come with the NPMP. It can be said that the YEA 
seems to have NPMP implementation challenges due to: 
• Their reluctance to embrace change in relation to their PMS; and 
• Their intolerance of innovation as a means to change. 
Summing up... 
Considering the discussions above, the two hypotheses posited in relation to uncertainty 
avoidance have been confirmed by the findings of the study. The study confirms the 
first hypothesis in the sense that the YEA which was presented as a high uncertainty 
avoiding organisations with less room for innovation shows a greater tendency of 
resisting change. And such cultural phenomenon is revealed as incompatible with the 
NPMP and thus have impeded a successful implementation and institutionalisation of 
the NPMP as compared to the NMC and OHC that have quite a receptive uncertainty 
avoidance culture. In addition, the OHCS and NMC are regarded as strong uncertainty 
avoiding organisations with strong rule following tendencies. In this light, these 
organisations have a well enforced code of rules and details guiding the whole NPMP 
implementation process and hence, have accounted for a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP. The YEA seems struggling partly because of its weak 
rule enforcement culture. And that also confirms the second hypothesis. 
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6.4 Political Neutrality 
In this section, I present findings on political neutrality as the third cultural dimension 
of the study. This dimension basically tries to examine bureaucrats’ attitude towards 
politics and how their work intersects with partisan politics. By dint of that, the study 
looks into the extent to which bureaucrats are politically neutral as well as the 
politicisation of the selected bureaucracies. The study adopts Classical Bureaucracy 
Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy as the indicator to serve as a benchmark for analysis with 
respect to political neutrality. 
• Classical Bureaucracy Vs. Partisan Bureaucracy 
The findings of the study suggest a high level of political neutrality, thus classical 
bureaucracy at the NMC and the OHCS. All the engaged bureaucrats from these 
organisations agreed in principle that, their bureaucracies are politically neutral. In 
implication, the findings suggest that, bureaucrats are politically open-minded, and rule 
oriented and thus, ready to serve any government that captures political power. In 
classical bureaucracies like the OHCS and the NMC, bureaucrats’ attitudes towards 
politics is inversely proportional, hence a clear distinction between partisan politics and 
bureaucratic activities. This is so because, these bureaucracies believe in the fact that, 
inasmuch as they work in the shadow of the executive arm of government, their 
activities are backed by law which makes them quite autonomous. In this connection, 
it is extremely difficult to see bureaucrats’ actions and inactions being influenced by 
their political orientation. In spite of the fact the NMC and OHCS runs a purely classical 
bureaucracy where organisational work is distinguished from partisan politics, some of 
the bureaucrats did not rule out the fact that bureaucrats may have their political party 
preferences, however, they argue these preferences do not influence organisational 
work.  
On the other hand, findings from the study present the YEA as a highly partisan 
bureaucracy. The bureaucrats were not reluctant to admit that the organisation is highly 
politicised and fragmented along partisan lines. Some believe this as a result has 
accounted for the stagnation of its growth. A bureaucrat explains this particular point 
in the following quote:   
“If you know YEA for a while, it has not been politically neutral. It is this 
politics which has accounted for its downfall. Bureaucrats are always eager 
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to know your political affiliation immediately you enter in here. You could 
see the political factions within the organisation. This does not even help 
work.” (Senior Administrative Officer, YEA). 
Furthermore, the entire leadership setup is determined and influenced by the ruling 
government which in turn threatens the political neutrality of the agency. The 
bureaucrats reveal that, the tenure of their leaders is tied to politics and thus, a change 
of government implies a change of leadership.  
In sum, the study reveals that the YEA is really struggling to disassociate its functions 
from partisan politics. The YEA is being portrayed as a partisan bureaucracy with a 
high level of political interference. The OHCS and the NMC on the other hand is also 
being portrayed as a politically neutral classical bureaucracy. The findings of the study 
suggest that these variations are as a result of how these organisations were created 
especially with YEA. The YEA until recently used to operate from the Office of the 
Presidency of Ghana which happens to be a political office in the political landscape of 
Ghana and hence the politicisation of the YEA. Figure 6.2 provides a thematic summary 
and analysis of political neutrality in the selected cases of the Ghanaian bureaucracy. 
YEA                                                                                                    
 Politically biased / Partisan Bureaucracy                                 
                                    
 
 
        
 
 OHCS & NMC                                                                         
Politically neutral / Classical bureaucracy                         
Figure 6.2 network analysis and summary of political neutrality in the Ghanaian 
Bureaucracy 
6.4.1 Political Neutrality and Performance Management 
This sub section looks into how bureaucrats’ responsiveness to politics affects 
performance management systems in the Ghanaian bureaucracy. The political aspects 
are very important for the success of appraisal reforms (Karyeija, 2010: 197). The main 
rationale behind the NPMP is to kick away subjectivity from performance management. 
In this sense, any form of manipulation which may stem out from bureaucrats’ response 
to politics will rather undermine the objectivity element of the NPMP. In this light, the 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY IN THE 
GHANAIAN BUREAUCRACY (OHCS, 
YEA, AND NMC) 
CLASSICAL BUREAUCRACY VS. 
PARTISAN BUREAUCRACY 
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study hypothesises that “the higher the degree of political neutrality in the Ghanaian 
Public Service, the less the bureaucracy becomes fragmented along political lines. Such 
a situation facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and 
hence, a better NPMP implementation and institutionalisation in the Ghanaian Public 
Service.” 
• Political Neutrality, Favouritism and Equity 
Equity is a key policy principle of the NPMP. As discussed in chapter four, it is one of 
the goals of the NPMP to foster equity considerations in the performance appraisal 
process. The policy stipulates that the PMS must not be discriminatory with respect to 
gender, politics, ethnicity, geographical location etc. (PSC, 2015). In other words, the 
PMS must eschew any form of discrimination and favouritism which may emanate 
from one’s political identity in addition to other cultural identities. Favouritism is a pre-
eminent organisational element which tends to cripple performance management 
systems in most public organisations. Favouritism sometimes becomes very pervasive 
in organisations when the internal human resource is fragmented into factions along 
political party lines. There is always the struggle between favouritism and equity. In a 
politically fragmented organisation, bureaucrats who belong to the same identifiable 
cliques tend to manipulate and alter things in the interest of their groups or cliques and 
thus, making it difficult for employees to develop on merit. In connection to 
performance management, this organisational syndrome creates some sort of non-
responsiveness to staff performance appraisal system, and a breakdown in discipline 
and work ethic. The old PMS failed to thrive in the wider bureaucratic system because 
its modus operandi with respect to appraisal was very subjective and much beset with 
favouritism and other assessment manipulations influenced by factors like politics and 
ethnicity.  
The study reveals that the YEA is really struggling trying to sieve out political 
considerations from its administrative systems. The YEA runs a very political or 
partisan bureaucracy, and that in itself is a threat to the objectivity and equity intent of 
the NPMP. From some of the revelations of the bureaucrats at the YEA, everything at 
the YEA has been politicised. The political factions are very conspicuous to the extent 
that everyone is keen to know your political identity once you join the bureaucracy. 
Against this backdrop, how then will the application of appraisal procedures and 
outcomes be the same for every individual within the bureaucracy? It is of no doubt 
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that these internal factions will lead to favouritism in the application of the performance 
management in the bureaucracy. A bureaucrat hints in the following: 
“You cannot take politics out from the YEA like I said earlier. Everything is 
influenced by politics. Most of the bosses here have their own favourite 
persons and when it comes to some organisational benefits like training, they 
mostly consider these persons. I am 100% sure that will also be the case for 
performance appraisal. Because the last time we had appraisal, I observed 
favour being bestowed on the chosen ones.” (Administrative Officer, YEA) 
In addition to the equity threat posed by this cultural tendency, the principle of 
accountability, transparency, and ownership are to a large extent threatened by the 
element of favouritism as a result of lack of political neutrality in the bureaucracy. First, 
bureaucrats will not feel very accountable for their appraisal scores if they feel the entire 
process was marred with favouritism and other politically induced appraisal 
irregularities. Second, transparency is threatened by favouritism as well when 
bureaucrats feel the mode of assessment was skewed to favour certain targeted groups 
at the detriment of others. In this connection, the bureaucrats will not own the process 
and outcome of the assessment mechanism which the NPMP seeks to achieve with its 
ownership intent. 
The OHCS and NMC on the other hand are revealed as classical bureaucracies that 
uphold the principle of political neutrality. This is as a result of their system of 
Weberian bureaucracy where administrators are arranged according to a hierarchy with 
a vertical authority system, lifelong career, impersonality, and promotion on the basis 
of merit (Jamil, 2007: 70). Furthermore, such a stable system is not supposed to be 
disturbed by a change in government; the system continues despite political changes 
and upheavals (Ibid). Administration in these bureaucracies, is seen as a neutral 
instrument concerned with the translation of political decisions which are derived from 
other sources into practice (Barker, 1996; Self, 1972 cited by Jamil, 2007:70). In this 
sense, it makes it easy for such bureaucracies to stay committed to any public policy 
which is backed by law.  The NMC and OHCS have been able to achieve a great deal 
of success by getting the NPMP institutionalised due to the nature of their stable 
bureaucratic system and their political neutrality unlike the YEA. The congenial 
cultural environment has made it more conducive for the NPMP to thrive. Bureaucrats 
do not consider the political source of the policy since they are expected to stay loyal 
to any government which comes to power. By dint of this, the NMC and the OHCS are 
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not segregated in any way along political lines and this is what has fostered a very 
smooth implementation and institutionalisation process. All appraisal procedures, 
processes, and outcomes are very free and fair as mirrored in the transparency principle 
of the NPMP. 
Summing up... 
The study reveals an incompatible coexistence between objectivity as a virtue of the 
NPMP and politicised organisations such as the YEA. The OHCS and NMC are seen 
to have a very receptive political neutrality culture to NPMP. This culture has really 
fostered a very objective performance appraisal process. The YEA is seen 
compromising on the aspects of the appraisal instrument which seeks to enhance an 
objective appraisal process. And this is partly because, the highly politically fragmented 
culture does not accommodate the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the 
NPMP. This particular situation in effect confirms the fourth hypothesis that classical 
bureaucracies such as the OHCS and the NMC devoid of any form political induced 
organisational fragmentations tend to have a very successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP. And this is because such neutrality culture really 
facilitates the objectivity, neutrality and equity element of the NPMP and hence, a little 
or no NPMP implementation and institutionalisation challenges in the Ghanaian Public 
Service. 
6.5 Final Reflections on Administrative Culture as a Contextual-
Explanatory Variable 
The findings clearly indicate that the NPMP is been nurtured on different administrative 
cultural environments across the various bureaucracies in the Public Service of Ghana. 
Some of these cultures have been very receptive while others are seen as threats to the 
NPMP. The study presents different cultural variations among the selected cases of the 
study. Thus, it presupposes that the outcome of the interplay of the host administrative 
cultures and the NPMP will differ across these organisations. In the same vein, 
bureaucracies with similar cultural tendencies are bound to elicit similar policy 
outcomes. When we consider the NMC and the OHC, the findings of the study reveal 
that these two organisations share lots of bureaucratic cultural traits in common. So, it 
is not surprising that, these two organisations are thriving together as far as the 
institutionalisation of the NPMP is concerned. Most of their cultural tendencies are 
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seemingly conducive and compatible with the policy goals of the NPMP. The YEA has 
entirely unique administrative cultural features which in itself serve as a threat to the 
provisions of the NPMP. Although, the YEA has not gone far with the NPMP, its false 
start can partly be traced to the incompatibility of the host culture and the NPMP. 
Hypothetically, a bureaucracy with the right and conducive cultural environment 
should be able to make a good start to a policy like the NPMP and hence a brighter 
institutionalisation prospect. With my engagements with the OHCS and NMC, none of 
them expressed a case of a false start or any deviation tied to cultural incompatibility at 
the early implementation phase of the NPMP and hence, their success.  Table 6.1 
presents a brief overview of the compatibility of the NPMP and the host administrative 
culture of the selected bureaucracies of the study. 
Table 6.1 brief overview of the compatibility of the NPMP and the host administrative culture 
of the selected bureaucracies of the study. 
Case Cultural Features The Compatibility of the NPMP 
and the Host Culture 
 
OHCS 
High Power Distance 
Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
High Political Neutrality 
 
ü  
NMC High Power Distance 
Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
High Political Neutrality 
 
ü  
YEA High Power Distance  
Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
(Poor rule enforcement) 
Low Political Neutrality 
 
Ñ  
Ñ - Represents a case of incompatibility.   
ü - Represents a case of compatibility 
6.6 Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
One interesting revelation of the study is that, all the three cases of the study in some 
instances do share some similar cultural features such as power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance; however, these features seems to have different effects on the 
institutionalisation process of the NPMP at the various organisations. This in 
implication connotes that culture do not always function in isolation, and thus, 
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organisational culture can be managed by instrumental actors, that is, organisational 
leaders to achieve the desired results. The findings of the study suggest high power 
distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures in all the three organisations, that is, 
the OHCS, NMC, and YEA. However, these cultural tendencies have had positive 
implications on the institutionalisation of the NPMP at both the OHCS and the NMC 
with a negative implication at the YEA and the difference is leadership. Most studies 
on administrative culture in developing countries have a negative connotation that, 
large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance contexts negatively affects 
administrative reforms. However, the case of OHCS and NMC also indicate that leaders 
can manage and utilise these cultural traits to instigate the desired change as purposed 
by the reform. By dint of this, the leadership of the OHCS and NMC combines and 
utilises the cultural traits of hierarchy, friendly relations between superior-subordinate, 
and subordinates’ preference for rule following to neutralise the negative implications 
of large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies in order 
to foster a successful institutionalisation of the NPMP. The NPMP looks unpromising 
at the YEA due to the inability of leaders to effectively utilise leadership strategies to 
neutralise the negative threats posed by large power distance and strong uncertainty 
avoidance cultures.  
In view of this, it can be said that the implementation anomalies and the lackadaisical 
attitude of the YEA towards the NPMP is as a result of managerial and leadership 
lapses. Until performance management is prioritised and received the requisite 
commitment by the governing leadership, the implementation of the NPMP will be 
forever be deadlocked. The OHCS and NMC of Ghana were identified as one of the 
best performing organisations with respect to the operationalisation of the NPMP, first 
by the PSC and later substantiated by the findings of the study. The success of the policy 
in the above-mentioned organisations are directly attributed the efforts and commitment 
of their organisational leaders. It took the efforts of revolutionary and visionary leaders 
at the OHCS and NMC to achieve such heights with the NPMP. And, in order to have 
a uniform diffused level of NPMP success in the Public Service, the leadership of the 
various organisations will have to rise up to make it happen starting from the apex 
implementing body, that is the PSC. This is how a director at the OHCS summed up 
the role of leadership in entire implementation and institutionalisation of the policy: 
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“I will say it is leadership, it is leadership, it is leadership. I will explain. For us 
as the Ghana civil service, it took somebody with that leadership quality to say 
that “we have ended it. This is where I want us to go.” So, it takes a very good 
leader with all the capabilities because then in the public service if you are 
waiting for somebody to come and motivate you before you move, then it won’t 
work. So, I will say again it is leadership. “(Principal Director, OHCS)  
Considering the findings of the study, it is very evident that leadership really plays a 
significant role in the institutionalisation of NPMP and PMS in the Public Service. The 
institutionalisation process draws on the right leadership strategy and commitment for 
a successful institutionalisation. This confirms the fifth hypothesis that the right 
leadership strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to manage cultural 
incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and institutionalisation of the 
NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service.   
6.7 Conclusion and Chapter Summary 
In conclusion, it worth noting that context really makes a difference when it comes to 
policy implementation and not just at the international level (IPSM) but also at the 
organisational level. Administrative culture and leadership are two key contextual 
elements that cannot be taken for granted in implementing and institutionalising 
administrative reforms. Both administrative culture and leadership matter in the 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP and PM reforms. A cultural 
tendency such as political neutrality is difficult to be managed by leaders in developing 
countries unlike cultures like power distance and uncertainty avoidance. In effect, their 
implications on reforms are mostly inevitable and beyond leadership control.  
This chapter primarily sought to examine the interplay and effect of contextual cultural 
variables on the operationalisation of the NPMP. Discussions in the chapter mainly 
explained the factors behind the NPMP institutionalisation situations at various selected 
bureaucracies. The findings suggest that the organisations (OHCS and NMC) with high 
political neutrality, high power distance and a strong uncertainty avoidance with a strict 
rule enforcement culture tend to perform better with the operationalisation of the NPMP 
as compared to the organisations (YEA) with low political neutrality, high power 
distance and a strong uncertainty avoidance but poor rule enforcement culture.  
The next and final chapter wraps up with final theoretical discussions, summarises and 
concludes the whole thesis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSION 
7.0 Introduction 
This particular chapter which happens to be the final chapter of the thesis wraps up and 
concludes the study. It primarily offers concluding remarks which cuts across 
theoretical discussions, summary of the research findings, recap of both theoretical 
framework and methodology, and the implication and limitation of the study.  
7.1 Theoretical Discussions 
This section elaborates on the theoretical discussions and implications relative to the 
key highlights of the research findings discussed in the preceding findings chapters. It 
captures discussions under the theoretical framework. 
7.1.1 Discussion Under the Instrumental Perspective 
The Instrumental School of Thought conceives public organisations as instruments for 
achieving certain goals seen as important in society (Christensen et al. 2007: 20). Such 
goals include the public-sector restructuring through NPM inspired administrative 
reforms in making the functions of the State and the broader society better. In one sense, 
these reforms in the lenses of instrumentalists are seen as tools in the hands of public 
organisational leaders for achieving such goals in the society. As discussed in chapter 
two, the arguments of the instrumental perspective hinges on the logic of instrumental 
rationality. This implies that the reform process entails rational assessment of available 
alternatives or tools according to their consequences and in relation to the chosen goals, 
making wilful choices between alternatives and achieving the effects desired through 
those choices (Ibid). In this view, the research study identified Performance 
Management Reforms as a rational restructuring tool to stimulate performance and 
productivity in the Public Sector of Ghana. The first research question of study, “What 
is the state of performance management reform in Ghana’s Public Service? To what 
extent has this been institutionalised in the various public institutions sought to unravel 
 - 107 - 
how the Public Service has rationally utilised performance management reforms to 
revamp its PMS to incite high performance in the service.  
In consequence, as part of the findings of the study, the study established a clear 
trajectory of PM reforms from its distant historical past to the most reform policy, that 
is, the NPMP. The study reveals that the past PM reforms prior to the NPMP such as 
the ACRS (1974), PES (1992), and the PAS (1997) failed to achieve their intended 
goals and effects due to certain decision shortcomings caused by what Herbert Simons 
describes as “Bounded Rationality”.15 The Instrumental Perspective argues rational 
choices consist of four elements, that is: Goal or problem identification, Identification, 
Expectations about consequences, and Decision-making rules (Christensen et al. 2007). 
Against this logic, it is quite implicit that reformers’ in designing reforms main point 
of departure is to identify an organisational goal or problem; assess possible alternatives 
based upon their consequences, and a choice is made accordingly (Ibid). If these 
rational calculations and actions are not properly handled considering decision 
constraints posed bounded rationality, decision consequences in a form of reforms tend 
to suffer at implementation and institutionalisation stage. In the case of Ghana as 
revealed by the study, it can be said that the previous PM reforms were beset with 
implementation shortcomings due to: 
• the inability of reformers to anticipate future consequences; 
• an adoption of “one size fits all” policies from the international community. 
All these shortcomings are as a result of constraint posed by bounded rationality which 
caused reformers to go the easy way of reforming. For instance, the PES was introduced 
in 1992 under the CSRP (1987-1993). The CSRP was fundamentally a public-sector 
management improvement exercise which formed part of the core components of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was donor funded by the Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA) of the United Kingdom and the World Bank 
(Ayee, 2001). This presupposes that the public service reformers adopted the PES and 
CSRP by way of restructuring the service the easy way and enjoying some donor 
                                               
15 Herbert Simon’s Bounded Rationality assumes that members of organisations and decision -makers 
have limited knowledge or cognitive capacity and will act on the basis of simplified models of the 
world (Christensen et al. 2007: 10) 
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funding without looking into the future ramifications as well as some possible 
contextual incompatibilities. Adei & Boachie-Danquah (2003: 13) assentuates this 
particular defect in their argument that the entire PES and CSRP was a failure because 
“the programme was crafted as a technical instrument by ‘consultants’ and mission 
experts and imposed top-down with little local participation and ownership”. 
It must be said that NPM inspired public service reforms which happens to be the most 
effective way of fixing the unending developmental challenges crippling the public 
sector has created an Internationalisation of Public Sector Management (IPSM) 
(Ohemeng, 2006: 247). This IPSM has led to a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
administrative reforms (Ibid). However, several reform studies like (Ohemeng, 2006) 
reject this approach to reform. Ohemeng (2006: 248) argues that, “there is no “one best 
way” for changing the state... factors that may influence or enhance the successful 
implementation of administrative reforms in one country may not lead to a successful 
implementation of reforms in another.” Ohemeng (2006) is in his study reveals that 
rational policy formulators must consider all contextual implications before adopting 
any reform into the circles of the administrative systems of the Public Service. He 
argues below: 
 “the socio-economic and political environment, including a country’s history, 
past development, system of governance, and relationship with the outside world 
(particularly, International Financial Institutions), the bureaucracy, and the 
culture in which the reforms are being implemented should all be of serious 
concern in determining the policies for reforms. In this sense, policies being 
transferred from one environment to another should be adapted to meet the 
environmental circumstances of the recipient country. In other words, such 
policies should be refined to accommodate a country’s specific exigencies if they 
are to achieve their intended purposes.” 
7.1.2 Discussion Under the Institutional/Cultural Perspective 
Administrative culture is the main study variable tied to the cultural perspective. The 
fundamental logic behind administrative culture and the cultural perspective is the logic 
of appropriateness. This means that, “when acting in public situations, one will not 
primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra arguments, 
or out of self-interest or assessments of possible consequences of actions; instead, one 
will engage in matching, whereby rules for action are deployed in order to link 
situations and identities.” (Christensen et al. 2007: 40). This particular organisational 
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phenomenon plays a very crucial role in the adoption of any reform onto the 
administrative systems of public organisations as demonstrated throughout the study. 
Organisational reform and cultural studies indicate that organisational culture affects 
reforms in diverse ways. It can either be positive or negative depending on the 
compatibility of the cultural tendencies and the reform objectives. In highly 
institutionalised organisations, organisational actors first and foremost consider how 
their actions are acceptable within the organisation before considering how acceptable 
it is vis à vis reform provisions. According to Christensen et al. (2007: 40), 
organisational actors are constantly concerned with their “recognition” (which type of 
situation am I faced with as a public decision-maker?), their “identity” (which identity 
is most important for my institution and for me?), and the rules of the game (what are 
my institution and I expected to do in a situation like this?). 
In this instance, the cultural norms dictate the “rules of the game” and thereby 
determining which aspect of the reform can fully be institutionalised and vice versa. 
Looking at the findings of the study, the YEA’s operationalisation and start to the 
NPMP looks unpromising due to the cultural incongruence. Bureaucrats at the YEA are 
constantly engaged in what Christensen et al (2007: 40) describes as matching whereby 
rules for action are deployed in order to link situations and identities. The bureaucrats 
at the YEA through the existing organisational culture have been integrated into the 
organisation with an ‘integrative glue’ and thereby creating a collective feeling and 
identity. By dint of this, the organisation and its leadership are faced with no option 
than to deviate from the NPMP and modify the policy to suit its culture without trying 
to change their culture fundamentally. 
The negative effect of culture is also well demonstrated in Karyeija, Gerald’s (2010) 
study on the topic “Performance appraisal in Uganda’s civil service: Does 
administrative culture?”. Karyeija’s findings demonstrated that “for the successful 
introduction of performance appraisals, culture matters because the performance 
appraisal is imposed from abroad and requires a compatible host administrative culture 
in order to take root” (Karjeija 2010: iv). He identified large power distance, strong 
uncertainty avoidance, high ethnicity and political neutrality as the main features of the 
Ugandan’s bureaucracy. He further argued that “although the Ugandan government 
successfully introduced the appraisal reforms, the incompatibility between the values 
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embedded in the appraisal and the host administrative culture watered down the reform” 
(Ibid). 
7.1.3 Discussion Under the Transformative Approach 
The study adopts a transformative approach in explaining why some reforms are 
watered down by contextual factors and hence addressing the second research question, 
what explains the institutionalisation of performance management reform? Is it 
leadership or administrative culture that matters? Or a combination of both, that is, 
leadership and culture? Christensen and Lægreid (1999a cited by Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2001: 24) as discussed in chapter two advances a transformative approach in 
explaining the interplay of reform process and context. To them, a transformative 
perspective emerges when we combine internal and environmental reform features to 
explain why NPM may have different content, effects and implications in different 
countries (Ibid). In this connection, the study primarily adopts leadership and 
organisational culture as the contextual variables in explaining the institutionalisation 
of the performance management in the Ghanaian Public Service. The implications of 
these two variables are tied to the dynamic interplay of instrumentalism and culturalism 
(transformative perspective). The findings of the study reveal that both leadership and 
organisational culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP.  
The function of leadership (traits and styles) is viewed differently by the instrumental 
and the institutional perspectives. From the instrumental perspective, structures 
surrounding a leader form their traits and they can use them deliberately as tools, almost 
irrespective of their own personal traits (Christensen et al., 2010: 110). Thus, in 
principle, it is irrelevant which qualities leaders have because formal norms steer 
behaviour, that is, what is decisive is the organisational framework (Ibid: 111). From a 
cultural perspective on the other hand, leadership trait is essential for how leaders 
exercise their roles. From this Selznick-inspired perspective, leadership traits become 
much more relevant...not only to promote historical norms and values, but also to be 
able to show, by example or in some other way, what the cultural norms and values are 
and to use them to garner support and aid social integration (Ibid).  
The above discussed functions of leadership are very much mirrored in the findings of 
the study. The leadership at both the OHCS and NMC showed great levels of dexterity 
in the institutionalisation of the NPMP. Their astute leadership traits substantially 
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account for their NPMP successes as revealed by the study. What then accounts for 
this? Against the backdrop of the arguments posited by the instrumentalists, both the 
OHCS and the NMC have the institutional structures backed by law, and thus, these 
structures in turn serve as tools in the hands of their leaders to control the 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP. The study reveals that the key 
policy implementers (leaders) at the OHCS and NMC drew on certain structural 
features to harness the entire operationalisation of the policy. Both the two 
organisations tapped on their financial backings and strengths to facilitate the entire 
implementation process. These organisations organised both in-house and external 
trainings on the NPMP to help bureaucrats understand the policy better. It is worth 
pointing out that these training programmes were organised as part of the organisations’ 
training schemes (structural feature). 
Also, against the backdrop of the arguments posited by the cultural perspective, leaders 
exhibited astute leadership traits by utilising and managing the organisational informal 
norms to achieve a great level of NPMP institutionalisation. This leadership argument 
posited by the culturalists, explains how the leaders at the OHCS and NMC managed 
to utilise large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance cultural tendencies to 
their advantage (compatibility) unlike the leadership at the YEA. Large power distance 
and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures are mostly detrimental to reform 
implementation especially in developing countries and it was very evident in the case 
of the YEA. 
7.2 Overview of the Study 
The dispensation of the NPM over the last two decades has provided a surest way of 
restructuring the administrative systems of Ghana’s Public Service through reforms. 
Ghana after adopting its maiden NPM reform in 1987, have remained focused on its 
bureaucratic reformative agenda. Since 1987, Ghana has witnessed several NPM 
reforms with some internationally adopted and others internally initiated. It is worth 
noting that, the NPM reform trajectories project performance management system and 
reform as an integral component of all these reform initiatives. The most recent 
performance management reform in the Ghanaian Public Service, is the NPMP. 
And in this connection, the primary purpose of the study was to examine the whole 
operationalisation of the PM reforms, specifically the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public 
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Service. In a narrow sense, it mainly sought to explore and examine the impact and 
influence of leadership and administrative culture as contextual factors on the 
implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP in Ghana’s Public Service.  It 
focused on explaining failed and successful institutionalisation of the NPMP and 
ascertain whether leadership, administrative culture or both matters in the 
institutionalisation process in the selected public organisations, that is the OHCS, 
NMC, and YEA. In this light, the study sought to address this research phenomenon by 
posing two research questions: “What is the state of performance management 
reform in Ghana’s Public Service? To what extent has this been institutionalised 
in the various public institutions?”; “What explains the institutionalisation of 
performance management reform? Is it leadership or administrative culture that 
matters? Or a combination of both, that is, leadership and culture?” In answering 
these questions, a qualitative research design was employed to gather, analyse and 
interpret data on the research phenomenon. The study adopted the instrumental and 
institutional/cultural perspectives as well as the interplay of these perspectives 
(transformative approach) in explaining administrative reforms in the Ghanaian Public 
Service.  
At the end of the study, the state of performance management was unravelled with 
NPMP identified as the current working PM reform in the public service. And OHCS 
and NMC were seen to have had quite a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP due to leadership efforts and cultural compatibility. 
The YEA on the other hand was seen to have had a false start to the implementation to 
the NPMP, and hence a policy deviation due to poor leadership style and commitment 
as well as cultural incompatibility. Also, the study concluded by arguing that both 
leadership and administrative culture matter in the institutionalisation of the NPMP and 
administrative reforms in general. 
 7.2.1 Recap of the Theoretical Framework 
The arguments of the study were built on New Institutional Theories, that is the 
Instrumental Perspective, Cultural/Institutional Perspective and the Transformative 
Perspective (dynamic interplay of the instrumental and cultural perspective). The 
instrumental perspective which hinges on the underlying logic of consequence argue 
that organisations and organisational actors are seen as instruments to address societal 
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challenges. To instrumentalists, leaders are seen as rational actors and thus, they wield 
the transformative power of instigating change in organisations through reforms. 
Hence, reforms are seen as tools in the hands to bring change in organisations and the 
society at large. The institutionalisation of PM reform as a consequence of rational 
decisions of leaders is seen as the dependent variable of the study.  
The institutional/Cultural perspective is also tied to the logic of appropriateness and 
administrative culture as an independent variable of the study. To Culturalists, “people 
in public organisations act according to historical norms, values and what is seen as 
appropriate” (Christensen et al, 2007: 55). Furthermore, the study adopts a 
transformative approach in explaining the effect of context on reforms. In consequence, 
leadership is also identified as a contextual element which influences reform processes, 
hence an independent variable of the study. The transformative perspective argues that 
it is always prudent to merge and examine the interplay of environmental 
characteristics, polity features and historical-institutional factors in explaining reform 
process and context. 
7.2.2 Recap of the Methodology 
The study employed a qualitative research design with a multiple case study research 
strategy to investigate the research phenomenon. The main reason for this choice was 
to study the research phenomenon through the eyes of the people studied in their natural 
setting (Bryman, 2012). As a comparative multiple case study, the unit of analysis 
(cases) for the study was the Public Service of Ghana focussing specifically on the 
OHCS, NMC, and the YEA. 
The study employed both purposive sampling (opportunistic sampling) and snowball 
sampling approach in identifying well-informed stakeholders, both principal officers 
and junior officers, in the various organisations for interview engagements. The essence 
of this was to ensure that all levels of staff across all targeted organisations were 
substantially represented. A total of twenty-eight (28) bureaucrats were interviewed in 
that regard. In addition to the usage of interviews as the main primary data source, the 
study also gathered data from other secondary sources inclusive of documents, and 
direct observation. 
By way of data analysis, the study adopted a Condensed Content Analysis to guard 
against being captivated by the richness of the data collected (Bryman, 2012: 565). 
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Furthermore, the study adopts Validity, Reliability, and Generalisation as some 
criteria for assessing the quality of the research. Last but not least, the study saw to it 
that ethical principles which include; avoidance of harm to participants, seeking 
informed consent, confidentiality, and personal integrity were strictly upheld through 
the research process.  
7.3 Summary of key Findings 
In this section, I present a summary of the key findings of the study which enfold around 
the main research questions and hypotheses posed by the study by way of investigating 
the research phenomenon. In view of this, table 7.0 and 7.1 present a summary of the 
key research findings under the two research questions. 






What is the state of 
performance 
management reform 











                         Trajectory of PM Reforms 
• Annual Confidential Reporting System (ACRS) – This was the main 
PM instrument of the Ghanaian Public Service before Ghana’s maiden NPM 
reform which was later reviewed in 1974. 
• Performance Evaluation System (PES) – The main PM instrument 
under the CSRP in 1992. It was primarily an interactive process between 
managers and members of staff. 
• Performance Agreement System (PAS) – This system marked the 
paradigm shift from a traditional bureaucratic system to a more result-
oriented management culture and it ran from 1997 to 2008. The main 
challenge of this system was that it was quite ad-hoc in its implementation 
and lacked a clear feedback system. 
          
         The New Performance Management Policy (NPMP) 
• The NPMP was first piloted in 2011, further developed and 
introduced in 2014 by the PSC in collaboration with the OHCS, the 
Australian Public Commission and other key stakeholders replace the old 
PAS. 
• The rationale behind its introduction was: to introduce a “one-for-
all” policy framework for the entire public service; to provide a 
comprehensive robust PA system and methods on how performance should 
be measured; to institutionalise better reward and sanction systems linked to 
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performance as well as training and career development; and to reduce 
subjectivity in the entire PMS. 
• Implementation Framework- The study did identify a four-level 
implementation chain of the NPMP. The key bureaucratic actors making up 
this four-level implementation chain include: the main autonomous agencies 
(PSC, NDPC, FWSC), the Governing Councils and Boards; the Heads of the 
Public Services, Chief Executives, and Chief Directors (Management); and 
the Street-level Bureaucrats. 
• The performance management system depicts a six-stage cyclical 
process, that is, performance planning, measurement, monitoring, evaluation, 
annual reporting and improvement plans. 
To what extent has 
this (PM Reforms and 
the NPMP) been 







• From the findings of study, the OHCS and NMC are seen as 
organisations having a great deal of institutionalisation with the NPMP. 
However, the findings do suggest that it is not all rosy with the 
implementation and institutionalisation of the policy at these organisations. 
Both organisations despite their successes are still struggling with the 
construct D (reward and sanction system) of the policy 
• The YEA on the hand is seen as “new babies” in terms of the 
implementation of the policy. The organisation in its quest to revamp its PMS 
decides to roll the NPMP out, however, its attempt to get the NPMP 
implemented is seen as a false start and thus, clear case of policy deviation. 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of the key research findings (Independent Variables) 
Research Question  Theoretical 
Underpinning 
Key Findings 
What explains the 
institutionalisation of 
performance 
management reform?  
Is it leadership, 
culture or a 
combination of both, 
that is, leadership and 






• That study reveals that both administrative culture and leadership are 
two key contextual elements that cannot be taken for granted in implementing 
and institutionalising administrative reforms. Both administrative culture and 
leadership matter in the implementation and institutionalisation of the NPMP 
and PM reforms. 
Administrative Culture as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
• Power Distance- The findings from the YEA (having a tensed 
informal relations) confirms the hypothesis that the existence of a large power 





















distance culture and informal relations in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy may 
threaten proper institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public 
Service.  In contrast, the findings from the OHCS and NMC (having a healthy 
informal relations) refutes this hypothesis. The findings suggest a very 
positive effect of large power distance on the implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP.  
• Uncertainty Avoidance- The study confirms the first hypothesis that 
high uncertainty avoidance is associated with more rule following, less 
innovation, more resistance to change and thus, impede successful 
institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case 
of YEA).  
The study also confirms the second hypothesis that more rule following may 
institute positive attitude to rule setting and its enforcement. Thus, higher 
uncertainty avoidance may foster a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case 
of OHCS and NMC). The YEA seems struggling partly because of its weak 
rule enforcement culture. 
• Political Neutrality- The findings of the study confirms the fourth 
hypothesis that classical bureaucracies such as the OHCS and the NMC 
devoid of any form political induced organisational fragmentations unlike the 
YEA tend to have a very successful implementation and institutionalisation 
of the NPMP 
Leadership as a Contextual-Explanatory Variable 
• The study confirms the fifth hypothesis that the right leadership 
strategy and commitment, and the ability of leaders to manage cultural 
incompatibility may foster a successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service (In the case 
of OHCS and NMC).   
7.4 Contribution of the Study 
First and foremost, the findings of the study really add up to the extant literature on PM 
and NPM reforms, and Administrative Culture in Africa and the world at large. As 
already mentioned, the research area is a largely unexplored area both in the Ghanaian 
context as well as the international context especially within the sub-Saharan Africa. 
Most importantly, the findings of study contribute in filling in the gaps in the extant 
literature on public sector reforms in Ghana. Most reform studies in Ghana have only 
sought to address the scope and content of reforms with little interest of examining the 
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role and impact of contextual factors such as organisational culture and leadership. In 
this view, this study contributes by serving as a literature point of departure for NPM 
reforms and contextual studies in Ghana. 
Also, another tremendous contribution of the study to extant literature worth pointing 
out is the finding of the study which discusses the effect of large power distance and 
strong uncertainty avoidance cultures on NPM reform process. Most studies on 
administrative reform and culture in developing countries like Karyieja’s (2010) study 
on the impact of culture on performance management reforms in the Ugandan 
Bureaucracy suggest a very negative impact of the above-mentioned cultural tendencies 
on the implementation of reforms. It is most often projected that large power distance 
and strong uncertainty avoidance cultures are usually incompatible with reform 
initiatives and thus, water down these reforms. However, this study has illustrated 
otherwise; such cultural tendencies coupled with the right leadership and managerial 
strategies can result into a promising implementation and institutionalisation of the 
reform policy. And that is something new to the extant literature on reform and cultural 
studies in developing countries. 
7.4.1 Implications for Further Studies 
This study opens the way for further comprehensive assessment of the 
operationalisation of the NPMP in the Ghanaian Public Service. As of the time this 
study was conducted, the PSC was still creating the awareness and training 
organisational leaders on the NPMP with only a few organisations having rolled out the 
policy in their respective organisations. Thus, further studies will imply a wider scope, 
cases and research population. Further studies can also focus on the impact of other 
contextual variables such as record of resource availability, structural capacity, 
information constraint, independence of action (organisational sovereignty), etc. 
7.5 Limitation of the Study 
The main limitation of the study is the challenge posed by the unfriendly research 
environment in Ghana especially in the public service and the negative attitude towards 
research in the service. Access to key informants and data information in the public 
organisations was quite difficult, which at a point curtailed the progress of the research. 
 - 118 - 
In addition, although I was given the greenlight to conduct my research at the OHCS, 
the office did not officially respond to my letter. 
Second, another main limitation of study stems from the choice of cases for the study. 
YEA was included in the study to provide balance to the study in terms of perceived 
good and bad performing organisations relative the operationalisation of the NPMP. 
Nonetheless, considering the findings from the study, the balance seems unconvincing 
especially considering the fact that the policy was just almost a year old at the YEA as 
of the time the study was conducted. It thus, undermined the comparative intent of the 
research study. 
Also, another limitation of study is in relation to the fact the cases and research 
population were not wide enough to warrant a statistical generalisation as typical of 
most case studies. However, this study makes its generalisation through analytical 
generalisation as discussed in chapter three. Responses from the respondents from the 
selected organisations are generalised to the theories underpinning the study and also 
may have some implications for other African countries. For example, this research can 
serve as point of departure for other similar studies and research analysis.  
Last but not least, another limitation of the study is about the duration of the study. The 
time frame was short to delve more into the operationalisation process of the NPMP. I 
believe I would have unearthed more interesting findings if I had spent more time at 
the research field. The study lasted for only two months (from September 2018 to 
November 2018) 
7.6 Final Remarks 
The NPMP, I must say, looks very comprehensive and competent in bringing out the 
best out of public service organisations as it approaches performance management from 
a broader and scientific perspective. Although the policy looks very promising in scope, 
its implementation and institutionalisation is not an automated process. It needs the 
right working environment to thrive. For a brighter future of the policy, it will be highly 
essential to get all key missing elements fixed starting from the correction of 
implementation anomalies. Considering the challenges that have crippled the progress 
of the policy, it is of no doubt that the whole implementation of the policy requires a 
high degree of leadership commitment and an attitudinal change of bureaucrats 
(detachment from cultural norms) in order to thrive in the Ghanaian Bureaucracy. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1- Interview Guide 
NPM-INSPIRED ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
1. Please state the administrative reforms that you are aware of that have taken place in 
the service. 
2. Why do you think these policies were introduced? 
3. Which one of these do you think have come from the international arena? 
4. Which one of these do you think have been a result of home grown solutions? 
5. Who are the key actors involved in the initiation of these policies? 
6. Who are the key actors involved in the implementation of these policies? 
7. What are the main elements of the administrative reforms that you have 
witnessed? 
8. What are the main constraints of these polices? 
9. In your view what are the main successes of these reforms? 
10. In your view, what are the main challenges of these reforms? 
11. Are these reforms entrenched in the Ghanaian Public Service? If so, to what extent? 
ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE 
POWER DISTANCE 
1. How do you see hierarchism and power distance in this institution? 
2. Do you think hierarchism is a convenient way in dividing up work in this 
institution? If so to what extent? 
3. How is the boss – subordinate relationship like in this institution? Do bosses 
take care of their subordinates as if they were his own children (like the role of a chief)? 
4. How is the participation of subordinates in decision making in this institution 
like? In your opinion, do you think it’s the best or there is more room for improvement? 
5. How wide is the salary range between bosses and subordinates? 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY 
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6. Do you think public servants are politically neutral? To what extent do you think 
the actions and inactions of public servants are politically motivated? 
7. Do you see the interference of politicians in the business of public servants 
disturbing?  
8. Most people think public servants should remain neutral in relation to political 
parties. To what extent do you agree with this perception? 
9. Has there been any trait of conflict of political interests in this institution? To 
what extent has it affected the progress of this institution? 
10. Do you think technical considerations must be given more weight than political 
factors in the public service as a whole? 
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE 
11. How is the attitude of the employees towards the rules and ethics of this 
institution and the service at large like? (emotional need for rules) 
12. Personally, do you feel it is better to follow known standards and procedures 
than experiment with new ideas? 
13. How is decision making in this institution like? Is it based on rational thinking 
or common sense? 
14. Do you agree to the claim that “more money is better than more leisure time”? 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? 
15. How do you see the attitude of public servants towards innovation and invention 
as against implementation? 
16. Is innovation really appreciated in the public service? 
17. Do you think subordinates feel more comfortable working under close 
supervision?  
FINAL DELIBERATIONS ON CULTURE 
18. How does culture contribute to bureaucracy innovation, success, or failure? 
19.  How can culture be managed and or changed, in implementing NPM reforms? 
20.  Is this culture receptive or resistant to NPM reforms? And how? 
 
THE NEW PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK OF 
GHANA 
1. What do you think are the main reasons for implementing the new performance 
management policy? Do you think it has succeeded? Clarify. 
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2. What are the key behaviour patterns, practices, values and cultural attributes 
responsible for the effective implementation of the performance management policy? 
The New Performance Management Policy seeks to implement performance/results-
oriented management in meeting organizational goals.  
3. Do you think this has fully been institutionalized in the service? 
4. Is the power distance in the institution a potential threat to this objective? How? 
5. Do you think strict rule following is the most effective way to help entrench this 
in the service? 
Introduction of a Performance Appraisal System (PAS) 
6. How effective is the appraisal system in this institution? 
7. Has it influenced the performance of public servants in a way? 
8. Has the power distance in this institution really fostered a more effective PAS? 
9. Do you think political biasness is a threat to an effective PAS system? 
10. Do you think appraisers and appraisees feel threatened by the appraisal system? 
If so, then why? 
The new performance management policy also seeks to enhance transparency of 
performance targets – In a consultative manner between the assesse and the assessor. 
11. To what extent has this been institutionalized? 
12. Is this aspect of the policy compatible with the power distance of the public 
service? 
13. Do you think there should be strict rules to help enforce this provision? 
Recognition, Incentive, reward, and sanction system linked to performance. 
14. To what extent has this been institutionalized? 
15. Do you believe this system is in a way influenced by favouritism? 
FINAL DISCUSSIONS 
16. Generally, do you think the Ghanaian administrative culture is compatible with 
the new Performance Management reform initiatives? Why? 
17. What do you think about the commitment of public servants to the performance 
management system? Whom do you think is most receptive to the performance 
management system? Which categories of public servants do you find resistant to the 
PM? Give reasons. 
18. Do you feel the new PMS policy has produced intended performance of the 
public service? 
19.  Any suggestions on how to make the performance system effective? 
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Appendix 2 – Recommendation and Response Letters 
 
(Same letter to both the OHCS and NMC) 
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